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I. INTRODUCTION
Stolen art inundates the legitimate market. Over the years, attor-
neys, estate executors, trustees, and legal commentators have advised
art collectors to conduct due diligence investigations to determine
whether valuable art objects have been stolen.' As one observer com-
mented, "[t]he lax commercial conventions of the art trade have
resulted in most stolen art being eventually owned by innocent good
faith collectors. '  Without a documented record of appropriate
inquiries, legal ownership rights in mistakenly-acquired stolen mater-
ials cannot be secured.' The failure to perform due diligence investi-
gations for valuable artworks can also expose unnecessarily the estates
and trusts of collectors to potential liability.4
If property, including artwork, is stolen, the law in the United
States prevents a purchaser from acquiring good title regardless of the
purchaser's good faith and ignorance of the theft.5 This common law
1. See Robert E. Madden, Steps to Take When Stolen Art Work Is Found in an Estate, 24
EST. P. 459, 464 (Dec. 1997); Peter Spero, Asset Protection Aspects of Art, 3 J. OF ASSET PRO-
TECTION 58, 60 (Jan./Feb. 1998); Leigh-Alexandra Basha, Stolen Art: What Estate Planners
and Trustees Need to Know, 137 TR. & EST. 60, 60 (Dec. 1998).
2. Spero, supra note 1, at 59; see also Madden, supra note 1, at 461, (asserting that "[s]tolen
art saturates the U.S. market"); Spero, supra note 1, at 58 (stating that "[liaw enforcement offi-
cials, legal commentators, and journalists consistently report that art objects collectively worth
billions of dollars are stolen annually. Most stolen works eventually surface on the legitimate
market and are acquired by unsuspecting collectors.").
3. Madden, supra note 1, at 464 (instructing that an appropriate due diligence investigation
is necessary in order to raise the equitable defense of laches to a potential judicial claim of a for-
mer owner seeking to recover a stolen art object); Spero, supra note 1, at 61 (advising "'due dili-
gence' to avoid liability.")
4. See, e.g., Basha, supra note 1, at 60.
5. In Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 819-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), the court stated that
the "principle has been basic in the law that a thief conveys no title as against the true owner."
The court commented that the law "stands as a bulwark against the handiwork of evil, to guard
to rightful owners the fruits of their labors." This common law rule is set out in the Uniform
Commercial Code at § 2-403, which provides that a mere possessor cannot convey good title.
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rule, the English nemo dat rule, provides that one who purchases, no
matter how innocently, from a thief, or all subsequent purchasers from
the thief, acquires no title in the property. Title always remains with
the true owner. Thus, in the absence of a limitations bar or a laches
defense, a purchaser, whether an individual or an institution, would
not acquire good title to valuable artwork if there was a thief anywhere
in the chain of title. As a result, even innocent purchasers of stolen
artwork are exposed indefinitely to claims of true owners. This poten-
tial liability mandates that potential buyers conduct due diligence
investigations before acquiring valuable art and collectibles.
Those recommending due diligence investigations for valuable
art objects simply are urging collectors and their professional advisors
to comply with thirty years of judicial admonitions that persons who
buy and sell expensive artworks on the international market take
appropriate precautions against trading in stolen property.6 Courts
6. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969). The Menzel court dis-
missed the argument of an art dealer, in a suit by a former client seeking damages for selling a
stolen painting, that recovery in an amount reflecting the current, appreciated value of the work
would ruin him economically. The court counseled that "this 'potential ruin' is not beyond the
control of the seller since he can take steps to ascertain the status of title so as to satisfy himself
that he himself is getting good title." Id. In Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254,259 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979), affd, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981), the court condemned the "fantasy land of mar-
keting in the fine arts" and observed that "in an industry whose transactions cry out for verifica-
tion of ... title ... it is deemed poor practice to probe." In addition, the court declared that"commercial indifference to ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen art... and
diminishes the integrity and increases the culpability of the apathetic merchant." In O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980), the court recited that "[t]he limited record before us pro-
vides a brief glimpse into the arcane world of sales of art, where paintings worth vast sums of
money sometimes are bought without inquiry about their provenance." The court in Auto-
cephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fines Arts, Inc., 917
F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990), cautioned that "those who wish to purchase art work on the inter-
national market, undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not without means to protect themselves.
Especially when circumstances are suspicious... prospective purchasers would do best to do
more than make a few last-minute phone calls." In Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell,
569 N.E.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. 1991), the court commented that in "the New York City art mar-
ket... illicit dealing in stolen merchandise is an industry all its own" and imposed an affirmative
duty of investigation upon buyers of art in order to curtail illegal commerce. In Erisoty v. Rizik,
No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), affd, No. 95-1807 (3d
Cir. 1996), the court stated that in buying a painting at auction without further investigation, the
purchaser "took a gamble" that the work was stolen and "took the risk that an original owner
could appear at any time."
Legal commentators have acknowledged the judicial censure of art market conventions. See,
e.g., Julia A. McCord, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New Perspective on Stemming the
Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J. 985, 1006-7 (1995) (noting that in Porter, "[t]he prevailing sen-
timent of the court was to reprimand the art merchant community for its penchant for secrecy
and customary absence of inquiry into the titles of artwork)"; Deborah Hoover, Museum Collec-
tions at Risk: Standards of Diligence in Protecting Your Monet, 20 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 37, 40
(1990) (stating that "[t]he O'Keeffe court raised serious questions about practices in today's mar-
ket in which valuable works of art can be bought and sold without even minimal inquiry into
title.").
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throughout the United States have made it clear that unless collectors
can show they took such steps, they may not be positioned to defeat
judicial claims brought by former owners seeking to recover stolen
materials. Because the innocence or good faith of buyers is irrelevant
to the question of title, the question that usually determines the out-
come in stolen art cases is whether the claim is precluded by the appli-
cable statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of laches.7
Courts decide this question by "balancing the equities" between
the parties.' They not only compare the precautions collectors ob-
served against acquiring stolen art with the steps theft victims took to
report their losses,9 but also consider other factors that help determine
what is fair and just under the circumstances.' 0
For several reasons, courts view this balance as initially tilted in
favor of art theft victims. Courts have recognized that persons who
suffer art looting often confront extraordinary obstacles in locating
their property through the "labyrinth of the international art mar-
ket."' Many years may elapse before they can identify what has been
stolen or even determine that a theft has occurred. 2 Sometimes, as
with casualties of the Holocaust, the task of locating looted art falls
upon children, grandchildren, or other relatives. 3 Moreover, many
7. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 1, at 460; Basha, supra note 1, at 65 (asserting that the
decisive question in most cases brought is "whether a claim [to recover a stolen art] object will be
regarded as timely for statutes of limitations purposes.").
8. Madden, supra note 1, at 462; see also Steven Bibas, The Case Against the Statute of
Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2448 (1994).
9. Madden, supra note 1, at 462.
10. All equitable determinations, of course, balance the interests of the parties and seek to
achieve fairness and justice. See, e.g., Estate of Herrera v. Farrel Constr. Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
751, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[a] hallmark of equity is comparing the relative
merits and faults of parties with respect to the controversy."). In Marker v. Marker, 142 B.R.
734, 742 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992), the court observed that "[e]quity is a flexible concept which
involves rejection of rigid rules to accomplish what is fair and just in a particular situation."
11. Madden, supra note 1, at 460. See also Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131,
1138 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing that "[b]ecause [stolen] art work can be both extremely valuable
and highly marketable to an underground clientele, the difficulties original owners face in recov-
ering missing art abound.").
12. For example, in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-79 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th
Cir. 1990), a Greek-Orthodox church in Cyprus, in an area under the control of Turkish military
forces, did not learn that priceless Byzantine mosaics had been looted from it until perhaps three
years after the theft had occurred.
13. For example, Chicago-based pharmaceutical heir Daniel Searle recently was sued by
grandchildren of a couple who had perished in the Holocaust, seeking to reclaim a Degas paint-
ing that the Nazis had plundered from their grandparents. The case was to be settled with Searle
agreeing to donate the painting to the Chicago Art Institute. Terms of the settlement agreement
required the Art Institute to have the Degas appraised and to pay the heirs one-half of such
appraised value. The Wall Street Journal reported in January 1999 that a settlement of the con-
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theft victims lack the resources and art world sophistication to conduct
an exhaustive and sustained search. They rarely enjoy the same
wealth, access to expertise, and investigative capabilities as art market
patrons. Accordingly, courts have placed the initial burden on defen-
dants in possession of stolen artworks. Unless they can show that they
diligently searched to determine whether the disputed object may have
been stolen, they may not be able to preclude as untimely a judicial
action brought to reclaim the object. While ownership of personal
property can never be made as secure as title to realty, 4 and no com-
prehensive registry system for stolen art is available,"5 there are
numerous discrete due diligence investigative steps that prospective
buyers and current owners of valuable art objects can take to safeguard
their legal ownership rights in stolen artworks.
This Article will explore the concept of "due diligence investiga-
tion" for valuable art objects and the considerations that properly
frame the scope of such an examination. The Article represents that
because, as between a dispossessed owner and a good faith purchaser
of artworks, equities are balanced in favor of the dispossessed owner,
current law has imposed a higher standard of diligence on the pur-
chaser. Thus, the Article will underscore the need for purchasers and
collectors to conduct appropriate and comprehensive investigations
into title of artworks they acquire or already possess and will demon-
strate that a due diligence investigation is the only means by which a
potential purchaser can be assured of acquiring good title to valuable
artwork. It will demonstrate how existing law entailing an affirmative
duty of investigation for buyers and sellers of expensive artworks helps
curtail international art theft by encouraging collectors and their
agents to use all resources that have proven effective and that are rea-
sonably accessible for identifying stolen art. These resources include
troversy appeared to be "unraveling." Lee Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims: Art with a History,
WALL ST. J., January 14, 1999, at A18.
14. As one commentator observed, "[t]itle to personal property can never be as securely
documented as title to real estate. Unlike real property, personal property is movable, thereby
frustrating private means of tracing title and the origins of such merchandise." Robin M. Colin,
The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17, 21 (1993) (citation omitted).
15. As the court in Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995),
explained, no registration system exists that allows the transfer of title to artworks to be docu-
mented, and valuable art objects occupy the same legal position as other items of tangible per-
sonalty:
There is no statutory system of registration or recordation for documenting and trans-
ferring title to works of art. There is nothing comparable to recording statutes for
land. Indeed, art is given even less legal dignity than automobiles, for which there are
statutory systems for recording ownership and transferring title. Works of art,
regardless of their uniqueness and possible value, are relegated to the same legal status
as ordinary chattels.
[Vol. 23:631
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stolen art databases, relevant experts, institutions with prominent col-
lections of a particular artist, and the applicable catalogue raisonne, if
available. Finally, this Article will identify the discrete inquiries
courts and commentators have prescribed to ensure that art objects
have not been reported, nor are reasonably discoverable, as having
been stolen, and will discuss the rationale for each.
II. SOURCE OF THE "DUE DILIGENCE" INVESTIGATION
The equitable foundation of the due diligence obligation and its
corresponding sensitivity to all surrounding facts and circumstances,
as well as to public policy concerns in stolen art cases, invite courts to
impose a demanding, yet fair and practical, standard upon the U.S.
museums and private collectors that drive the international market.
This standard is fair both to theft victims and to good faith purchas-
ers. It rewards comprehensive investigation and promotes commercial
certainty. Thus, the due diligence responsibility reconciles, in the
most equitable and practical manner, the many hardships confronting
victims of international art theft with the need of the U.S. art market
for an appropriate title clearing mechanism.
Further, the investigative criterion for expensive artworks coin-
cides with the formal fiduciary responsibilities of both tax-exempt
U.S. museums as public trustees and the attorneys and institutional
fiduciaries that counsel wealthy collectors in estate, investment, and
trust planning. Valuable art objects necessarily play important roles in
the estate and investment plans of wealthy collectors.16 Recent articles
in professional journals have identified works of art as appropriate
alternatives to stocks and bonds in investment portfolios. 7 Leading
estate planning and asset protection attorneys now are stressing the
importance of ensuring that clients have secure legal title to artworks
in their possession. 8 The professional capabilities of estate planners,
executors and institutional trustees, their formal fiduciary responsi-
bilities to safeguard their clients' property, and the precautions com-
monly employed to protect assets of comparable value provide an
16. For a discussion of the roles valuable art objects can play in estate and investment plan-
ning, see, e.g., Anne M. Carley, Planning When Art and Collectibles Are Assets of an Estate, 21
EST. P. 219 (1994), and Genevieve L. Fraiman, The Lifetime Disposition of Fine Art, 4 PROB. &
PROP. 14 (Nov./Dec. 1990).
17. See Jane E. Curry, Art As An Alternative Investment, 137 TR. & ET. 25 (October
1998); see also Warren P. Weitman, Jr., The Changing Collectibles Marhet, 128 TR. & EST. 10, 16
(July 1989); Franklin Feldman, Commodities and Art: A Delicate Relationship, 10 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & Arts 197, 202 (1986).
18. See Madden, supra note 1, at 460; Spero, supra note 1, at 61; Basha, supra note 1, at 62.
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appropriate context for gauging whether an adequate due diligence
investigation has been conducted.
Due diligence investigations are imperative under the equitable
balancing tests that courts have created for determining whether
claims to recover stolen art objects will be entertained for statute of
limitations purposes. The two equitable balancing tests are the
"demand and refusal/laches" standard applied in New York and the
discovery rule that governs actions brought elsewhere. 9
Courts apply these tests when a statute of limitations defense or
the equitable doctrine of laches is asserted in a lawsuit brought to
reclaim a stolen item of personal property. Affirmative defenses that
will time-bar or otherwise negate such lawsuits are essential in pro-
tecting the legal ownership rights and commercial expectations of good
faith collectors. As previously noted, under substantive U.S. law,
legal title to stolen property never can be obtained, regardless of either
how many times a stolen item is bought, sold, or donated, or of the
innocence and good faith of those who acquire it.2" This black letter
statement of the law is not entirely accurate, however. When a vic-
tim's legal claim to recover stolen property has been vitiated by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches, the ownership rights of
the current possessor have been made secure. If defendants in mis-
taken possession of stolen art were unable to thwart judicial challenges
to their ownership rights as untimely or otherwise inequitable, they
would remain exposed perpetually to possible judicial claims of theft
victims. Thus, statutes of limitation are vital defenses employed by
purchasers of stolen art.2
The question that usually determines whether a court will enter-
tain a claim to recover a stolen item of personal property and, thus,
whether the ownership rights of the current possessor will be dis-
turbed, is when the claim arose or "accrued" for statutes of limitations
purposes. Courts regard a cause of action as having arisen or"accrued" for statute of limitations purposes when everything neces-
sary to establish the liability of the defendant has taken place.22
19. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 2446-48; Madden, supra note 1, at 462; Spero, supra note 1,
at 59.
20. See Naftzger v. American Numismatic Society, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 791 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2d 1996); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 872 867 (N.J. 1980) (instructing that a thief cannot
obtain good title to a stolen art object and cannot "transfer good title to others, regardless of their
good faith and ignorance of the theft.").
21. Sydney M. Drum, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 909, 913 (1989).
22. See, e.g., John G. Petrovich, Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Stat-
ues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 1129 n.29 (1980) (stating that "[a]
cause of action comes into existence and thereby accrues when all the elements necessary to
[Vol. 23:631
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Statutes of limitation generally do not prescribe when this requirement
has been satisfied, however, but rather allow courts considerable lee-
way to make this determination.
Courts in the United States consistently have invoked principles
of equity when exercising their discretion to decide whether a claim for
the recovery of a stolen work of art has properly accrued. To answer
this question, courts consider all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances of the case and attempt to "balance the equities" between the
parties. Through this equitable balance, courts attempt to reconcile
the concern that art theft victims receive adequate opportunities to
locate and reclaim their stolen property with the goals of repose that
statutes of limitation are designed to achieve.23
Courts have developed two conceptually distinct, although prac-
tically equivalent, approaches to this issue. While these approaches
differ in how they assign the initial burden, both are grounded in
equity, both consider all the attending facts and circumstances, and
both require defendants in mistaken possession of stolen art to show
that they investigated the history of the disputed item in a reasonable
manner. As one commentator concluded, "Despite the profusion of
labels, the laches, due diligence, and discovery rules are similar if not
equivalent. These flexible balancing tests weigh the owner's diligence
and delay, the buyer's innocence and reliance, the existence of preju-
dice, and other equitable factors., 2
4
A. Due Diligence Investigation for Purchasers Under New York Law
Courts in New York, the center of the art market in the United
States, have imposed an affirmative obligation upon buyers and col-
lectors of art to investigate the background of potentially stolen mate-
rials in their possession.2" This responsibility assumes special
establish... liability occur" (quoting Comment, The Evolution of Illinois Tort Statutes of Limita-
tion: Where Are We Going and Why? 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 673, 677 (1977))).
23. Commentators frequently identify the following as the primary goals of statutes of
limitations in stolen art cases:
1) encouraging repose;
2) avoiding suits brought after testimony and other evidence necessary to establish a
claim or defense is no longer available;
(3) increasing the certainty of ownership;
(4) facilitating commercial transactions by protecting the bona fide purchaser; and
(5) promoting diligence by theft victims in locating and reclaiming their stolen prop-
erty by punishing unreasonably delay.
See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119,
131 (1989); Bibas, supra note 8, at 2451; Petrovich, supra note 22, at 1127.
24. Bibas, supra note 8, at 2448.
25. In Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991), New
York's highest court rejected the contention of a collector that the judicial claim of a museum to
63920001
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meaning in the context of the distinctive law of conversion that applies
26in New York, and perhaps two or three other states.
Conversion is the "intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to
control it that the actor may be justly required to pay the other the full
value of the chattel. ' 27 In most states, conversion occurs when a good-
faith purchaser simply takes possession of stolen property.28  "The
intent required is not necessarily a matter of conscious wrongdoing,"
explain Professors Prosser and Keeton.29 Rather, "[i]t is ... an intent
to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact incon-
sistent with the plaintiffs rights."3
recover a painting stolen some twenty years earlier was barred by New York's three year statute
of limitations for conversion and replevin, even though the museum had done nothing in the
interim to locate and reclaim the painting other than search its own files. Id. at 430. The court
repudiated the notion that New York's statute of limitations contained an implicit "discovery
rule" that required art theft victims to search diligently for their property "if they wanted to pre-
serve their right to pursue a cause of action in replevin." Id. at 431.
The court maintained that although the claim of the museum was not barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations, it nonetheless could be precluded by the equitable doctrine of laches.
This defense, the court instructed, would require the defendant to show that she was prejudiced
by the museum's lengthy delay, and placed the responsibility for investigating the background of
a work upon the buyer. Id. at 431. "[T]he better rule," the court explained, "places the burden
of investigating.., a work of art on the potential purchaser." Id.
Finding nothing in the record to demonstrate that either party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the defendant's laches defense, the court remanded the proceeding for further
fact finding at trial. Id.
26. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15,
at 94 n.50 (5th ed. 1984) (observing that "[t]he courts of New York, and those of two or three
other states" have held that the mere possession of stolen property "is not in itself a sufficiently
serious interference with the owner's rights to amount to conversion, so that the purchaser is
liable only when he refuses to return the goods on demand."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§ 229, cmt. h (1965) (instructing that "[i]n a small minority of jurisdictions, the bona fide pur-
chaser of stolen goods is held not to be in itself a sufficiently serious interference with the rights
of the owner to amount to conversion until he refuses to surrender the goods to the owner on
demand.").
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 222A (1965). See also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 26, § 15, at 90 (instructing that "the tort of conversion has been confined to those major
interferences with the chattel, or with the plaintiffs rights in it, which are so serious, and so
important, as to justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant which is the distinguishing fea-
ture of the action.").
28. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, § 15, at 94 (stating that "the great weight of
authority regards the mere acquisition of the goods under such circumstances as in itself an asser-
tion of an adverse claim, so detrimental to the dominion of the owner that it completes the
tort.... "); see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1987); Stephen L.
Foutty, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fines Arts,
Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND
L. REv. 1839, 1843 (1990).
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 92.
30. Id.
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Under New York law, however, good faith buyers of stolen prop-
erty do not become liable for conversion until they refuse the demand
of the true owner to return the item. As the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals explained in Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,3"
"[u]nder New York law, an innocent purchaser of stolen goods
becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner's demand of their
return. Until the refusal, the purchaser is considered to be in lawful
possession."32 The refusal of such demand is a substantive element of
the tort of conversion under New York law, so that a cause of action
for conversion does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not
begin to run, until the requisite demand has been refused.33 Because
the demand is "an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action.. . without satisfaction of the demand requirement, the plain-
tiff simply has no right to relief."34
The rationale for the New York rule is that "[p]ossession by a
bona fide purchaser is not in itself a sufficiently serious interference
with the owner's rights to amount to a conversion"35 and that until the
possessor repudiates the owner's demand for the return of the item, no
legal wrong has occurred. The rule is intended to give persons in
mistaken possession of stolen property an opportunity to rectify their
good-faith mistakes before they incur legal liability.36 "The demand
[and refusal] rule protects the innocent purchaser while allowing for
eventual recovery for the theft victim: the innocent purchaser is
shielded from tortious liability, and the true owner's claim is not
extinguished by the passage of time."
37
31. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
32. Id. at 1161.
33. Id. See also Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y.
1991), in which the court stated that "[tihe rule in this State is that a cause of action for replevin
against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand
for return of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it .. " In
Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), the court declared that "[i]n
replevin, as well as in conversion, the cause of action against a person who lawfully comes by a
chattel arises, not upon the stealing or the taking, but upon the defendant's refusal to convey the
chattel upon demand."
34. VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, SUPPLEMENTAL PRACTICE COMMENTARIES TO N.Y.
CIV. PROC. § 206, at 96 (1996) (computing periods of limitation in particular actions).
35. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
36. As the court explained long ago in Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874):
The rule is a reasonable and just one, that an innocent purchaser of stolen property
from a wrongdoer shall first be informed of the defect in his title and have an oppor-
tunity to deliver the property to the true owner before he shall be made liable as a
tortfeasor for wrongful conversion.
37. Elisa B. Pollack, Toward a New Standard in Art Recovery Cases: New York's Solomon
R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell and the Rejection of Due Diligence, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 361, 362 (1992).
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In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,38 the Court of
Appeals of New York reiterated the principle that the mere passage of
time does not expunge the ownership rights of a theft victim under
New York law. In Lubell, the Guggenheim Museum brought a
replevin action against a private collector (Mrs. Lubell), seeking to
recover a Chagall painting that a museum employee had stolen some
twenty years earlier. Mrs. Lubell and her late husband bought the
painting in 1967 from the reputable Robert Elkon Gallery in Man-
hattan for $17,000, and twice had displayed it publicly.39 The muse-
um had done nothing since the theft to search for the painting or to
notify the art world or potentially affected persons. "It is undis-
puted," the court observed, "that the Guggenheim did not inform
other museums, galleries or artistic organizations of the theft, and
additionally did not notify the New York City Police, the FBI, Inter-
pol or any other law enforcement authorities."4  The painting was
located when a transparency was taken to Sotheby's for an estimate
and identified by an employee who formerly had worked at the muse-
um." Mrs. Lubell argued that the action of the museum was barred
by New York's three year statute of limitations for the recovery of
chattels.42 The trial court awarded Mrs. Lubell summary judgment
on this defense, reasoning that an implicit discovery rule governs the
demand and refusal principle of conversion, so that "a property owner
has an obligation to use reasonable efforts to locate its missing prop-
erty" to ensure that the demand is not unreasonably delayed.43 The
Appellate Division, however, refused to recognize the statute of limi-
tations defense and ruled that the trial court had erred in concluding
that "delay alone can make a replevin action untimely."44
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate
Division and made it clear that despite the lengthy delay of the muse-
um in prosecuting its claim, Mrs. Lubell's statute of limitations
defense failed. The court reaffirmed that under New York law, "a
cause of action for replevin against a good faith purchaser of a stolen
chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand for the return of
the chattel and the person in possession ... refuses to return it."45
The court declared that "there is no reason to obscure its straightfor-
38. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991). For a summary discussion of the Lubell decision, see note
25, supra.
39. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 428.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 429 (referring to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1996)).
43. Id. at 429.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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ward protection of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable dili-
gence" and concluded that it "would not be prudent to extend the case
law and impose the additional duty of diligence before the true owner
has reason to know where its missing chattel is to be found."46
Most importantly, the court underscored the impossibility of
prospectively formulating specific reporting requirements that all art
theft victims must follow to preserve their judicial remedies.47 The
court opined that "it would be particularly inappropriate for this
Court to spell out arbitrary rules of conduct that all true owners of
stolen art work would have to follow to the letter if they wanted to
preserve their right to pursue a cause of action in replevin."4 The
value of the object and identity of the theft victims should determine
the steps taken to recover stolen art.49 "[I]t would be difficult, if not
impossible to craft a reasonable diligence requirement that could take
into account all of these variables and that would not unduly burden
the true owner. [Art theft victims] should not be expected to behave
in the same way and should not be held to a common standard."" °
The court declared that by encouraging investigation into artworks,
the affirmative defense of laches was better calculated than the discov-
ery rule to reform the lax commercial practices of the art market and to
prevent New York from becoming a haven for stolen art traffickers."'
"This shifting of the burden onto the wronged owner is inappropri-
ate," the court stated. "In our opinion, the better rule gives the owner
relatively greater protection and places the burden of investigating...
a work of art on the potential purchaser."52
The court made it clear that even though Mrs. Lubell's statute of
limitations defense was not viable, she still might defeat the museum's
claim with her affirmative defense of laches. The court stressed that it
was not validating the delay and lack of diligence of the museum in
searching for the stolen painting or in prosecuting its claim: "Our
holding today should not be seen as either sanctioning the museum's
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
so. Id.
51. Id. at 428-29. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 38 F.3d
1266 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994), the court in Lubell announced its concern
with formulating principles in stolen art cases that would help curtail international trafficking in
stolen art and protect the commercial integrity of the New York City art market: "[t]he Guggen-
heim court grounded its decision on a range of policy considerations growing out of its concern
that any legal rules established by the courts be cognizant of New York's role as a world art cen-
ter .... ."
52. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
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conduct or suggesting that the museum's conduct is no longer an issue
in this case." 3 However, "it [was] impossible to conclude from the
facts of this case that the museum's conduct was unreasonable as a
matter of law." The court directed that Mrs. Lubell's "contention
that the museum did not exercise reasonable diligence in locating the
painting be considered by the trial judge in the context of her laches
defense." 4 This defense, the court decided, would make the conduct
of both parties relevant and would require Mrs. Lubell to show that
she was injured or prejudiced by the museum's delay. 5 The Court of
Appeals remanded the case, which settled on the first day of trial.
Mrs. Lubell and two third party art dealers agreed to pay the museum
$212,000 in damages, an amount reflecting the current, appreciated
value of the work, in exchange for title to the painting.56
The Lubell decision contains several lessons for art buyers and
collectors, as well as their legal counsel. First, in New York, regard-
less of how long theft victims delay their search, they do not forfeit
their judicial remedies. As the appellate court in Lubell declared, it is"plain that the relative possessory rights of the parties cannot depend
upon the mere lapse of time, no matter how long."57 Accordingly,
"[a]ny failure of the owner to exercise due diligence in locating the
chattel after discovering its disappearance is not a factor in determin-
ing the accrual of the statute of limitations.""8
Second, Lubell makes the conduct of both parties relevant to the
final ownership decision and scrutinizes the steps the person in posses-
sion of the disputed item took to avoid acquiring stolen property. As
the appellate court in Lubell instructed, the "defendant's vigilance is as
much an issue as plaintiff's diligence."59 Concurring in an application
of the Lubell rule, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals explained that
"[t]he result of this decision is to permit a court.., to consider and
balance all the equities, including the reasonableness of the efforts the
theft victim made to locate the property and the reasonableness of the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between
the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49,
59 n.56 (1995) (citing Andrew Decker, Guggenheim and Collector Resolve Suit Over Chagall
Gouche, ARTNEWSLETTER, Jan. 25, 1994, at 4-6).
57. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 622 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
58. ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 93.
59. 550 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
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possessor's basis for believing that it was entitled to obtain and keep
the property."6"
Third, Lubell imposes a burden on persons in mistaken posses-
sion of stolen art to show that they took reasonable precautions to
avoid acquiring stolen property. This responsibility translates into an
affirmative due diligence investigation obligation. As one commenta-
tor observed, "[b]y making laches the applicable defense, the court
forced the burden of proof onto the... purchaser to document that he
had made due diligence efforts prior to purchase."61
Finally, Lubell holds that to benefit from any delay by art theft
victims in prosecuting their claims, persons in mistaken possession of
stolen art must show that they were injured or prejudiced by such
neglect. As the supplemental commentaries to the New York statute
of limitations for replevin actions instruct, "[t]o prevail on the laches
defense... the possessor must be prepared not only to demonstrate a
lack of diligence in the owner's efforts to solve the theft but also to
show how this lack of diligence prejudiced the possessor."62
Many jurists and legal commentators long have favored making
the conduct of defendants in stolen art cases relevant by requiring
them to investigate materials in their possession. In 1980, eleven years
before Lubell was decided, Justice Handler, dissenting in the landmark
New Jersey case O'Keeffe v. Snyder,63 complained that the majority
decision failed to consider the behavior of the defendants. In
O'Keeffe, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that legal ownership to
stolen chattels no longer could be acquired through the doctrine of
adverse possession.64 Rather, the court decreed, the rights of theft
victims to reclaim stolen personalty would be governed by a discovery
rule.6" The discovery rule, the court explained, requires theft victims
60. Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1139 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J., concur-
ring).
61. Hans Kennon, Take a Picture, It May Last Longer if Guggenheim Becomes the Law of
the Land: The Repatriation of Fine Art, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 373, 405-06 (1996). See also
Pollack, supra note 37, at 378, stating that "[uinder the Guggenheim standard, the true owner may
have failed to mount what would be termed a diligent search... but may nevertheless be able to
recover based upon the possessor's negligent behavior in ascertaining title."
62. ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 94. Other commentators have underscored the need for
collectors in possession of stolen art to demonstrate that they were injured by the plaintiffs
delay. See, e.g., Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen Art-The Tug of
War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers Continues, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75,
87 (1993-94) (commenting on the Lubell decision that "[it is clear ... that delay, even if
unreasonably long, will be insufficient by itself to defeat an owner's claim. Purchasers
presumably will need to demonstrate detrimental reliance and change of position resulting from
the delay in order to establish a successful defense of laches.").
63. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
64. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874.
65. Id. at 870.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
to show that they took reasonable steps to locate and recover their sto-
len property in order to suspend the running of the applicable limita-
tion period: "[t]he rule permits [one] who uses reasonable efforts to
report, investigate, and recover a painting to preserve the rights of title
and possession. "66 Justice Handler objected that "[n]o similar duty of
diligence or vigilance, however, is placed upon the subsequent receiver
or possessor, who, innocently or not, has actually trafficked in stolen
art."67  He saw "no justification for removing that burden from the
defendant, who may assert equities in his favor to establish his enti-
tlement to the artwork., 68
Commentators have recognized the salutary policies promoted by
a legal rule that requires buyers to take precautions against acquiring
stolen property. "[I]t is surely true," one scholar observed, "that a
legal rule that threatens the repossession of some stolen property...
would influence the behavior of some [buyers] and ultimately the
profitability of thievery. ,,69 Lubell has been applauded for encouraging
wealthy art buyers and collectors to take steps to avoid acquiring sto-
len art. According to one authority, "the demand rule followed by the
New York Court of Appeals in Guggenheim is the soundest policy yet
applied in stolen art cases. This doctrine best balances the respective
rights of the parties and delegates most equitably the obligations of
both innocent purchasers and true owners. '"70
While Lubell offers many benefits to art theft victims, collectors,
dealers, auction houses, and the international art market, it no doubt
threatens those who neglect to take appropriate precautions against
acquiring or holding stolen art with potentially indefinite liability.
Apologists for institutional collectors have protested that "[a]s a result
of this decision, New York effectively has no statute of limitations for
the recovery of stolen property, and.., purchasers are perpetually at
risk of a claim of theft by a former owner."71 Others have lamented
that Lubell "leaves the buyer of stolen art in a position of uncertainty
for an indefinite period, until the original owner discovers that the
66. Id. at 872.
67. Id. at 878 (Handler, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 885.
69. Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16
J. LEG. STUD. 43, 46 (1987).
70. Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture,
43 DUKE L.J. 337, 374 (1993). As the former Executive Director of the International Founda-
tion for Art Research, Dr. Constance Lowenthal, stated, the Lubell decision "means that people
will be less likely to buy stolen art... and more likely to ask questions." Id. at 281 (quoting Sam
Verhovel, Guggenheim May Sue for Chagall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, at C7).
71. Hawkins et al., supra note 56, at 51.
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buyer has it,", 2 and that "Lubell may have opened the door to suits by
foreign owners for the recovery of artworks and antiquities in United
States museums, galleries and private collections."73 Although justi-
fied, these concerns will become manifest only if buyers and collectors
continue to fail to investigate the background of objects they acquire
on the art market. While Lubell requires buyers and collectors to take
informed precautions against acquiring stolen art, it rewards those
who discharge their responsibilities with repose and clear title.74
Despite these complaints, the Lubell decision is sound for the
following reasons: (1) it coheres with the common law principle that
ownership rights in stolen property cannot be conveyed; (2) it is con-
sonant with the current political climate recognizing the rights of vic-
tims of international art theft to locate and recover their stolen
property; 75 (3) it helps inhibit the exploding international commerce in
stolen art by encouraging art buyers and collectors to take greater pre-
cautions; (4) it fairly allocates duties of inquiry and investigation to
both parties in stolen art cases, finally recognizing the capabilities of
collectors to take meaningful steps to avoid acquiring stolen art; and,
(5) it offers potential for clarity and certainty by inviting courts and
legal commentators to identify specific due diligence investigative
steps that should enable persons in mistaken possession of stolen art to
protect their legal ownership rights. 6 Moreover, as discussed infra,
the Lubell decision protects the commercial expectations of buyers and
collectors if they are supported by reasonable "due diligence" investi-
gations, and provides an essential "title clearing" mechanism for the
New York City art market.
B. Due Diligence Investigation Under the Discovery Rule
Buyers and collectors of art also must conduct due diligence
investigations to protect their legal ownership rights in potentially
72. Constance Lowenthal, The Role of IFAR and the Art Loss Register in the Repatriation of
Cultural Property, 29 U.B.C. L. REV. 310, 312 (Special Issue 1995).
73. Montagu, supra note 62, at 86.
74. Kennon, supra note 61, at 406.
75. For example, the U.S. State Department hosted the Washington Conference on Holo-
caust-Era Assets in December 1998, which was attended by representatives of over forty gov-
ernments to assist nations in resolving issues related to artworks looted during World War II.
76. Hayworth, supra note 70, at 378-79.
77. The goals of fostering commercial certainty and creating an appropriate title clearing
vehicle are, of course, paramount for any market. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 1, at 459 (stating
that "[flundamental objectives of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) are to expunge hid-
den ownership claims and to promote reasonable commercial expectations so that trade may be
encouraged."); Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 154 (proposing that "the purpose of the doctrine of
adverse possession of personal property is not only to eliminate stale claims... but, perhaps
more significantly, to promote certainty and ease of transfer in commercial contexts.").
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stolen materials in the majority of states that apply the discovery rule
to claims for the recovery of stolen chattels. The need for due dili-
gence investigations under the discovery rule, similarly, is instructed
by the substantive law of conversion that applies in these states. In
most states an act of conversion is completed when stolen property is
merely acquired,78 so that a buyer of a stolen art object commits con-
version immediately upon taking possession of the item.79 Accord-
ingly, in most states "a sale and delivery of the plaintiffs goods to
another... will constitute a conversion," and "[i]t is no answer that
the defendant acted in good faith, in the honest belief that the delivery
was lawful, proper or authorized."8" "The rule is generally applied
where, in addition to the act of purchasing the property, the purchaser
takes possession of the goods" and holds them to his or her own use."
Unlike New York, in most states a cause of action for conversion
accrues and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run when
the good-faith purchaser acquires the stolen property.82 "To avoid
harsh results from [a] mechanical application of the statute, the courts
have developed a concept known as the discovery rule."8 As the New
Jersey Supreme Court explained in O'Keeffe,84 "[t]he discovery rule
provides that, in an appropriate case, a cause of action will not accrue
until the injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which form the
basis of the cause of action."85 Moreover, as the court instructed in
Erisoty v. Rizik,86 "[i]n the stolen art context, such facts include the
'identity of the possessor' of the stolen property.
87
The discovery rule is "essentially a principle of equity, the pur-
pose of which is to mitigate unjust results that otherwise might flow
from a strict adherence to a rule of law." 8 The New Jersey Supreme
Court has stated that "[p]roperly interpreted, the discovery rule be-
comes a vehicle for transporting equitable considerations into the
78. See supra page 640 and accompanying notes.
79. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 (1965) ("Conversion by Receiv-
ing Possession in Consummation of Transaction").
80. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, § 15, at 96-97.
81. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 34, at 167 (1985).
82. Sarah S. Conley, International Art Theft, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 493, 504 (1995). See also
Foutty, supra note 28, at 1843 (observing that under the majority rule of conversion, "the limita-
tions period begins to run [upon] wrongful possession.").
83. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 869.
86. No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), affd, No. 95-1807
(3d Cir. 1996).
87. Id. at *29.
88. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869.
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statute of limitations for replevin." 9 The discovery rule is invoked"'whenever equity and justice have seemed to call for its applica-
tion."'90
Courts and commentators consistently have recognized that the
discovery rule enables courts to consider a broad range of equitable
factors, including public policy concerns, in deciding whether to enter-
tain a particular claim. The discovery rule allows the court to consider
all aspects of a case relevant to the determination of accrual, and to
arrive at a result that is fair and consistent with statute of limitations
policy goals.9 The court in Erisoty related that "[t]he discovery rule is
'highly fact sensitive' ... and flexible; it thus permits the court to
consider the relative equities of the rival claimants to the art work."92
The discovery rule explicitly inquires whether the defendant has been
prejudiced by any delay of the plaintiff in prosecuting the claim.93
The discovery rule necessarily entails a "balancing of the equi-
ties" of the claimants. "[I]n each case the equitable claims of opposing
parties must be identified, evaluated, and weighed.., to ascertain
whether the cause of action may be brought."94 Thus, "[c]ourts have
claimed that the discovery rule functions as a balancing test between
the defendant's legitimate aims of repose and the hardship to the
plaintiff of having a claim barred" before having a reasonable oppor-
tunity to learn of the claim.9"
The equitable foundation of the discovery rule dictates that the
investigative responsibilities for art theft victims necessarily will
depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. As the Erisoty
court explained, "'the meaning of due diligence will vary with the facts
of each case, including the nature and value of the personal prop-
erty. '"'96 Another court has suggested that whether a theft victim has
complied with the discovery rule in a given instance depends upon
"the relevant standard in the particular community affected."97
89. Id. at 872.
90. Paula A. Franzese, Georgia on My Mind-Reflections on O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 19 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (citing Lopez v. Sawyer, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (N.J. 1973)).
91. Petrovich, supra note 22, at 1153.
92. Erisoty, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *34.
93. See Lopez v. Sawyer, 300 A.2d 563, 568 (N.J. 1973) (identifying the question "whether
the delay may be said to have peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant" as one of several
factors appropriately considered in applying the discovery rule).
94. Id. at 567.
95. Leah E. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes or
Limitations, and Title Disputes in theArt World, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIME 1067, 1081 (1991).
96. Erisoty, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *34.
97. Society of California Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Many different factors will determine the appropriate scope of
investigation for the owner of a stolen art object. However, authorities
largely agree that institutional owners, such as museums, should be
required to do more than individual theft victims to locate and recover
their stolen property. 98 As one commentator stated, "even if an indi-
vidual plaintiff is wealthy, he or she may not have art-world contacts
equal to those of institutional [defendants]." 99 Other considerations
that illuminate the meaning of due diligence in a given instance
"include the original owner's specialized knowledge, resources, and
experience, and the value of the stolen artwork."'00
Most importantly, the discovery rule considers whether the
efforts of theft victims to locate and reclaim their stolen property were
reasonable under the circumstances, not whether the stolen item was
in fact discoverable, or could have been discovered with greater inves-
tigative resources. As the court in Erisoty made clear, "the focus must
be on the nature of the [plaintiffs] efforts, as measured by the stand-
ard of reasonable due diligence, not by a standard of discoverabil-
ity." 1' Theft victims need not "leave no stone unturned in order to
recover their stolen art."' 2 "The standard is not whether [theft vic-
tims] did everything that might have been done with the benefit of
hindsight, but whether their efforts were reasonable given the facts of
[the] case."'0 3 The discovery rule also does not require theft victims to
provide constructive notice of their loss to the art world in order to
preserve their judicial remedies to reclaim stolen property. The court
in Erisoty repudiated any notion that "providing notice to the art
world" is "fundamental to compliance with the demands of the dis-
covery rule. "' 04
The discovery rule creates incentives for buyers and collectors to
take precautions against acquiring stolen art even though the rule does
not explicitly impose an affirmative burden of investigation upon per-
sons found in mistaken possession of stolen property. The failure of
someone in inadvertent possession of a stolen work to investigate
whether the item has been reported stolen enables a theft victim,
98. Hoover, supra note 6, at 83; Drum, supra note 21, at 940-41.
99. Drum, supra note 21, at 940.
100. Id. at 940-41.
101. Erisoty, 1995 Dist. LEXIS 2096, *22-23.
102. Id. at *42.
103. Id. at*41.
104. Id. at *38. In Erisoty, the court noted that while the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), included constructive notice as a factor or variable
to be considered in applying the discovery rule, neither O'Keeffe nor other authorities reviewed
"make compliance with such factor a prerequisite to satisfaction of the discovery rule." Id. at
*38.
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under the balance of equities criterion, to preserve perpetually a supe-
rior legal ownership interest in the item with only minimal effort. As
one commentator observed, "[t]he discovery rule ... encourages pur-
chasers of art to inquire into ... artworks. If an owner.., adequately
publicized the theft. . . inquiry by potential purchasers ... is likely to
reveal defects in title." ' Neglecting to investigate the item, on the
other hand, would leave a prospective buyer unaware of the owner's
claim and would expose it "to the risk of dispossession." 106
Courts have recognized that the effect of the discovery rule is to
encourage greater precaution by art buyers and collectors. As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey opined in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, "[i]n
practice, our ruling should contribute to more careful practices con-
cerning the purchase of art.""0 7
The potential for the discovery rule to foster investigations by art
buyers was illustrated in Erisoty.08 There, the court held that a family
from whom a Giaqunito painting had been stolen in 1960 was suffi-
ciently diligent, for discovery rule purposes, to preserve their judicial
remedy to reclaim the painting even though they had done nothing for
thirty years to put the international art market on constructive notice
of their loss. The family merely had contacted the Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan police and the F.B.I." 9 The court conceded that while
the family "could certainly have been more aggressive in their search,
for example, making inquiries at galleries and museums," ' 0 it con-
cluded, nonetheless, that "the balance of equities weighs in [the fam-
ily's] favor.. 1. The court denounced the failure of the buyer, a
professional art restorer, to investigate the painting before acquiring it
at auction. The court declared that in neglecting to conduct an inves-
tigation, the buyer "took a gamble" and "took the risk that an original
owner could appear at any time."' The court concluded that "[t]he
discovery rule is fact-sensitive so as to adjust the level of scrutiny as is
appropriate in light of the identity of the parties," and ruled that under
the facts at bar, the scant attempt the family had made to recover the
painting constituted a "reasonable search effort under the discovery
rule."'13  The court stressed that the standard of inquiry was "not
105. Montagu, supra note 62, at 83.
106. Id.
107. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873.
108. Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995),
affd, No. 95-1807 (3d Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at*38.
112. Id.at*39.
113. Id.at*40-41.
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whether [the family] did everything that might have been done with
the benefit of hindsight, but whether their efforts were reasonable
given the facts of the case." '114 The court concluded that "[iln light of
all factors considered... [the family] exercised due diligence in
searching for their painting and as such have satisfied the demands of
the discovery rule." '115
The Erisoty decision confirms the earlier observation of a com-
mentator that in stolen art cases, "as between a dispossessed owner
and a good faith purchaser for value, a higher standard of diligence
will be imposed upon the latter. '" 6  The decision is instructive
because it demonstrates how similar the discovery rule in practice can
be to the Lubell decision. Both standards "balance the equities"
between the parties and both standards favor art theft victims. Lubell
imposes an affirmative obligation of investigation upon collectors.
Erisoty shows that the discovery rule can be interpreted to mean that
even the most minimal efforts of a theft victim to report a loss, not
even efforts reasonably calculated to locate the missing item and fal-
ling far short of providing constructive notice of the theft, will suffice
when the buyer has taken no precautions against acquiring stolen art.
Both Lubell and Erisoty make clear that collectors can protect
their legal ownership rights in valuable works of art only by conduct-
ing appropriate due diligence investigations. Without such investiga-
tions, collectors will be subject to potentially indefinite liability to
former owners under the equitable balancing principles of either
standard. As one commentator has warned, "[t]he time has passed
when the transfer of art could be veiled in romantic mystique. Today,
accurate information about ... title must be available if buyers, as well
as sellers, are to successfully avoid the replevin suits associated with
cultural patrimony." '1
C. Due Diligence Investigation as Principle of Fairness and Good Faith
By encouraging collectors to investigate art objects, courts apply-
ing the "balance of equities" judicial criteria of either Lubell or the
discovery rule are furthering the historical concerns of ensuring that
both parties are treated fairly and that buyers have acted in good faith.
Several scholars have argued that traditionally, in stolen chattel cases,
the mere absence of knowledge on the part of the buyers that the item
114. Id.at*41.
115. Id.at*42.
116. Thomas W. Pecoraro, Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cultural Prop-
erty: Efforts at Harmonization in Private International Law, 31 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1, 46 (1990).
117. McCord, supra note 6, at 1008.
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in question had been stolen was deemed sufficient to confirm the buy-
er's good faith and to provide a rationale for expunging the theft
victim's ownership rights if the adverse possession time-period had
expired."' Courts, however, have recognized that the "no questions
asked" nature of the international art market does not assure that a
person found in possession of a stolen art object is without fault. 9
After thirty years of admonitions by both courts and scholars to take
affirmative precautions, persons who have acquired stolen artworks
without first investigating their background are, at a minimum, reck-
less.12 1 Courts have rightly decided that commercial recklessness can-
not be the basis for title clearing in the art market. The affirmative
duty of due diligence investigation signals this conclusion.
Stolen art cases present, according to one scholar, "what might be
called the 'Eternal Triangle of Property Law,"' in which the players
are the Owner, the Thief, and the Bona Fide Purchaser (BFP).1' The
Owner's property is stolen and disposed of by the Thief. The BFP
acquires the stolen property from the now-missing Thief, and Owner
wants to recover it. Authorities have recognized that in such cases
courts necessarily must reconcile the rights of the original owner with
the reasonable reliance of the buyer and the need for commercial sta-
bility in the marketplace:
The underlying concern in an action for replevin of lost or con-
verted property is that of fairness-fairness to the dispossessed
owner who may not have had sufficient opportunity to locate
and reclaim the property, and fairness to the innocent purchaser
of such property who may be surprised and disadvantaged by
the long delayed claim. The law has balanced, on the one hand,
its regard for the rights of ownership, as against its concern for
quiet in the marketplace and repose in society at large. 22
Courts traditionally have favored the more innocent party in sto-
len property disputes, and the equitable basis of replevin actions has
encouraged this result because it rewards good faith. "Because equi-
118. See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 23; R.H. Helmolz, Wrongful Possession of Chat-
tels: Hornbook Law and Case Law," 80 N.W. L. REV. 1221 (1986), discussed infra.
119. See discussion infra pages 655-62 (regarding the peculiar characteristics of the interna-
tional art market and the culpability that reasonably can be imputed to all who obey its protocol
of commercial laxity).
120. See supra note 6 (discussing the many judicial warnings to the art industry to take pre-
cautions against buying and selling stolen art).
121. John Henry Merryman, Reversals in Two California Cases Prompt Debate on Time
Limits, 17 IFAR Reports No. 5 (May 1996), at 4.
122. Tobin A. Sparling, The Resolution of Title to WPA Prints, 12 COL.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
131, 151-52 (1987).
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table principles are applicable in a cause of action for replevin, courts
attempt to protect the party who is the most innocent." '123
Claims for the recovery of stolen chattels traditionally were
decided under the doctrine of adverse possession.124 The doctrine of
adverse possession permits a possessor to obtain good title to property
even though the possession was wrongful as against the prior owner. 121
Adverse possession requires the possession to be adverse to and hostile
against the "rightful owner," open, notorious, visible, exclusive, and
continuous. The possession must continue for the prescribed statu-
tory period before the adverse possession will mature into rightful
ownership and the statute of limitations will bar the owner's suit to
recover the property. 126
Even though the doctrine of adverse possession does not pre-
scribe explicitly that the competing equities of the parties be weighed
and balanced, two scholars who surveyed American jurisprudence in
the area have concluded that courts historically have so required. 127
As one explained, "[t]o say that [courts] decide the cases by balancing
the equities is no exaggeration. Indeed, in one context [adverse pos-
session] is expressly called the 'superior equities doctrine.' "128 The
other writer asserts that "the [requirement of] good faith and reason-
able reliance of the adverse possessor is the most significant extra-
statutory element required to establish adverse possession of personal
property."129
According to both scholars, courts traditionally have considered
the equities favoring the position of each party in stolen property cases
and especially have sought to preclude those in possession of stolen
materials from profiting from their own wrongdoing. As one author
summarized:
Courts regularly have examined the legitimacy of possession of
chattels, and have refused to accord possessory rights when they
have found... misconduct on the part of the possessor. Some-
times this has involved balancing equities between two compet-
ing possessors, neither of whom has claim to title. More often,
123. State Bar Committee on Legal Aspects of the Arts, Acquiring Title to Stolen Art, 55
TEX. BAR J., March 1992, 237, 239 [hereinafter Acquiring Title].
124. In O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ruled that claims for the recovery of stolen personal property items no longer would be decided
under the doctrine of adverse possession.
125. Basha, supra note 1, at 67 n.14. See also Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 120-21.
126. Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 120.
127. See Gerstentblith, supra note 23; Helmolz, supra note 118.
128. Helmolz, supra note 118, at 1236 n.94 (citing Schrier v. Home Indemnity Co., 273
A.2d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
129. Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 124 (citation omitted).
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however, it simply has involved closing the door on wrongdoers
who are seeking to take advantage of their own wrongs.' 30
Before rewarding good title to a possessor of stolen property
under the doctrine of adverse possession, one scholar noted that courts
generally required three conditions: "(1) honesty on the part of the
purchaser; (2) open use by him for the statutory period; and (3) failure
on the part of the owner to take reasonable steps to secure his
rights."'' The writer observed that while "[t]he heralded ... case of
O'Keeffe v. Snyder expressly laid down this test .... the result is less
innovative than the New Jersey Supreme Court announced. The test
it adopted is very much like what American courts long have done in
practice. ' 131
Most importantly, courts applying the doctrine of adverse pos-
session have not balked at awarding good title to buyers of stolen
property when their honesty and good faith were manifest, even
though their possession did not provide the original owner with con-
structive notice of the competing claim. In posing the question whe-
ther adverse possession of personal property would be permitted even
when the true owner had neither actual nor constructive notice of the
adverse claim, one scholar concluded that "the answer to this question,
based on analysis of both case law and statutes, is clearly in the
affirmative. "133
Courts have permitted the ownership rights of theft victims to be
expunged, even when they lacked constructive notice of rival claims,
in order to protect the reasonable commercial expectations of buyers
and to provide a way for title to be made secure in the marketplace.
One scholar has voiced his agreement with this result and commented
that "clear title must be established at some future point; title eventu-
ally must pass out of the original owner. Otherwise, no one could ever
gain secure title." '34 According to the commentator, "cases in which
courts have allowed possession to ripen into title have involved good
faith takers of the property." 3 ' Thus, "[i]t is not the simple passage of
years that cures the 'vice' of wrongful possession. It is honesty." '36
Another commentator stated:
130. Helmoz, supra note 118, at 1223-24.
131. Id. at 1236.
132. Id.
133. Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 124.
134. Helmoz, supra note 118, at 1236.
135. Id. at 1237.
136. Id.
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The fact that the good faith possessor prevails over the diligent
owner demonstrates that when ethical considerations are equiva-
lent, commercial certainty becomes the decisive factor. The
good faith possessor who relied on a good title to the property
and possessed it for a sufficient period of time prevails so that
both commercial activity and ethical conduct may be protected
and encouraged. 137
According to this writer, the goals of rewarding good faith and
achieving commercial certainty in stolen property cases are not antag-
onistic, but rather complementary, for "[t]he requirement of good
faith actually advances the goals of commercial certainty and economic
efficiency.""13
The historical propensity of courts in stolen property cases to
"balance the equities" between the parties tacitly, and to scrutinize the
good faith of those found in possession of stolen materials, suggests
several implications for future jurisprudence. First, by supplanting
the doctrine of adverse possession with the discovery rule or laches
standard, courts can address equitable considerations in stolen art
cases more candidly and can achieve results more compatible with
declared public policy goals. Both the discovery rule and the laches
standard require "a more explicit and responsive balancing of the rele-
vant equities, thereby freeing courts to engage in such inquiry openly
(and more accountably), freed from the inhibiting confines of adverse
possession doctrine.' ' 139 Second, the traditional judicial focus under
the doctrine of adverse possession on the honesty and good faith of the
buyer or possessor of stolen property as a benchmark for title clearing
decisions recommends that courts maintain a similar perspective when
adjudicating cases under the discovery rule or laches standard. As
scholars have observed, courts historically have appreciated the impor-
tance of a "title clearing mechanism" for personal property and have
inquired into the genuine innocence of the buyer or possessor of stolen
chattels to decide whether a particular claim for the recovery of such
an item should be time-barred.
Courts deciding cases under the discovery rule and laches stand-
ard properly should continue to make this consideration pivotal.
Because of (1) the myriad impediments art theft victims confront in
seeking to locate and recover their stolen property (discussed infra), (2)
the greater resources and access to information that collectors of valu-
able art objects typically enjoy, and (3) the repeated efforts of courts
137. Gerstenblith, supra note 23, at 125.
138. Id. at 163.
139. Franzese, supra note 90, at 17.
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over the years to encourage art buyers and collectors to investigate art
objects, nothing justifies expunging the ownership rights of theft vic-
tims unless persons found in mistaken possession of stolen materials
can establish they had no reasonable way to learn that the disputed
item was stolen. In the context of today's art market, this means
showing that they took all demonstrably effective and reasonably
available precautions to avoid both acquiring and holding stolen prop-
erty. Possessors of stolen materials who have not taken adequate pre-
cautions and have not conducted appropriate investigations cannot be
considered "innocent" or "good-faith" for this purpose, and courts
rightfully have concluded that their exposure to former owners should
continue indefinitely.
Collectors who decline to investigate materials because they fear
the results of such an investigation must be regarded as blameworthy,
at least when compared to a theft victim under the balance of equities
standard. Collectors who neglect to make inquiries in this context are
benefiting from the lackadaisical practices of the international art mar-
ket and the many difficulties theft victims encounter in locating stolen
property. They are "hedging their bets" that if a particular artwork in
their possession has been stolen, the former owner will not be able to
find it. The problems facing collectors who eschew investigations for
works of art that they already have acquired were identified in a recent
commentary:
Where one owns art that may be stolen, a clear dilemma arises.
To commence due diligence after one has purchased the item
may be throwing good money after bad. If the item turns up
stolen, it would appear that it would have to be returned to the
rightful owner. To attempt to sell a work of art known to be
stolen or continue to hold it may constitute a crime-that is
transporting, selling, or holding stolen property. 140
Such persons are only one degree removed, in a progression of
culpability or scienter, from criminal liability under the National Sto-
len Property Act (NSPA) and analogous state statutes.14 1 The NSPA
proscribes the "knowing" transportation of stolen property. 142  Col-
lectors who willfully decline to investigate materials in their possession
are at a minimum "reckless" in regard to the question whether these
140. Spero, supra note 1, at 59-60 (citation omitted).
141. The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1994).
142. The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994), provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, know-
ing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both (emphasis added).
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items have been stolen. That is, rather than knowing that a particular
work has been stolen, collectors have recognized a material risk that
the item may be stolen and have decided not to discover the true
facts.14 3 Courts rightfully have concluded that such persons cannot
prevail, in a balance of equitable considerations, against a theft victim.
Finally, persons who acquire materials on the international art
market without further investigation should not, and indeed cannot,
be considered "innocent" or "good-faith" purchasers for title clearing
purposes. As discussed in detail infra, the international art market is a
sieve through which stolen art objects pass undetected to unwary col-
lectors. For thirty years, both courts and commentators have decried
the absence of commercial integrity in the art market and punctuated
the importance of independent investigation. Persons who neglect or
brush aside these admonitions are necessarily in some degree culpable.
At a minimum, they are negligent in failing to take reasonably appro-
priate precautions to limit the notorious risk of acquiring stolen prop-
erty. An intention to capitalize upon the systemic corruption of the
international market and to exploit the plight of theft victims also rea-
sonably might be imputed to sophisticated participants who are all too
familiar with the art world's many machinations.
D. Overall Necessity for Due Diligence Investigation
Stolen art is so pervasive that collectors and their professional
advisors need to conduct due diligence investigations regardless of
whether suspicious circumstances surround a particular artwork.
Without compiling a record of appropriate due diligence precautions,
persons found in mistaken possession of stolen art cannot be assured
of defeating, under the "balance of equities" judicial criterion, future
potential lawsuits that former owners may bring to recover the art.
Some authorities have suggested that a duty of enhanced inquiry
arises primarily when doubt exists about the ability of the seller to
convey good title.' Such a scenario, however, merely implies a con-
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (6th ed. 1990), defines the term "recklessness" to
mean, in applicable part, "[t]he state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard
to its probably or possibly injurious consequences, or which, through foreseeing such conse-
quences, persists in spite of such knowledge." Collectors who recognize a risk that materials in
their possession may have been stolen, but decide not to investigate, clearly foresee possible
"injurious consequences" and "persist[] in spite of such knowledge" within the meaning of this
definition.
144. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 6, at 52 (advising that "[t]he museum as purchaser must
also be alert for suspicious circumstances that would seem to warrant further investigation");
Linda F. Pinkerton, Word to the Wise: Scrutinize Objects of 'Questionable Origin,' MUSEUM
NEWS 28 (Nov./Dec. 1989) (urging museums to "exercise care when acquiring objects of ques-
tionable origin"); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
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spicuously high probability that the item in question has been stolen;
material risks that art objects have been stolen can exist even when cir-
cumstances are not suspicious. As one authority recently observed,
"[i]t is fast becoming conventional wisdom that the art market is rife
with stolen goods.""'4 Accordingly, "[i]t is likely that clients who own
significant art collections hold some stolen items." '146
The lax commercial conventions of the international art trade,
which enable massive quantities of stolen art to seep into the legiti-
mate market, necessarily undercut any reasonable reliance that secure
title has attached to an art object. For many artworks, the "presump-
tion of secure ownership is not well placed because the commercial
conventions by which these items are traded do not assure that good
title has been conveyed."' 47 Only by conducting appropriate investi-
gations can collectors prospectively avail themselves of the equitable
defense of laches to legal challenges of their ownership rights.
III. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRING
DUE DILIGENCE INVESTIGATION
A range of equitable concerns favor a broad due diligence inves-
tigative obligation for valuable art objects. As legal scholars approv-
ingly note, "our judicial system is finally recognizing that in order to
stem the tide of theft and plunder, purchasers ... must adhere to cer-
tain standards of diligence."' 48 While "[c]ourts have not enunciated a
bright line for either victims or possessors of stolen art," nonetheless,
"[t]he purchaser and holder of stolen art clearly [has] a heavy burden
to meet in defending an action to recover stolen art."' 49
A. Magnitude and Dynamics of International Stolen Art Trade
Several aspects of the stolen art trade underscore the need for col-
lectors to investigate comprehensively the background of objects they
acquire or already possess. First is the sheer volume of the illicit
commerce: stolen art is annually a multibillion dollar industry. "The
FBI and Lloyds of London estimate that as much as six billion dollars
of art has been stolen annually in recent years," a prominent plaintiffs
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990) (counseling that "[e]specially when circum-
stances are... suspicious ... prospective purchasers would do best to do more than make a few
last-minute phone calls.").
145. Letter of attorney Jonathan Ziss to editor of "The Appraiser" (Second Quarter 1998),
at 2.
146. Spero, supra note 1, at 61.
147. Madden, supra note 1, at 459.
148. Hoover, supra note 6, at 37.
149. Spero, supra note 1, at 61.
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attorney in stolen art cases recently noted. 5' There are literally hun-
dreds of thousands of art objects stolen each year. 5 ' Art theft is rag-
ing on every continent, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.
International art looting "has been fanned by political upheaval in
Eastern Europe, bringing in its wake an epidemic of theft as well as
destruction.' 12  Plunder from countries that have suffered recent
military conflicts, such as Bosnia and Kuwait, add to the illegal com-
merce, as "virtually all the stolen objects went abroad."'5 3
In addition to the current epidemic of looting, art objects pilfered
during World War II continue to resurface, often bringing with them
title disputes between their pre-war owners and post-war good faith
purchasers.' 54 According to Ronald Lauder, a former U.S. ambassa-
dor to Austria and now chairman of the Museum of Modem Art in
New York, "more than 100,000 pieces of art, worth at least $10 billion
in total, are still missing from the Nazi era."' 5  Mr. Lauder believes
that "because of these large numbers, every institution, art museum
and private collection has some of these missing works."' 56 Materials
looted during World War II "increasingly are being found on the
market and in the estates of the persons who originally acquired them
in the late 1940s and 1950s."'17 Given the dimensions and prevalence
of this looting, it is unsurprising that "several of the most prominent
judicial decisions concerning claims to recover stolen art have involved
items looted during the War."'58
A second aspect of the stolen art trade favoring the imposition by
U.S. courts of a comprehensive investigation duty is that much of the
illicit commerce is concentrated in the United States. "Since World
War II, the United States has been the biggest market of illegal art.""'
"The U.S. is a consumer country for stolen art," declared an FBI offi-
150. Ziss, supra note 145, at 2.
151. Ken Shulman, FBI Posts Net Gain, ARTNEWS, December 1998, at 48 (quoting FBI
official Lynne Richardson).
152. Norman Palmer, Recovering Stolen Art, 47 CUR. LEG. PROB. 215, 218 (1994).
153. Id.
154. Hoover, supra note 6, at 451. As the court in Morgold v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995), observed, "1995 marks fifty years since the end of World War II, and
valuable art works obtained by the force of arms are emerging from hiding in cellars and attics."
155. Ronald Lauder, quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, 44 Nations Pledge to Act on Art
Looted by Nazis, WASH. POST, December 2, 1998 at A-2.
156. Id.
157. Ziss, supra note 145, at2.
158. Madden, supra note 1, at 461.
159. Alan Riding, French Museum Chief vs. Art Thieves, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1991, at 13,
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cial recently. "Most people don't realize that the majority of stolen art
is sold on the open market."' 16
Third, international art thefts greatly exceed the losses reported
to stolen art databases,16 1 increasing the need for art buyers and col-
lectors to make additional inquiries to determine whether a particular
item may have been stolen. Commentators have recognized that art
buyers have "strong incentives" to inquire beyond stolen art databases
to make sure that what they are acquiring is not looted. 62 The failure
of many art theft victims to report their losses to any art world author-
ities or resources compounds this need. 63 Even though the number of
stolen art objects in circulation eclipses reported losses, (perhaps by an
order of magnitude or greater), "more than 250,000 works of art and
antiquities have been reported stolen to the leading commercially
available databases alone. "164
A fourth factor favoring a broad inquiry is the contiguity of the
illicit and legitimate markets. As one commentator observed, "the art
world is unique in that it is a recognized legitimate profession as well
as a black market.' 16' Another writer has lamented that "[i]n the
international art world, the distinction between criminal activity and
shrewd business dealing [essentially] is a blurry one. There is essen-
tially a sliding scale between smuggler, middleman and dealer. "166
Stolen art is easy to hide, smuggle, and resell.'67 Moreover, the inten-
sive publicity surrounding the art trade, and "the aggressive promo-
tion by auction houses ... have done much ... to attract illicitly
160. Shulman, supra note 151, at 48 (quoting FBI official Lyrme Richardson).
161. Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in
Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1431, 1435-36 (1992) (citing the
"discrepancy between the number of reported art thefts and the true number of art thefts.").
162. Hawkins et al., supra note 56, at 91.
163. See, e.g., Conley, supra note 82, at 498 (asserting that "[airt theft affects museums and
churches, dealers and private collectors. These targets suffer from costly thefts, yet often do not
report their losses.").
The reasons art theft victims often neglect to report their losses include: (1) fear that disclo-
sure of the theft would expose security weaknesses and endanger the remainder of the collection;
(2) concern that reporting a loss would drive the stolen work further underground; and (3) a
desire to conceal information about expensive art collections from taxing authorities. Grover,
supra note 161, at 1435-37.
164. Ziss, supra note 145, at 2.
165. Meredith Van Pelt, Note, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fines Arts, Inc.: A Case for the Use of Civil Remedies in Effecting the
Return of Stolen Art, 8 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 441, 458 (1990).
166. Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alterna-
tive, 95 COL. L.REv. 377, 385 (1995).
167. Drum, supra note 21, at 910-11.
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acquired goods to the auction and sales rooms of the 'art market'
states."168
Fifth, the speed with which stolen art can be transported inter-
nationally and sold into the legitimate market accentuates the need for
comprehensive investigation. Art objects can be stolen, relocated, and
resold long before information about the theft has been disseminated
to all potential destinations. As noted infra, in some instances several
years may elapse before the theft of an art object is even realized. As
one observer bemoaned, "[s]tolen goods move around the world very
quickly. Art information moves slowly." '169
The pervasive secrecy of the art trade is another reason why buy-
ers and collectors need to take independent and informed precautions.
One scholar has related that the most striking thing to a lawyer who
comes upon the art world is the assumption that transactions should
normally be, and are certainly entitled to be, secret.
70
Finally, the lackadaisical "ask no questions" commercial conven-
tions of the international art trade make it imperative that buyers and
collectors aggressively and competently investigate materials to ensure
that they are not acquiring stolen property. Courts and commentators
consistently have expressed dismay with the casual practices that gov-
ern the art trade. 7' For example, in Porter v. Wertz,'72 the American
Association of Art Dealers, Inc. filed an amicus brief, conceding, in
the court's words, that "the ordinary custom in the art business is not
to inquire as to title," and arguing that "a duty of inquiry would crip-
ple the art business which is centered in New York."' 73 In Morgold,
Inc. v. Keeler,17 4 the court commented that "it is not the practice in the
art industry, in the absence of warnings, for a buyer to require a seller
to make disclosures about the chain of title ....
The absence of investigation and inquiry in the commercial art
world means that reputable dealers and auction houses often sell stolen
168. Lyndell V. Prott, International Control of Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage:
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 333,
348 (1983).
169. Edward Lewine, To Catch a Thief, 3 MERCEDES "MOMENTUM" 44,47 (quoting Get-
ty Information Institute consultant Robin Thomes).
170. Conley, supra note 82, at 496. Legal commentaries repeatedly have noted the "shroud
of secrecy surrounding art transactions." Id.
171. See supra note 6 (quoting a rash of judicial condemnations of the lax commercial prac-
tices of the art industry).
172. 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
173. Id. at 502.
174. 891 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
175. Id. at 1368. See also Collin, supra note 14, at 28 (noting the "absence of any custom in
the trade of inquiring into an artwork's provenance or the seller's ability to lawfully transfer the
work.").
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art. As the U.S. Court of Appeals commented in Holzer v. City of
Stamford, '76 "[iut is not uncommon... for purchasers of fraudulently
obtained art work to make their acquisitions from reputable dealers
and galleries."' 77 A noted scholar has described the ease with which
stolen art can be sold at auction: "[t]he use of auction houses by illicit
traffickers to dispose of their goods is ... not difficult ... Tradition-
ally, they have satisfied themselves that the seller is the prima facie
owner of the piece, and that is all.' 178
The failure of dealers and auction houses to take appropriate pre-
cautions against selling stolen art means that unobservant collectors
regularly acquire looted materials. As one authority stated, "[m]ost
stolen works eventually surface on the legitimate market and are
acquired by unsuspecting collectors. "179 Stolen art "easily evades
detection before it is purchased by innocent collectors."'80
For these reasons, a former Secretary General of the International
Council of Museums (ICOM) recently declared that "the art market is
the only sector of economic life in which one runs a 90 percent risk of
receiving stolen property. "18' Dr. Constance Lowenthal, a former
Executive Director of the International Foundation for Art Research
has concluded that "85% of all stolen art is hanging on the walls or sit-
ting on the pedestals of unsuspecting collectors."'8 2 An asset protec-
tion specialist and attorney has counseled that "[a]rt theft is so perva-
sive today that chances are that any client who owns an object of art
may be holding stolen property." ''"3
The ease with which stolen art can be sold on the legitimate mar-
ket to unsuspecting collectors amplifies the need for comprehensive
and informed investigations.
B. Capability of Common Law and Civil Remedies to Redress Stolen Art
Epidemic and Protect Commercial Integrity of U.S. Art Market
The scope of prescribed investigation for wealthy collectors
should be determined by how well due diligence inquiry can help
deter the stolen art trade and safeguard the commercial probity of the
176. 933 F.2d at 1131 (2d Cir. 1991).
177. Id. at 1132.
178. Prott, supra note 168, at 348 (emphasis in original).
179. Spero, supra note 1, at 58.
180. Ziss, supra note 145, at 2.
181. Elizabeth des Portes, The Fight Against the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property: The
Role of Museum Professionals, in THE LAW OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND NATURAL HERI-
TAGE, ch. 5, at 5-4, (Marilyn Phelan ed. 1998).
182. Dr. Constance Lowenthal, quoted in Lewine, supra note 169, at 47.
183. Spero, supra note 1, at 58.
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art market. Legal scholars and commentators repeatedly have main-
tained that the common law, through civil remedies to reclaim stolen
materials, can curtail illicit commerce in stolen art. "The law offers an
opportunity to shape standards of commercial conduct which preserve
the stability and integrity of our economy," asserted one scholar." 4
"Common law, by permitting and encouraging victims of theft to sue
and recover their property, provides the best opportunity to combat
the problems of theft and trafficking in civil litigation."185 One scholar
observed that "the civil remedies available are the most practical,
because in addition to having the art returned, the threat of litigation
serves as an excellent deterrent to art purchasers. The fear of having
art, purchased at considerable cost, returned.., would certainly make
a buyer examine all pertinent [information].' 8 6
The many difficulties of applying criminal penalties in the inter-
national stolen art trade should also amplify the prescribed degree of
due diligence investigation entailed of collectors. As one scholar
explained, "[t]he criminal justice system performs its functions quite
differently in the international setting than it does in the domestic set-
ting. The difference results in a benefit to both thieves and receivers
of stolen goods."'8 7  Because the problem of art theft cannot be
addressed by criminal sanctions alone, dealers and collectors must be
encouraged to conduct extensive inquiries into the background of art-
works they buy and sell in order to reform the art trade and rid the
legitimate marketplace of stolen art.' 8
184. Collin, supra note 14, at 42.
185. Id. at 25.
186. Van Pelt, supra note 165, at 443. The author maintains that civil remedies in the sto-
len art context: (1) encourage original owners to sue converters, thus increasing the likelihood
that stolen materials will be located and raising costs to the illicit trade; (2) can be more broadly
applied than criminal sanctions; and (3) face fewer constitutional obstacles than criminal penal-
ties. Id. at 452-53.
187. Colin, supra note 14, at 35. The author relates that the difficulties of enforcing crimi-
nal sanctions internationally include multiple law enforcement agencies with overlapping func-
tions and jurisdictions. Id. at 45. Moreover, "[t]he gathering and delivery of evidence from one
jurisdiction to another, including the identification, capture and delivery of a suspect, is compli-
cated by the overarching issue of sovereignty." Id. at 36.
Other commentators have acknowledged the inherent limitations of the criminal law to
redress the international stolen art trade. See, e.g., Paige L. Margules, International Art Theft
and the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation,
and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 609, 645 (1992) (asserting that "[tlhe merits of
criminal sanctions under the NSPA (National Stolen Property Act) are dubious" and that "[t]he
international nature of art theft creates additional problems for criminal sanctions in the United
States. There is a lack of international criminal cooperation between the United States and for-
eign nations.").
188. Collin, supra note 14, at 29.
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C. Increasing Notoriety of International Art Theft
The public prominence of the stolen art trade should influence
the range of due diligence investigation required for valuable art ob-
jects. Stolen art has become so pandemic that even the mainstream
media now treats it. Works of art looted by the Nazis and found in
the possession of U.S. museums and private collectors have received
special attention. For example, in 1997, one columnist reported the
discovery of "archival records suggesting that many of the unrecov-
ered artworks from Europe moved into the vibrant U.S. market after
the war with virtually no U.S. government interest in stopping the
flow"1 9 and noted that there is "[g]rowing evidence that the ... U.S.
market contains a greater number of plundered artworks from World
War II than anyone had expected.""19 World News Tonight featured a
program in which it reported that the Seattle Art Museum, without
any investigation, had acquired a Matisse painting plundered from a
family fleeing the Nazis." 1 Nightline traced Nazi loot to U.S. muse-
ums and reported that art objects plundered by the Nazis "have ended
up in private collections and museums all over the world."' 92  U.S.
News & World Report related that stolen art objects from World War
II have been located in prominent U.S. museums, and that "[d]isputes
over paintings ... have erupted across the country." '93
These and other stories have brought the subject of stolen art
into public focus and highlight the precautions that collectors reasona-
bly can be expected to take to avoid becoming part of the problem.
D. Significance of State Policy to Protect U.S. Art Market
The importance that courts have assigned to preventing the U.S.
art market from becoming a haven for stolen art traffickers also should
help define the appropriate scope of due diligence investigation. It is
fundamental that equity-based determinations, such as the "balance of
equities" judicial criterion, necessarily consider public interest and
public policy. As the Supreme Court observed long ago in United
189. Walter V. Robinson, Stolen Art Claims Shakes N.Y Museum: Raise Concern U.S.
Houses Looted Work, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1997, at Al.
190. Walter V. Robinson, An Ignominious Legacy: Evidence Grows of Plundered Art in U.S.,
BOSTON GLOBE, April 25, 1997, at Al.
191. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, (ABC television broadcast, reporter Brian
Ross, Oct. 22, 1997) (transcription on file with author).
192. Nightline: Nazi Loot in America (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 28, 1998) (transcript
on file with author).
193. John Marks, How Did All That Art End Up in Museums? U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, June 8, 1998, at 38.
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States v. Morgan,194 "[i]t is a familiar doctrine that the extent to which
a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid, and the manner of
molding its remedies, may be affected by the public interest
involved.""19 Indeed, "[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the
public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved," '196 and "[i]t cannot be gainsaid that a court
asked to dispense equitable remediation should give serious attention
to the public interest." '97
Courts in the United States, and particularly those in New York,
repeatedly have underscored the important public policy of protecting
the commercial integrity of the art market. The Solomon R. Guggen-
heim Foundation v. Lubell decision,"98 as discussed, was calculated to
encourage investigation by collectors in order to curtail the trade in
stolen art, and as the court in Deweerth v. Baldinger 199 explained,
"[t]he Guggenheim Court grounded its decision on a range of policy
considerations growing out of its concern that any legal rules estab-
lished by the courts be cognizant of New York's special role as a world
art center." '
Other New York courts have stressed the need to combat stolen
art traffic. For example, the court in Federal Republic of Germany v.
Elicofon0' asserted that "New York policy is... to protect owners
generally as a means to preserve the integrity of transactions and pre-
vent the state from becoming a marketplace for stolen goods."2 2 In
Porter v. Wertz,20 3 the court declared that "commercial indifference to
ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of
art. ' 20
4
Accordingly, the importance of declared state policy seeking to
constrict illicit commerce in stolen art should influence determinations
whether the buyer or possessor of a valuable art object has investigated
the item sufficiently.
194. 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
195. Id.
196. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
197. Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 882 (1st
Cir. 1995). See also, e.g., Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 323 (1st Cir. 1989)
("Equity must always be mindful of the public interest.").
198. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
199. 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
200. Id. at 548.
201. 536 F. Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
202. Id. at 846.
203. 416 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
204. 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
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E. Value of Art Objects and Expense of Litigation
The economic value of art objects that due diligence investiga-
tions are intended to protect, including the scope for potential appre-
ciation of many works, suggests that a broad investigative obligation is
appropriate. The potential for many artworks to appreciate exponen-
tially is evident in several of the reported decisions involving the
recovery of stolen art. For example, in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foun-
dation v. Lubell, a Chagall painting bought in 1967 for $17,000 was
valued at approximately $212,000 by 1995.211 In Erisoty v. Rizik, the
court found "interesting... the appreciation in value of the [disputed]
painting over time, estimated to have been worth $9,000 or $10,000 in
1962 and valued at $200,000 in 1993. , 206 In Menzel v. List,20 7 an art
dealer protested that an award of damages in the current, appreciated
value of a stolen painting that he had sold some fifteen years earlier
would subject him "to potentially ruinous liability. 218
The likely expense of defending a judicial claim for the recovery
of a stolen art object also should be considered in defining the scope of
an appropriate due diligence investigation. Lawsuits for the recovery
of stolen art are notoriously costly and resource-intensive. Complex
choice of law questions often are raised, 29 as parties frequently con-
tend that one or more issues are governed by the laws of a foreign
country.2 0 Testimony from expert witnesses is also usually essential.
In 1993, the New York Times reported that the standard cost of
205. See supra notes 56 and 57 and accompanying text, discussing the terms of settlement
the parties reached in Lubell.
206. No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *31 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), affd,
No. 95-1807 (3d Cir. 1996).
207. 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
208. Id. at 745.
209. As the published judicial decisions attest, lawsuits brought to reclaim stolen art
objects frequently present choice of law questions involving the laws of foreign countries. See,
e.g., Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 812-15 (repudiating, inter alia, a contention that the Act of State
doctrine validated the seizure in Belgium by the Nazis of a Chagall painting belonging to private
citizens); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 (2d Cir. 1982) (reject-
ing the argument of the defendant, in an action brought to recover looted paintings by Renais-
sance artist Albecht Durer, that the German doctrine of Ersitzung terminated the title of the
former owner); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400-04 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (ruling that the defendant in an action to
reclaim plundered Byzantine mosaics failed to make sufficient inquiry to obtain the status of
good faith purchaser under the substantive commercial law of Switzerland).
210. See, e.g., Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160 (rejecting the contention of the defendant, a New
York resident, in a lawsuit brought by a German museum to recover paintings looted during
World War II that the German doctrine of Ersitzung had expunged the ownership rights of the
museum); Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1400-04 (addressing the contention of the defendant in
a suit to reclaim plundered Byzantine mosaics that the ownership rights of the church from
which the mosaics had been looted were expunged under the commercial law of Switzerland).
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defending a claim for the recovery of an art object was approximately
$250,000.211 That number can only increase with time.
In some instances the parties have paid, or were threatened with,
even higher costs. For example, one authority estimated that Chica-
go-based collector Daniel Searle recently paid $1,000,000 in legal fees
defending a lawsuit brought by descendants of Holocaust victims to
reclaim a Degas painting looted during World War 11.212 Searle had
bought the painting in 1987 for approximately $850,000.213 The 1998
settlement required him to pay one-half of the current value of the
painting to the plaintiffs and then to donate the work to the Chicago
Art Institute.214 Searle's failure to have investigate the painting when
he acquired it proved most costly.
F. Potential Damage to Collectors, Estates, and Trusts
The extensive injury that recovery of a stolen art object can cause
individual collectors, as well as their estates, trusts, and financial
plans, favors a broad investigative responsibility. The presence of a
stolen work of art in a private collection can wreak havoc on the most
carefully laid plans. First, taking away a specific work can ruin a col-
lection. Expensive art objects are frequently distinctive, if not unique,
and thus irreplaceable. Indeed, the singular character of many items
contributes importantly both to their artistic significance and financial
value. Thus, removing such an item from a collection causes a corre-
spondingly significant injury. In addition, extracting a particular work
may destroy the integrity of the collection and negate its theme.
Opportunity costs for obtaining other works not subject to conflicting
ownership claims also are lost whenever a prized work is confiscated.
A threshold consequence is that the chance to invest in another art
object, or other asset, that is not impaired with a competing ownership
claim is forfeited. The recovery of a valuable art object can destroy
the estate, trust, and financial plans of collectors. "First, any invest-
ment in a stolen work mistakenly held may represent a lost opportu-
nity cost that can diminish both the financial status of the testator
during life as well as the wealth that otherwise would have been avail-
able for distribution at death. 21 1
211. William H. Honan, Lately, More Antiguities Can Go Home Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25 1993, at C1.
212. Walter V. Robinson, Holocaust Victims' Heirs Given Share of a Degas, BOSTON
GLOBE, August 14, 1998, at Al.
213. Lee Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims: Art with a History, WALL ST. J., January 14,
1999, at A18.
214. Id.
215. Basha, supra note 1, at 62.
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Second, the unanticipated loss of a valuable work of art necessar-
ily changes the corpus of a collector, and thus affects the financial
planning goals of the collector. Because artwork is rarely viewed as a
potential source of lifetime liquid assets by collectors, the loss of a
work of art often causes the greatest damage in the field of estate plan-
ning. Mistakenly held stolen art can undermine estate planning in
several ways. First, the unanticipated presence of stolen art in an
estate skews initial understanding about the estate's assets and liabili-
ties. Because accurately evaluating the assets and liabilities of an
estate is a necessary first step in estate planning, a stolen work mistak-
enly held results in a material misrepresentation in this phase. A
potential liability is treated instead as an asset, and a comprehensive
estate plan is constructed based upon this misconception.216
Stolen art objects jeopardize planning for estate liquidity and
estate tax liabilities. As one authority explained, "collectibles belong-
ing to estates often are sold to provide liquidity for administration
expenses and estate tax liabilities." '217 Accordingly, "[i]f a stolen work
is designated to be sold to provide estate liquidity, the removal of a
work from the estate through a successful judicial challenge means
that other assets must be disposed of to supply liquidity. The original
estate plan has been disrupted, and a new plan must be devised. 218
The need to ensure that adequate funds are available to pay estate
taxes makes it correspondingly important for estate planners to estab-
lish that the collector has secure legal title to all assets that have been
designated to satisfy this obligation.219
The unanticipated presence of stolen art can wreak havoc upon
the administration of an estate or trust. As one writer explained, a
stolen work may portend costly future litigation to the estate or trust
beneficiary who receives it as a distribution. "If the testator intends to
distribute a stolen work to a beneficiary, it becomes a potential 'time
bomb' that may explode in an expensive lawsuit at some unknown
future date. . . . [T]he distribution of a stolen work to a legatee is a
doubtful advantage. "220
Perhaps most significantly, the inadvertent inclusion of a stolen
art object in an estate may result in an overpayment of estate taxes,
216. Id.
217. Madden, supra note 1, at 460.
218. Id. at 463.
219. Commentators repeatedly have discussed the need to ensure that adequate funds are
available in the estates of collectors to satisfy estate tax liabilities. See generally LEONARD D.
DUBOFF & SALLY H. CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, § E (Estate Planning) (1993);
Basha, supra note 1, at 62-63.
220. Madden, supra note 1, at 463.
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especially if a tax refund has become time-barred. As one writer cau-
tioned, "[t]he payment of an estate tax liability based upon the mis-
taken assumption that the decedent owned a valuable art object could
impose a substantial hardship upon the estate, especially if the item is
recovered by the real owner., 221' The extensive damage that stolen art
can cause collectors, individually as well as to their estates, trusts, and
financial plans, recommends a thorough investigative responsibility.
G. Identity and Comparative Resources of Parties
As between art theft victims and art buyers, the comparative
equities initially weigh heavily in favor of art theft victims for a variety
of reasons. First, the status of theft victims is by definition involun-
tary. In contrast, art buyers obviously choose to assume that status.
As one scholar noted, "[t]he position of the original owner is entirely
an involuntary one. He has done nothing except be robbed. The good
faith purchaser, by contrast, has entered into a transaction known to
be problematic." '222  The Erisoty v. Rizik23 court, in balancing the
equities between a family from whom a painting had been stolen and a
professional art restorer who had bought the work "no questions
asked," pointed out that the family "had suffered an intrusive
crime."'224 There is little one can do in this context to avoid becoming
a victim. Options are clearly limited when the circumstances sur-
rounding the theft involve war, massive political upheaval, or geno-
cide. Art buyers, on the other hand, who are aware that stolen
artworks flood the marketplace, can take steps to safeguard against
acquiring stolen property. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit observed in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,22' "we should note
that those who wish to purchase art work on the international market,
undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not without means to protect
themselves." '226 One authority commented that an art buyer "will
221. Basha, supra note 1, at 64. Several professional observers have cautioned about this
prospect. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 1, at 463 (pointing out that "[i]n this scenario, the value
of the stolen work would have been wrongfully included in the estate and an estate tax at a mar-
ginal rate as high as 55% would have been paid on the value of the work."); Spero, supra note 1,
at 60 (exclaiming that "[i]n effect, the estate or its successors may be required to return valuable
items on which estate taxes were paid, without a corresponding setoff!").
222. Stephen E. Weil, Repose, 8 IFAR REP. (Aug./Sept. 1987) at 72.
223. No. 93-6215, 1995 Dist. LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), affd, No. 95-1807 (3d
Cir. 1996).
224. Id. at *14.
225. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
226. Id. at 294.
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have had an opportunity to request and receive documentation. 227
Moreover, "[h]e will have had an opportunity to negotiate an
arrangement under which he might protect himself against the eco-
nomic consequences of a subsequent third party claim., 221
After an artwork is stolen, theft victims frequently encounter
severe obstacles in trying to locate and reclaim their property. As the
court in Hoelzer v. City of Stamford229 explained, "[b]ecause art work
can be both extremely valuable and highly marketable to an under-
ground clientele, the difficulties original owners face in recovering
missing art abound., 23 ° Indeed, "[a] recovery rate of less than ten per-
cent indicates that the odds are strongly against an original owner
retrieving stolen work." 231  There are several reasons for these over-
whelming odds.
First, many stolen art objects can be easily hidden and trans-
ported far from their point of origin. The vast majority of stolen
works of art are easy to transport and easy to conceal. It is for this
obvious reason that they are targeted by thieves in the first place.232 In
light of this hypermobility, it is unsurprising that theft victims often
cannot even imagine where to begin looking for their missing prop-
erty.
A function of the mobility of art is the international dimension of
the stolen art trade. The international nature of the legal and illicit art
market intensifies the burden of locating stolen materials. "The...
scenario of art work stolen in one country and sold to a good-faith
purchaser in another is common."233
The "ask no questions" commercial conventions of the interna-
tional art market further complicate efforts to locate stolen art. "Buy-
ers in the high demand market rarely probe the origins of desirable
pieces. '  Moreover, "[t]he original owner is further disadvantaged
by the art dealer's usual practice of not examining the sources of the
art works in which they trade." '235 Theft owners face the task of
searching a global market that trades in commodities with histories
about which many of the traders are willfully ignorant.
To compound the difficulty even further, no universally accepted
standard resources for searching for stolen art exist. The few
227. Weil, supra note 222, at 72.
228. Id.
229. 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 1138.
231. Drum, supra note 21, at 933.
232. Conley, supra note 82, at 494.
233. Drum, supra note 21, at 933.
234. Foutty, supra note 28, at 1840.
235. Drum, supra note 21, at 912-13.
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resources that are available often remain unknown to theft victims.
There is "no clear, regular procedure," one writer lamented, and
"[t]he fragmentary and little known mechanisms by which an original
owner could report and search for stolen art are inadequate to provide
a standard" by which the efforts of theft victims can be judged.236
Finally, because artwork often is displayed only privately, stolen
materials may never be exposed to public scrutiny. Although both"courts and commentators have noted that the mere residential display
of paintings may not constitute the type of open and notorious posses-
sion sufficient to afford notice to the true owner, ,237 that is little com-
fort to the theft victim who may never discover where her art has
finally settled. Though it is cold comfort to these victims, when
"innocent bona fide purchasers keep their art in the privacy of their
own homes for their own pleasure or that of a select few, it is difficult
to find any policy reason to favor them over the original owners who
will have no, or virtually no, opportunity to recover their art while so
held."23  "Once art objects are stolen," one observer commented,"owners often have no other alternative but to wait for their property
to resurface on the art market." '2 39 Even once the property does resur-
face, the lack of a widely-regarded mechanism for searching, the "no
questions asked" conventions of the art market, and the "private"
character of many art collectors often will work to prevent them from
ever recovering their stolen art.
Art buyers, on the other hand, who are aware that stolen art-
works flood the marketplace, can take steps far more effectively to
avoid acquiring stolen property. As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals observed in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus,240 "we should note that those who wish to purchase art work
on the international market, undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not
without means to protect themselves., 241' Art buyers can demand
documentation of an artwork's history. 242 If documentation is
236. Id. at 941.
237. Mary K. Devereaux, Note, Battle Over a Monet: The Requirement of Due Diligence in a
Lawsuit by the Owner Against a Good Faith Purchaser and Possessor, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 57, 66
(1989).
238. Earle A. Partington & Yves-Louis Sage, The American Response to the Recovery of Sto-
len and Illegally Exported Art: Should the American Courts Look to the Civil Law? 12 COL.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 395, 417 (1988).
239. Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes of Limitations and
Title Disputes in the Art World, 1 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1069-70 (1991).
240. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fines
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 294.
242. Weil, supra note 222, at 72.
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unavailable, the buyer can "negotiate an arrangement under which he
might protect himself against the economic consequences of a subse-
quent third party claim. '243 This, at least, would remove the buyer's
economic disincentive of returning artwork to rightful owners.
A final factor favoring theft victims in any equitable balance is
that buyers of expensive works typically enjoy the resources necessary
to investigate materials carefully. Such buyers generally are either
auction houses, museums, professional dealers, or wealthy private col-
lectors. "Purchasers of valuable art often are either art dealers or
individuals who employ art dealers to carry out their transactions,"
noted one observer.211 "Such individuals often are in a better position
than original owners to stop the transfer of stolen art objects because
they have the opportunity to investigate the validity of the object's
title before purchasing it. ''245 Accordingly, "[d]ue to their intimate
knowledge and extensive resources, entities and individuals in the art
industry should be held to a higher standard of good faith in their
dealings and investigations of title."246 Buyers of valuable art works,
then, "[are] most able efficiently to bear the cost of inquiry. "247
These many considerations give the initial position of theft vic-
tims far more weight in the "balance of equities" equation with art
buyers. "[A] buyer is likely to be several shades more culpable than
an owner who has reported the theft."
248
H. Fiduciary Responsibilities of Attorneys, Trustees, and Executors
The fiduciary obligations of both tax-exempt institutional col-
lectors and the attorneys and trust institutions that counsel many pri-
vate collectors support a broad investigative standard for valuable art
objects. Both tax-exempt organizations and professional fiduciaries
have discrete duties to protect the value and title of assets under their
control. These responsibilities support the imposition of a broad
scope of inquiry and investigation to safeguard against the inadvertent
acquisition of stolen artworks.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Maritza F. Bolano, Note, International Art Theft Disputes: Harmonizing Common Law
Principles with Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129, 163-64
(1991/1992).
247. Pollack, supra note 37, at 377. Commentators regularly have favored amplifying the
investigative standard imposed upon professional participants in the art market. See, e.g.,
McCord, supra note 6, at 1003 (arguing that "[b]ecause of (their) preeminent position... in the
art market, international auction houses should be held to a strict standard of care when buying
and selling artwork.").
248. Bibas, supra note 8, at 2453-54.
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1. Tax-Exempt Institutions/U.S. Museums
Almost every major international museum adheres to the Inter-
national Code of Professional Ethics of the International Council of
Museums, which requires museums to make sure that good legal title
attaches to all items in their collections. "Under these ethical stand-
ards, ... museums must satisfy themselves that the evidence of
the.., history of the artwork proves that the vendor has good legal
title."249
The Code of Ethics for Museums (Code), prepared by the Amer-
ican Association of Museums, declares that U.S. museums owe fiduci-
ary responsibilities to the public and requires that secure legal title
attach to all objects in their collections. The Code creates a "public
service" mission for museums and lauds their roles as "public
trusts. '"25° As public trusts, legal obligations form only the starting
point of museums' responsibilities; museums must adhere to demand-
ing ethical standards in their acquisition practices:
The law provides the basic framework for museums operations.
As nonprofit institutions, museums comply with applicable
local, state, and federal laws and international conventions, as
well as with the specific legal standards governing trust respon-
sibilities. This Code of Ethics takes that compliance as given.
But legal standards are a minimum. Museums and those
responsible for them must do more than avoid legal liability.
They must take affirmative steps to maintain their integrity so as
to warrant public confidence. They must act not only legally
but also ethically.51
The Code requires museums to ensure that they have acquired
valid legal title to all materials in their collections because the "stew-
ardship of collections entails the highest public trust and carries with it
the presumption of rightful ownership, permanence, care [and] docu-
mentation." 212 Museums are specifically enjoined to make sure certain
works in their collections are "protected," "secure," "unencumbered,""accounted for," and "documented.""2 3 Under the prevailing "balance
of equities" judicial criteria, legal title to valuable art objects cannot be"protected" or made "secure" other than through an appropriate due
diligence investigation.
249. McCord, supra note 6, at 1000.
250. American Society of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums (1994), at 4.
251. Id. at 4.
252. Id. at 8.
253. Id.
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The Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) issued a
report entitled "Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of
Art during the Nazi/World War II Era (1933-45)" (Report). The
Report encourages third parties to create databases of losses of art
objects sustained during the war. It also directs its members to con-
duct due diligence investigations to ensure that materials offered as
charitable donations, and those that already are in their collections,
were not plundered during World War II. The Report exhorts mem-
ber museums to
search their own records thoroughly, and, in addition.... take
all reasonable steps to contact established archives, databases, art
dealers, auction houses, donors, art historians and other scholars
and researchers who may be able to provide Nazi/World War
II-era... information.54
As is apparent from these documents, many U.S. museums have
imposed on themselves an affirmative duty to investigate the history
of both prospective acquisitions and art objects already in their posses-
sion. This makes it clear that publicly supported, tax-exempt institu-
tions can and should be expected to perform comprehensive due
diligence investigations for art objects in their possession.
2. Attorneys' Legal Liability
The fiduciary responsibilities of estate planning attorneys sup-
port a broad investigative standard. Attorneys advising art collectors
owe several professional duties to their clients that help define the
appropriate scope of investigation necessary in relation to valuable art
objects. Authorities have stressed the obligation of estate planning
attorneys to understand the wide variety of laws and bodies of knowl-
edge that affect asset protection planning.55
If a client owns art, this understanding must necessarily include
the laws affecting, and bodies of knowledge relating to, art ownership
and possession. Estate planning attorneys should have the ability to
inform clients of the potential problems that the presence of stolen art
can cause their estates. The unanticipated presence of stolen art in an
estate can carry severe consequences for the continued viability of an
estate plan. The failure of an estate planning attorney to raise the
issue may result in professional liability.5 6
254. Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art During the Nazi/World
War II Era (1933-1945), posted at <http://www.aand.org/guidln.shtml>.
255. Madden, supra note 1, at 462-63.
256. Sparo, supra note 1, at 58.
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At the very least, attorneys should advise their clients about the
risk of acquiring stolen art and its many adverse consequences. As a
New York court recently counseled, "an attorney is required to advise
clients of the legal consequences of their actions.", 7 This responsibil-
ity is especially important when clients are not otherwise likely to
appreciate a particular risk or exposure.28 Thus, "[w]here the client
owns art, the estate planning attorney should outline the potential
problems" stolen art may cause the estate, "for example, the possibil-
ity of a reduced estate," as well as the possibility that a due diligence
investigation "may result in the loss of the item." 259
Attorneys also have responsibilities to apprise estate administra-
tors and executors about the potential damage that stolen art can cause
an estate during administration. One commentator recently recom-
mended that "[t]he issue of stolen art should be raised to clients as
well as fiduciaries responsible for administering estates. Failure to do
so may distort and thwart estate plans and lead to significant losses to
clients and perhaps their advisors. '"260
The potential for overpaying estate taxes highlights an attorney's
duty to raise the potential problem of stolen art during estate admini-
stration. If estate taxes are paid on art that is later found to be stolen
and that art is subsequently returned to the rightful owner, the estate
may be time-barred from seeking a tax refund. 261' The overpayment of
these death taxes on a stolen art object, the true nature of which could
have been discovered by a diligent investigation urged or conducted
by the attorney, could subject both the attorney and the executor to
professional liability.262
3. Trust Institutions and Other Professional Fiduciaries
Trust institutions and other professional fiduciaries that manage
the assets of collectors have formal responsibilities to protect and safe-
guard assets under their care. These obligations should expand the
scope of investigation that courts expect for valuable art objects. Ini-
tially, trustees and other fiduciaries are required to exercise the degree
of skill that they present themselves as having and which they invoke
to attract clients:
257. Madden, supra note 1, at 463.
258. See Spero, supra note 1, at 60; see also Charles D. Fox & Rosalie Murphy, Fiduciaries
and Attorneys Must Face Developing Doctrine of Duty, 136 TR. & EST. 22, 22 (Sept. 1997) (enun-
ciating a "doctrine of attorney duty to estate and trust beneficiaries.").
259. Spero, supra note 1, at 60.
260. Id. at 62.
261. Id. at 61.
262. Id. at 60.
[Vol. 23:631
Due Diligence Investigation
The trustee has a duty to exercise such care and skill as a person
of ordinary prudence would exercise in the conduct of his or her
own affairs. If the trustee secures its appointment by repre-
senting that it possesses a higher level of skill, the trustee must
exercise that greater level of skill. 263
Large institutional trustees and professional fiduciaries almost
uniformly represent themselves as possessing extensive capabilities
and expertise in asset protection, estate planning, and wealth manage-
ment. 264 Some claim a special competence in handling expensive art-
works. 26' These representations, in conjunction with the staffs of
professionals that these institutions assemble (including attorneys,
certified public accountants, MBAs, and other professionals), support
a due diligence investigative obligation for valuable art objects that is
both comprehensive and legally informed.
Fiduciaries have a threshold obligation, under the "prudent per-
son rule" of fiduciary investment, to investigate each asset in an estate
or trust in order to identify discrete risks that are specific to that asset.
This investigation should include inquiry into attributes of the par-
ticular market in which the asset is sold. As a leading authority has
instructed, "[u]nder the rule, a prudent fiduciary must make an inde-
pendent assessment of each asset in an estate or trust with respect to
such factors as risk (both in terms of the asset itself and the wider mar-
ket of which it may be a part), appropriateness to the objectives of the
trust or estate, concentration, physical safety, yield and the like. 266
As previously noted, prevailing conditions in the international art
market facilitate the sale of stolen materials. 267  The prudent person
rule requires professional fiduciaries to be aware of these conditions
and to take appropriate steps to assess and limit risk. Thus, the
263. ROY ADAMS, FIDUCIARY LAW AND TRUST ACTIVITIES GUIDE 93 (1996).
264. The marketing brochure of the J.P. Morgan Trust Company (Morgan) exemplifies
these representations. Morgan touts a "Wealth Advisory" group with distinctive skills in deal-
ing with "unique assets such as real estate, art, and privately held businesses." Morgan Bro-
chure, at 2. Morgan asserts that its "[b]readth of advice is unique," id. at 3, and that its
"Fiduciary Management group provides an exceptional level of personal attention through its
staff of trust officers and administrators, most of whom have law degrees." Id. at 4.
Morgan represents that it has the capability to protect the value of all estate assets, including
valuable art objects, and of "managing and, where applicable, insuring special assets such as...
valuable collectibles." Id. at 5. In addition, Morgan states that in providing estate administra-
tion services, it "[m]oves immediately to protect all property in the estate." Id. at 7. The mar-
keting brochures of Banker's Trust, Bessemer Trust, Northern Trust, and Wilmington Trust
contain similar representations.
265. See discussion supra note 264 (regarding representations of marketing brochure of JP
Morgan Trust Company. Also note that Citibank offers a special Art Advisory Service.).
266. ADAMS, supra note 263, at 49.
267. See supra pages 659-63.
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threshold fiduciary responsibility of investigation necessarily requires
both knowledge and inquiries sufficiently comprehensive and in-
formed to discharge this duty.
A second fiduciary obligation, the duty to identify and inventory
the property of an estate or trust, also suggests a broader investigative
responsibility standard. 26" A third substantive fiduciary responsibility,
the duty to protect the assets of an estate or trust, also suggests a broad
investigative obligation for expensive art objects. As a professional
commentator recently noted, "the prevalence of stolen art complicates
the efforts of personal representatives to ensure that the estate has
secure legal ownership rights in art objects in its possession. 269
It is black letter law that a trustee must preserve the trust prop-
erty and that the trustee has a duty to enforce trust claims and defend
the trust against loss. 270 Because of the unique risks posed by posses-
sion of art objects, a special duty may attach to protect collectibles
such as art objects. As one authority recently opined:
[T]he prevalence of stolen art and the possibility that many
works may be stolen and subject to conflicting ownership claims
also may invoke the fiduciary responsibility of personal repre-
sentatives and trustees to "use reasonable care and skill to pre-
serve and safeguard estate and trust property." Authorities have
counseled that "the personal representative is required to take all
reasonable steps to protect the decedent's collectibles from loss
or damage," and that "this is particularly important in the case
of assets such as art and other collectibles." 271
The recent "prudent investor rule" of the Third Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, 22 and the correspondent Uniform Prudent Inves-
tor Act (UPIA), highlight the fiduciary responsibilities of professional
268. See Basha, supra note 1 at 64 (stating that "[a] primary responsibility of the personal
representative is 'to discover and inventory all of the assets held by the decedent at his death'
(citing Current Problems in the Administration and Distribution of Tangible Collectible Property in
the Estate of a Decedent, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 320, 320 (1981))).
269. Basha, supra note 1, at 64.
270. ADAMS, supra note 263, at 94.
271. Basha, supra note 1, at 64 (citations omitted).
272. The "prudent investor rule" is stated in § 227 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
(1990) in applicable part as follows:
§ 227. General Standard of Prudent Investment
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of the
trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution require-
ments, and other circumstances of the trust.
(a) This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to
be applied in the context of the trust portfolio and as part of an overall trust invest-
ment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable
to the trust.
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trustees and executors and emphasize the need for appropriate due
diligence investigation for valuable art objects included in an estate or
trust.273 As of 1996, "a core number of states, including the most pop-
ulous [such as New York and California) already enacted the Uniform
Act or something like it, 274 The UPIA is "expected to be widely
enacted in years to come. '27  It is likely that the "prudent investor
rule" as promulgated by both the Restatement and the UPIA will
have a significant effect in fiduciary surcharge suits.27 6
The prudent investor rule and the UPIA heighten the obligations
of professional fiduciaries to deal responsibly with valuable art objects.
The goal of the prudent investor rule is "to modernize trust invest-
ment law" and replace the "prudent man standard" by requiring trust-
ees "to design and actively carry out a reasoned investment policy
which fits the trust's unique purposes, circumstances, and beneficiary
needs., 277  This new standard requires trustees to identify and deal
responsibly with any assets, such as potentially stolen artworks, that
may impair the objectives of the trust. Several discrete requirements
of the prudent investor rule punctuate the need for professional fiduci-
aries to take appropriate and informed precautions to ensure that sto-
len art objects do not defeat trust objectives or a testator's intentions.
First, perhaps, is the premium value that the rule places upon
risk management. Comment e to section 227 of the Restatement of
Trusts states that because investment risk can never be avoided, but
only reasonably limited, fiduciaries must manage risk appropriately by
considering all the dangers to which assets under their care may be
subject. As instructed in the comment, "[t]he duty of caution does
not call for the avoidance of risk by trustees but for their prudent
273. In May 1990 the American Law Institute formally approved the "prudent investor
rule," along with "substantial changes in other Restatement sections that affect or are affected by
the prudent investor rule." Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restate-
ment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1151 (1992).
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Uniform
Law Commission), after a three year review, promulgated the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(UPIA) in order to codify revised Restatement principles as a uniform law. John H. Langbein,
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 641
(1996). As previously noted, many states already have adopted some form of the UPIA, and
authorities expect that it will significantly impact fiduciary responsibilities.
274. Langbein, supra note 273, at 641-42.
275. Id.
276. William S. Hershberger, Fiduciary Investing in the 90's-Restatement Third of Trusts:
Panacea or Placebo? 1993 INST. ON EST. PLAN., 500, at 5-21 (1993).
277. Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent Investor Rule May Affect Trustees, 131 TR. &
EST. 15, 15 (Dec. 1991).
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management of risk. For these purposes, risk management... takes
account of all hazards that may follow. ,278
Competent risk management for estates and trusts containing
valuable art objects requires efforts to ensure that the objectives of the
trust or estate are not frustrated by title defects. Because "tolerance of
risk varies greatly .. with the purposes of the trust and the relevant
circumstances of the beneficiaries,, 279 the prudent investor rule
requires trustees to "act reasonably in an effort to achieve the lowest
level of risk for a particular level of expected return .... Section
227 thus properly focuses on whether an incremental increase in risk
furthers the goal of attaining the desired return.281 This marginal risk
analysis imposes a special obligation upon fiduciaries to protect
against any "unique" or "nonmarket" risks that do not offer a corre-
sponding potential for greater returns.282 Accordingly, the minimiza-
tion of "uncompensated risk" becomes a significant goal of prudent
investors.23
Stolen art objects inadvertently included in an estate or trust
appear to present the type of "unique," "non-market," and "uncom-
pensated" risk that the prudent investor rule requires fiduciaries to
eliminate whenever possible. By ignoring the possibility that a parti-
cular art object may be stolen, a fiduciary does not thereby improve
the chances that the item will appreciate or that the total investment"portfolio" will earn a greater return. Rather, the risk is all "one-
sided" when stolen art objects are involved. The fiduciary recklessly
gambles that the stolen item will not be recovered by a former owner
and thus a potentially devastating loss will be avoided. Accordingly,
the failure of fiduciaries to recognize and deal responsibly with the
potential that artworks belonging to an estate or trust may have been
stolen signals a defect in risk management under the prudent investor
rule.
Other aspects of the prudent investor rule reinforce the responsi-
bilities of fiduciaries to take informed precautions to avoid the hazards
of stolen art. Commentators consistently have stressed that profes-
sional fiduciaries, in performing their responsibilities under the pru-
dent investor rule, must consider the objectives of the trust," 4 the
278. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1990).
279. Langbein, supra note 273, at 650.
280. Halbach, supra note 273, at 1166.
281. Hershberger, supra note 276, at 5-23.
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e (1990).
283. Halbach, supra note 273, at 1160.
284. See, e.g., Welch, supra note 277, at 24 (asserting that the prudent investor rule "holds
the trustee responsible for fulfilling investment duties in an informed, active manner. The trus-
tee is accountable and can be held to demonstrate that investment judgments were made on a
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particular risk characteristics of each asset or investment, 285 and the
suitability of the asset or investment for the trust's purposes. 216 Most
significantly, "abstractly risky investments.., should be judged not in
isolation but in terms of their role in a particular portfolio or strat-
egy. ' 287 Accordingly, "the prudent investor rule increases the likeli-
hood that trustees will actively pursue investment policies designed to
fit the particular needs of the trust and its beneficiaries . ".. ,288 There
can be little doubt, then, that fiduciaries who ignore the discrete risks
that expensive artworks pose to a trust or estate breach their responsi-
bilities under the prudent investor rule to ensure that each asset is
appropriate for the purposes of the estate or trust.
The specific criteria that the prudent investor rule instructs fidu-
ciaries to consider in making particular investment decisions also
underscores the need for informed due diligence investigations for
valuable art objects. In comment k to section 227 of the Restatement,
fiduciaries are counseled that in reviewing a particular investment a
trustee should consider, inter alia, "[e]xpectations concerning the
investment's total return," "the degree and nature of risks associated
with the investment," and "any special characteristics of the invest-
ment that affects its risk-reward tradeoff, and effective return, such as
exposure to unlimited tort liability. . . ."" The failure of a trustee or
executor to consider the possibility that a particular art object belong-
ing to a trust or estate may be stolen and subject to a conversion action
by a former owner would ignore these prescriptions.
The substantive responsibilities of fiduciaries both to review and
restructure trust investments at inception, as well as to monitor invest-
ment performance and suitability thereafter, also support an expanded
obligation of due diligence investigation. The prudent investor rule
requires trustees, when the trust is created, to ensure that each asset of
the trust estate is appropriate for the trust's purposes.290 Comment a
reasoned basis and sound economic assumptions appropriate for the unique needs and purposes
of the trust."); Halbach, supra note 273, at 1167 (instructing that fiduciary duties are to be per-
formed "with due care and skill, and with an eye towards the trust purposes and an overall
degree of cautions and conservatism reasonably appropriate to the trust at the time the particular
investment decision is made.").
285. See, e.g., Welch, supra note 277, at 25 (stating that "the prudent investor rule does
not excuse a trustee from acting prudently, intelligently and cautiously regarding each individual
investment."); Hershberger, supra note 276, at 5-23 (stating that each investment must be
considered, in part, "on the basis of its own potential risks and rewards.").
286. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 273, at 1167 (observing that "[e]ach investment...
should be evaluated in terms of [the]... trust purpose it is intended to serve.").
287. Hershberger, supra note 276, at 5-26.
288. Welch, supra note 277, at 25.
289. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. k (1990).
290. Section 229 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (1990) provides as follows:
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to section 229 instructs that "the trustee's decisions about retention
and conversion must take account of the suitability of an existing
investment to the needs and contemplated strategy ... of the particu-
lar trust." 291
This threshold investigation of trust assets should include
inquiry into attributes of the particular market in which the asset is
sold. A leading authority has stated that "[u]nder the rule, a prudent
fiduciary must make an independent assessment of each asset in an
estate or trust with respect to such factors as risk (both in terms of the
asset itself and the wider market for which it may be a part), appropri-
ateness to the objectives of the trust or estate, concentration, physical
safety, yield and the like." 292
The initial obligation to investigate estate and trust assets rec-
ommends that special precautions be taken for valuable art objects.
As previously discussed, prevailing conditions in the international art
market facilitate the sale of stolen materials. The prudent investor
rule requires trustees and executors to identify these conditions and to
assess and limit risk. For valuable works of art, these responsibilities
can only be discharged through an appropriately informed and com-
prehensive due diligence investigation.
Trustees also have a fiduciary duty to monitor the trust invest-
ments to ensure their continued suitability to the trust's objectives and
to keep apprised of opportunities and rights pertaining to trust assets
and investments. These duties also suggest a broad investigative
responsibility for valuable art objects. As prescribed in comment d to
section 227, the duty of care under the prudent investor rule "requires
the trustee to exercise reasonable effort and diligence in making and
monitoring investments for the trust with attention to the trust's
objectives. The trustee has a related duty of care in keeping informed
of rights and opportunities associated with those investments., 293
The responsibility to monitor and review trust assets "[o]rdinar-
ily... involves obtaining relevant information about such matters
as... the contents and resources of the trust estate, and the nature and
characteristics of available trust investment alternatives., 294  Under
this standard, unique assets, such as valuable art objects, need particu-
§ 229. Duty with Respect to Original Investments
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries, within a reasonable time after the
creation of the trust, to review the contents of the trust estate and to make and imple-
ment decisions concerning the retention and disposition of original investments in
order to conform to the requirements of §§ 227 and 228.
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS cmt. a (1990).
292. ADAMS, supra note 263, at 96.
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTScmt. d. (1990)
294. Id.
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lar attention. The duty to monitor and review trust assets requires
that trustees seek to identify any hidden ownership limitations or
restrictions in trust assets, such as the possibility that valuable art
objects may have been stolen, frustrating the objectives of the trust.
As one authority has recommended, "to the extent the individual trust
assets or portfolios may include special assets, . . . special review and
documentation may be advisable." 29
Requiring a trustee to monitor and review trust assets, even when
those assets include unique art objects, does not mean that the trustee
must personally become an expert to manage the trust effectively.
The prudent investor rule requires trustees to delegate the responsi-
bilities of trusteeship whenever a prudent person might do so. 26
Unlike the "prudent man" standard, which discouraged nonessential
delegation, 297 the new standard responds to the reality that "[a]s the
[trust] function has grown ever more complex, there is ever less reason
to believe that nonspecialists are fit to conduct it. "298
Generally, delegation is appropriate "whenever the trustee rea-
sonably believes the incremental costs of delegation is warranted and
the objectives and circumstances of the trust make delegation advis-
able."'299 The new rule clearly encourages trustees to "farm out"
responsibilities that fall outside the particular area of the trustee's
expertise.00
The new rule empowers trustees to delegate important trust
functions entailing independent professional judgment and discretion.
As instructed in comment f to section 171:
Delegation is not limited to the performance of ministerial acts.
In appropriate circumstances delegation may extend.., to dis-
295. Welch, supra note 277, at 23.
296. Section 171 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (1990) prescribes as follows:
§ 171 Duty with Respect to Delegation.
A trustee has a duty personally to perform the responsibility of the trusteeship except
as a prudent person might delegate those responsibilities to others. In deciding
whether, to whom, and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority in the admini-
stration of a trust... the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to exercise fiduci-
ary discretion and to act as a prudent person would act in similar circumstances.
(The duty of delegation is also prescribed in § 227(c)(2), requiring trustees to "act with prudence
in deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in the selection of agents," and cross ref-
erences § 171.)
297. See Halbach, supra note 273, at 1173 (explaining that "the prudent investor rule views
delegation in a more positive light than has traditional doctrine accompanying the prudent man
standard ... which... has grudgingly accepted delegation only if and to the extent the trustee
has no reasonable alternative.").
298. Langbein, supra note 273, at 651.
299. Welch, supra note 277, at 18.
300. Hershberger, supra note 276, at 5-29.
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cretionary acts, to the selection of trust investments or to the
management of specialized investment programs, and to other
activities of administration involving significant policy judg-
ment.3°'
Given this express authorization and clear break with the limited
delegation powers of the past, the refusal of trustees to delegate
responsibilities that they are not equipped or qualified to meet may
constitute an abuse of fiduciary responsibility32 and expose the trus-
tee to a suit alleging negligence.30 3 The broad authority that trustees
enjoy to delegate trust functions entailing independent professional
judgment repudiates any notion that professional fiduciaries cannot
reasonably be expected to conduct informed and comprehensive
investigations to ensure that valuable art objects under their care have
not been stolen. The prudent investor rule makes it clear that profes-
sional fiduciaries can, and indeed should, delegate such tasks so long
as the agents conducting these inquiries are appropriately qualified
and the cost of the investigation is reasonable in light of the value of
the art object in question and the risk that the investigation is calcu-
lated to eliminate.
Finally, two additional attributes of the prudent investor rule
support a comprehensive investigative standard for valuable art
objects. First, the focus of the prudent investor rule on gauging fidu-
ciary performance by the manner in which investments are made,
rather than how they are classified, recommends informed due dili-
gence as a benchmark. The prudent investor rule evaluates the fiduci-
ary performance of trustees based upon the quality of their
deliberations rather than their designation of particular investments as
either risky or acceptable. In other words, to evaluate the fiduciary
performance of trustees, the prudent investor rule looks to the way
that investment decisions are made, the process under which a portfo-
lio is constructed, and the manner in which it is managed, rather than
looking to whether an investment was "high risk" or "low risk,"
"imprudent" or "prudent. 3 4 Rather than presume to use a relative
term such as "risky" by which to judge the entire spectrum of poten-
tial trust forms, the prudent investor rule "requires the trustee to
design and actively carry out a reasoned investment policy which fits
301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 171 cmt. f (1990).
302. Comment a to § 171 counsels that "[a] trustee's discretionary authority in the matter
of delegation may be abused by imprudent failure to delegate as well as by making an imprudent
decision to delegate."
303. Welch, supra note 277, at 22..
304. Id. at 15.
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the trust's unique purposes, circumstances and beneficiary needs."3 °
Accordingly, by encouraging conscientious and informed decision-
making, the prudent investor rule champions appropriate due dili-
gence for each asset and investment in an estate or trust, including
valuable works of art.30 6
It is worth noting in this context that the importance the prudent
investor rule assigns to the deliberative process makes it correspond-
ingly important for fiduciaries to document their decisions. Docu-
mentary evidence is clearly the most effective way for a fiduciary to
establish that he or she effectively discharged his or her duty of per-
forming a comprehensive and legally informed due diligence investi-
gation.
I. Extent of Potential Risk in Failing to Take Precautions
Against Acquiring Stolen Art
The increased likelihood of being sued for the recovery of a sto-
len art object should amplify the scope of appropriate due diligence
investigation. Authorities repeatedly have observed that the increased
attention devoted to the recovery of materials looted during World
War II has created greater exposure for U.S. collectors. One attorney
recently observed, "the current wave of interest in gold, currency,
insurance and other assets displaced via the Nazis has surely bolstered
the resolve of art theft victims and their heirs, who ... are becoming
increasingly proactive, tracking down and laying claim to works stolen
decades ago."30 7  The judicial claims for the recovery of stolen art
brought so far portend many more to come, and the scope of potential
exposure to U.S. museums and private collectors is enormous.0 '
In February 1998 a director of the Art Institute of Chicago
informed members of the Banking Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives that the problem of looted art from World War II is"one of the most pressing and difficult questions facing American Art
museums today."309 The New York Art Journal identified as a "loom-
ing problem for American museums the likely prospect that disputed
305. Id. at 15.
306. See Hershberger, supra note 276, at 5-39.
307. Ziss, supra note 145, at 2.
308. Glen D. Lowry, Director of the Museum of Modem Art in New York, has opined
that "[tihis is the tip of the iceberg." Judith Dobrzynski, How Did You Get That Art in the War,
Daddy, N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 1998, at § 4, p. 4 (quoting Lowry). Lowry commented that
"[n]o museum that has acquired works of art in the last 50 years is immune from claims." Id.
See also Walter V. Robinson, Plundered Art Prompts Museum Review, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5,
1998, at Al.
309. Judith Dobryzynski, Capitol Hill Looks at Issue of Stolen Art in Wartime, N.Y. TIMES,
February 15, 1998, at A17 (quoting James D. Wood, director of the Art Institute of Chicago).
20001
Seattle University Law Review
art will continue to resurface not only in loan shows but in their own
collections. '"310 Art theft victims from World War II have become
more organized and intent upon locating and reclaiming materials
plundered during the War. The World Jewish Congress has created
the Commission on Art Recovery to help original owners locate and
recover assets looted during the War.31' The B'nai B'rith Klutznick
National Jewish Museum has sponsored the Holocaust Art Restitution
Project.312 Governor Pataki of New York "has announced that the
State Banking Departments Holocaust Claims Processing Office will
include in its mission the search for works of art which were displaced
during the War."' A group of Italian officials is campaigning to
reclaim hundreds of art objects looted from Italy during World War11. 314
J. Repeated Admonitions of Legal and Professional Commentators
The repeated injunctions of legal writers and professional com-
mentators about the extent of stolen art in circulation and the need for
collectors to take appropriate precautions should inform investigative
responsibilities. For many years, legal commentators have warned
how easily collectors can mistakenly acquire stolen art and have punc-
tuated the need for buyers and collectors to exercise caution. These
admonitions include the following:
"Many countries are attempting to repatriate their displaced
treasures. The 'rightful owner' of valuable artwork will continu-
ally seek its return. This is a problem, of course, for the pur-
chaser of artwork. A buyer cannot be certain whether the seller
of a valuable artifact has good title or whether there is a 'rightful
owner' who may later appear. ' 315
"[T]he most effective incentive for investigating title before pur-
chasing art ... is the potential for losing an art work to the
310. Beverly Screiber Jacoby, The Nazi Legacy in the Art World-Effect on Value is One of
Many Issues, N.Y. L.J., March 30, 1998, at 6 (citing the Summer 1998 issue of Art News). The
article made clear that the problem of stolen art is not limited to materials looted during World
War II: "[tihe definition of good faith acquisition changes over time. Today it's Nazi loot;
tomorrow it could be African sculptures in the Met." Id.
311. Ziss, supra note 145, at 2.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See David D'Arcy, Italy Goes After Looted Treasures, ART & AUCTION, May 1997, at
26. The article states "they have fixed their sights on some distinguished works and appear to be
prevailing." Id.
315. See Acquiring Title, supra note 123, at 237.
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owner from whom it was stolen and being left with no way to
recover the investment."316
"Courts have come to demand increasingly thorough investiga-
tions into title... of artworks and antiquities purchased on the
international art market. Purchasers of works of art and anti-
quities are well advised to undertake particularly thorough
investigations .... ""'
"If you are the purchaser of a work of art and you do not want to
have an open-ended risk of having the work confiscated without
compensation then you must exercise due diligence in checking
out its ownership status." 318
"The steps which (collectors) should take in checking title corre-
spond to those which a rightful owner should take in putting the
public on notice that the work is stolen and no title can be con-
veyed. 31
9
This past year, professional commentators in estate planning and
asset protection journals have urged attorneys and fiduciaries to deal
with valuable art objects responsibly. The exposure of clients with
expensive art "can only be eliminated after collectors have taken com-
prehensive and informed precautions against acquiring stolen art, and
have positioned themselves to raise the equitable defense of laches to
the potential ... judicial claim of a former owner. "320 One estate
planning attorney has stressed the need for persons in mistaken pos-
session of stolen art to conduct appropriate investigations in order to
establish a laches defense to potential future claims. 32 As emphasized
in a recent article, "stolen art can wreak havoc upon estate and finan-
cial plans, undermine estate administration and compromise fiduciary
responsibilities because it can be reclaimed by former owners. "322
Because numerous professional commentaries in leading estate
planning and asset protection publications have counseled due dili-
gence inquiries for expensive artworks, it is all the more reasonable for
courts to expect that such investigations will be performed.
316. Hoover, supra note 6, at 50.
317. Montagu, supra note 62, at 78.
318. Joshua Kaufman, In Case of Theft, Consult a Lawyer, THE ART NEWSPAPER, Nov.
1995, at 6.
319. Laura W. Wertheimer, The Implications of the O'Keefe Case, 6 ART & L. 44, 47
(1981).
320. Madden, supra note 1, at 464.
321. Spero, supra note 1, at 61.
322. Basha, supra note 1, at 60 (commenting that a "due diligence investigation can protect
estates, trusts and professional fiduciaries").
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K. Traditional Deficiencies Inherent in Investigating
"Provenance" of a Particular Work
Due diligence investigations are necessary because they are the
only effective way collectors and buyers can avoid acquiring stolen
artworks. The measures that the art world commonly accepts as ade-
quate to accomplish this objective-investigating the "provenance" of
a particular work and relying upon the reputation of individual deal-
ers-are defective.
There are several reasons that the available "provenance" of a
work does not diminish the risk the work once may have been stolen.
First, authorities have reached no agreement concerning: (1) how the
term "provenance" is defined;323 (2) what materials comprise a prove-
nance; (3) how gaps in available information should be treated; (4)
how the material that is selected as "provenance" should be disclosed
or presented; or (5) the identity of the person who should make such
disclosure.3 24
Second, regardless of how the term is defined, most works lack a
complete "provenance. '' 32' The secrecy of most art transactions
assures that accurate information about past ownership often will be
unavailable: examining the ownership history of a piece of art can be
difficult in a market where anonymity and secrecy are the accepted
norms.3 26  Gaps in "provenance" often occur in part because many
sellers wish to keep their activities hidden. One commentator ob-
served that "art dealers and auction houses often sell art on behalf of
well-to-do families who wish to conceal the fact that they are facing
financial difficulties. "327 Other collectors "are notoriously tight
lipped" and may wish to deflect IRS scrutiny or the attention of
potential thieves. 328
Even when a provenance is available, the materials offered fre-
quently contain errors and mistakes. Art objects of lower value more
frequently contain errors in the provenance than more expensive
pieces. Adding to the problem is the fact that forged provenances are
not difficult to create or purchase.3 29
323. See, e.g., Kennon, supra note 61, at 382 n.45 (discussing varying definitions of the
term "provenance" as found in Dictionary of the Arts (M. Wolf. ed. 1951) and Hudson Diction-
ary of Art Terms (E. Lucie-Smith Thames ed. 1984)).
324. JEssicA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURE LAW, § 2.11[2], at 2-50
(1995).
325. Newsletter of Gallerie St. Etiene (June 9, 1998-Sept. 11, 1998 edition).
326. Van Pelt, supra note 165, at 456.
327. Id. at 457.
328. William G. Flannagan, Phony Provenances Shake the Art World, FoRBES, August 12,
1996, at 170.
329. Id.
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Finally, few dealers even attempt to verify the information they
report as "provenance." Errors are rarely detected, and "the art trade
knows that a lot slips through the cracks. 33
0
As a result of these many deficiencies of "provenance," few
pieces of art come with a perfect and complete pedigree,331 and
"[i]nsiders know there's often no way to track down who has owned a
painting."3 32 As a matter of diligently researching the history of an art
object, the art world's reliance on provenance is misplaced.
The second precaution that the art world has counseled to avoid
acquiring stolen art, to buy only from "reputable" dealers, also is
flawed. Because dealers frequently do not investigate the background
of artworks they sell,333 they often inadvertently sell stolen materials.
Indeed, several defendants in prominent judicial decisions for the
recovery of stolen art purchased the disputed items from established
and "reputable" dealers. 34  As these anecdotal cases show, an art
buyer cannot assume that an art object's history is free from title
defects simply because a dealer is "reputable."
L. Art World Resources
The availability of investigative resources that consistently have
identified stolen art objects helps define the appropriate scope of
inquiry for art buyers and collectors. Legal commentators have main-
tained that the practical ability of buyers and collectors to investigate
the title of art objects should guide determinations about good faith
and innocence. In reality, this is little more than a call to assess a
buyer's good faith and innocence in light of all the facts and circum-
stances. Whether a title defect was discoverable at all will not neces-
sarily determine whether the buyer acted in good faith. Rather, the
buyer's innocence will hinge on his or her resort to reasonable and
effective mechanisms to search for potential title defects.33 5
330. Flannagan, supra note 328, at 297.
331. Van Pelt, supra note 165, at 457.
332. Flannagan, supra note 328, at 170.
333. See supra note 6 (discussing the concession of the American Association of Art Deal-
ers in Porter v. Wertz that "the ordinary custom in the art business is not to inquire as to title.").
334. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y.
1991) (observing that the defendant in a lawsuit brought to recover a stolen Chagall painting had
purchased the painting from the reputable Robert Elkon Gallery in Manhattan); DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In DeWeerth, Wildenstein & Co., Inc., (Wilden-
stein gallery) was joined as a third party defendant in an action brought to reclaim a Monet
painting looted at the conclusion of World War II. The Wildenstein gallery had sold the paint-
ing to the defendant in 1957. Id. at 542.
335. Bibas, supra note 8, at 2454.
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As discussed infra, several information resources and investiga-
tive channels in the art world repeatedly have proven effective in
identifying and locating stolen art objects. 36 Buyers and trustees have
access to these resources, and "[t]here are even organizations that spe-
cialize in the title search of fine arts and antiquities. , 37
Accordingly, the capability of buyers and collectors to investigate
the background of a work effectively and in a cost-efficient manner (or
to hire a professional firm to perform this task) should influence the
view of the law as to whether a purchaser took adequate precautions
prior to purchasing an artwork.
M. Precautions to Protect Assets of Comparable Value
"Due diligence" has been defined as the measure of prudence
and precaution expected of a reasonable person in a given situation.
As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, due diligence is:
[s]uch a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is prop-
erly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reason-
able and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not
measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the rela-
tive facts of the special case.338
The purpose of due diligence is to "discover and analyze all the
material information" and to "identify and address any material areas
of concern" in a transaction. 339 Due diligence investigations enable:
(1) relevant information to be fully disclosed; (2) prospective transac-
tions to be evaluated; and (3) potential liability to be limited.340
Because "[t]he ultimate success" of many transactions "depends
directly and exclusively on the quality and detail of the due diligence
investigation, the due diligence review is one of the most important
and risk-fraught elements of any transaction."341
The exhaustive due diligence undertaken to protect assets of sim-
ilar value and to manage risks of corresponding magnitude can serve
as a model for the broad investigative responsibility with regard to
expensive art objects. Due diligence investigation has become essen-
tial in almost all commercial and real estate transactions. Those who
336. See infra pages 715-27 (discussing the several inquiries that comprise an appropriate
due diligence investigation for a valuable art object).
337. Ziss, supra note 145, at 10.
338. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (6th ed. 1990).
339. GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.01, at 1-5
(1994).
340. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 1.03, at 1-9.
341. Id. § 1.01, at 1-4.
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neglect appropriate inquiries in any transaction invite liability. The
justifications for due diligence in business and real estate transactions
apply with special force when valuable art objects with unknown, and
often unknowable, ownership histories are bought and sold in a mar-
ket saturated with stolen merchandise. As one commentator observed,
"[t]he courts are encouraging buyers in the art market to treat pur-
chases more like real estate transactions by allowing time to investigate
title. "342
Due diligence is an ancient practice, and has been conducted in
some manner since the dawn of commercial activity:
The notion and practice of due diligence-that is using reason-
able efforts as measured by a prudent person standard to deter-
mine the accuracy and completeness of statements or the bona
fides [of]... [a] transaction-has, at least informally, been in
existence since the first unwary customer bought the first mis-
represented goods or services from a shrewd merchant.343
The complexity and litigiousness of the modern commercial
world have made due diligence investigations both essential and ubi-
quitous. In today's business environment, conscientious attorneys and
business persons will perform due diligence in virtually every transac-
tion, regardless of its type or the financial value of what is at stake.344
The scope of a diligent investigation required in any situation is
informed by the specific facts and circumstances, "as the standard of
reasonableness and that of a prudent man are standards that a court
will determine in a case by case basis."34 Moreover, the identity of
the person charged with the responsibility of investigation is always an
important consideration, and "the courts will measure the adequacy of
a defendant's due diligence inspection against what is expected of a
person in his particular role." '346 Breaches of due diligence responsi-
bilities are likely to be found when the information needed to make a
correct decision could have been readily obtained.347
The standard regarding how much investigation is indicated, or
"due" in a given situation, is never gauged by the common or histori-
342. Hoover, supra note 6, at 52.
343. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 2.01, at 2-2.
344. Id.
345. 1 WILLIAM M. PRIFITI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 11.05, at 15
(2d ed. 1995).
346. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 2.02, at 2-15; see also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (observing that in evaluating the due diligence defense of
a defendant in an action for the breach of he federal securities laws, "the unique position which
he occupied cannot be disregarded.").
347. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 690; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 2.02, at 2-14.
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cal practices of the industry in question. Rather, the measure of due
diligence is always determined by what a reasonably prudent person
would do in like circumstances. Justice Holmes formulated the black
letter rule many years ago:
What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done,
but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it is usually complied with or not."
Given the lax standards of the art world, this formulation of dili-
gence is important in exposing the "status quo" dealers and buyers to
liability. Authorities consistently underscore the importance of docu-
menting due diligence investigations to ensure that the parties receive
the intended protection. As one commentator observed, "[n]o matter
how effective and penetrating the actual due diligence investigation,
the level of protection it provides from allegations of inadequacy or
malfeasance will be greatly diminished if a clear, concise, and complete
record of investigation is not made and retained." '349 Most signifi-
cantly, "[t]he audience for the due diligence investigation compendi-
um... is likely to be a judge or jury who never heard of the
underlying transaction until it became the subject of litigation.""3 '
Due diligence is required whenever a change in asset ownership
is contemplated or when potential liability is threatened. For example,
whenever a business is being acquired, prospective buyers and their
attorneys are counseled to make inquiries into more than two hundred
discrete issues in subject areas including organizational structure, asset
ownership, contractual relationships with third parties, insurance, out-
standing claims, and current as well as potential litigation.351 Special
investigation is prescribed for international acquisitions.352
Due diligence for the purchase of real estate is similarly exten-
sive. One commentator instructed that "[t]he real estate acquisition
process is like navigating through uncharted waters" and that "[d]ue
diligence procedures can provide the framework for a safe course. '313
The role of the attorney, of course, is especially important in real
348. James D. Schwartz et al., Due Diligence in Life Insurance Selection, PROBATE & PROP-
ERTY 39 (March/April 1994) (citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 479
(1903)).
349. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 5.01, at 5-1.
350. Id. § 5.01[4], at 5-8.
351. See, e.g., 8 ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAx PLANNING
(1996) (describing many dozens of distinct inquiries to make when contemplating the purchase
of a business).
352. See, e.g., Michael R. Oestreicher, Legal Due Diligence Checklist -International Acqui-
sitions, 12 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S QUARTERLY 76 (1995).
353. Harvey S. Gettleson et al., Navigating the Due Diligence Process: A Checklist
Approach to Analyzing Real Estate for Your Client, U.S.C. Law Center Tax Institute, ch. 17.
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estate transactions. Attorneys must take exceptional precautions to
identify any ownership limitations or restrictions in real property that
their clients intend to acquire. As one authority instructed,
[d]eeds, title policies, transfer restrictions, easements, encum-
brances, restrictive covenants, zoning, building moratoria, all
these and more rest squarely within the attorney's domain, and
as such must constitute part of the law firm's principal due dili-
gence efforts for which it will bear primary responsibility. And,
as always .... the review [must] be conducted in a manner that
takes full account of these considerations .. .
Expansive due diligence investigations have become standard in
many other areas as well. For example, underwriters engaged in initial
public offerings of securities must perform due diligence in order to
escape liability under federal securities laws.355 Moreover, due dili-
gence has expanded in securities practice to areas where it is not even
identified by law as an affirmative defense.356 In addition, exhaustive
due diligence investigation for potential hazardous waste sites on real
property is prescribed to mitigate liability under federal environmental
laws.357 Estate planners also have been advised to exercise due dili-
gence in the selection of life insurance.3"8 Due diligence informs the
responsibilities of trustees in bankruptcy proceedings to inquire con-
cerning the assets of a petitioner under certain circumstances.359
Due diligence investigations now are recognized as essential in all
business transactions, and for many other activities as well. The insti-
tutionalization of due diligence procedures in so many areas makes it
all the more reasonable for courts to expect that appropriate precau-
tions of comparable scope also will be observed for valuable art
objects.
354. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 9.01[2], at 9-6, 9-7.
355. PRIFITI, supra note 345, at 57-58 (observing that "without at least a reasonable inves-
tigation of the items contained in the disclosure document, defenses in civil suits and adminis-
trative proceedings are unavailable").
356. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, § 2.02, at 2-29.
357. See, e.g., BA's Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) (1997) (counseling extensive
inquiries for complying with federal legislation imposing personal liability upon designated indi-
viduals for hazardous substances liability).
358. See, e.g., Patricia L. Brown, A Practical Approach to Due Diligence Planning, THE
PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Summer 1996, at 7.
359. See, e.g., In re Pomaville, 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (stating that
"due diligence requires a trustee to conduct searches that are realistic in the ordinary course of
the trustee's performance of his duties").
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N. Superior Capability of Appropriate Due Diligence
Investigation to Protect Legal Ownership Rights
Under the prevailing "balance of equities" judicial criterion, the
capacity of appropriate due diligence investigation to protect legal
ownership rights in stolen art objects supports a broader standard of
inquiry. In most contexts, due diligence investigation is a "virtual
'zero defects' business," because the failure to identify a particular
flaw or deficiency (however well-camouflaged or concealed) can result
in liability.36° The adequacy of many due diligence investigations "is
most often judged with the benefit of hindsight." '361 On the other
hand, due diligence investigations for valuable works of art do not
require perfection or that the collector "get it right." Courts applying
the "balance of equities" judicial criterion have not imposed a strict
liability standard upon buyers and collectors.
The "balance of equities" question is not whether the item in
dispute has in fact been stolen, or even whether the collector could
have identified the item as stolen through a more comprehensive
investigation. Rather, the question is whether the person found in
possession of the disputed object took reasonable precautions to avoid
acquiring the stolen property as measured by the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. Courts applying this standard will
weigh and balance the steps the possessor took to avoid acquiring sto-
len property against the steps the theft victim followed when reporting
the loss, and also will consider other equities that favor each party.
Courts will deny the claim of the theft victim if the equitable bal-
ance weighs in the defendant's favor even if the defendant might have
done more to investigate whether an item was stolen. The capability
of an appropriate investigation to protect legal ownership rights under
these circumstances favors a more comprehensive standard.
0. Cost-Effective Benefits of Expansive Due Diligence Inquiry
The cost-effective benefits that thorough due diligence investi-
gations achieve for international art theft victims, institutional and pri-
vate collectors, as well as the U.S. art market, additionally favor more
extensive inquiries. As stated in the increasingly familiar economist's
terms, "[t]he law's goal should not be to maximize marketability per
se, but rather to achieve optimum marketability by inducing buyers to
weigh the costs of investigation against its benefits." '362 Equally obvi-
360. LAWRENCE, supra note 339, at § 1.01, at 1-3.
361. Id.
362. Bibas, supra note 8, at 2451.
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ous is the fact that the law should assign investigative and reporting
duties upon the parties who can discharge them most effectively. 63
Extensive and informed due diligence investigations offer many
advantages. First, such investigations help international art theft vic-
tims to locate and reclaim their stolen property. Inquiries to resources
to which theft victims are likely to report their losses, or which other-
wise may be aware of such losses, by definition assist in locating looted
materials. The many difficulties theft victims face in finding stolen
art, as previously discussed, amplify the value of this benefit.
In addition, inclusive due diligence investigations enable both
institutional and private collectors to secure good legal title to poten-
tially stolen art objects under the "balance of equities" judicial criteri-
on. Legal commentators have recognized that information that
assures good title to works of art confers premium value in the mar-
ketplace.364 The cost-effectiveness of aggressive and informed due
diligence investigation for art buyers and collectors, then, alone more
than justifies it as a prescribed legal standard.
Finally, adequate due diligence investigations provide the U.S.
art market with an essential title clearing mechanism that will honor
the reasonable commercial expectations of art buyers and collectors.36
Accordingly, the many benefits of a comprehensive standard of inves-
tigation more than recommend it.
P. Refusal of Courts to Prescribe Specific Criteria for Art Theft Victims
The failure of leading U.S. courts to formulate specific investiga-
tive or reporting requirements for all art theft victims accentuates the
need for collectors to take greater precautions against acquiring stolen
materials. As previously discussed, the courts both in Lubell (applying
the laches standard of New York), as well as Erisoty (interpreting the
discovery rule), have declined "to spell out arbitrary rules of conduct
that all true owners of stolen art would have to follow to the letter if
they wanted to preserve their right to pursue a cause of action in
replevin." '366 Moreover, as the court in Erisoty instructed, the investi-
363. Hawkins et al., supra note 56, at 53-54.
364. See, e.g., Borodkin, supra note 166, at 412 (asserting that "the economic value of
legal... legitimacy is crucial to any understanding of the art market, since the market pays a
premium value for items with documented provenance").
365. As discussed at pages 659-63, supra, the prolific quantities of stolen art in circulation
and the lax commercial practices of the international art market mean that buyers and collectors
who neglect appropriate precautions cannot be said to entertain "reasonable" ownership expecta-
tions.
366. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991); see
also Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995), affd,
No. 95-1807 (3d Cir. 1996).
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gative standard for theft victims is necessarily "fact-sensitive so as to
adjust the level of scrutiny as is appropriate in light of the identity of
the parties; what efforts are reasonable for an individual who is rela-
tively unfamiliar with the art world may not be reasonable for a savvy
collector, a gallery, or a museum. ' ' 6
7
The intentionally flexible standard that courts have fashioned to
gauge the efforts of theft victims under the "balance of equities" judi-
cial criterion intuits that buyers and collectors of valuable art comprise
a relatively homogenous group. As previously noted, the identity of
art theft victims and the circumstances under which they sustain losses
differ substantially. Their wealth, resources, access to information,
and art world sophistication similarly vary. For example, impover-
ished grandchildren of a couple that perished in the Holocaust and
that left only scant records of the art objects the Nazis plundered from
their grandparents, have little in common with a nationally prominent
tax-exempt institutional collector, such as the Metropolitan Museum
of Art in New York, or the Chicago Art Institute, from which a par-
ticular painting has been stolen. Courts rightly have determined that
the efforts of these two diversely situated theft victims to report their
losses and pursue their claims should not be governed by the same
standard.
Collectors and buyers of expensive art objects, by contrast, have
much more in common. They all acquire materials voluntarily. They
either are tax-exempt institutions with an abundance of art world
expertise and access to information and sophistication or they are pri-
vate collectors who are sufficiently wealthy to afford these resources.
They have time to consider their prospective acquisitions and to con-
duct investigations before making decisions. The wealth and art
world resources that buyers and collectors of expensive works neces-
sarily enjoy, and their similar status concerning many of the consid-
erations that define their equitable position vis-a-vis art theft victims,
recommend that courts impose an investigative standard upon buyers
and collectors that is both comprehensive and comparatively uniform.
Because buyers and collectors cannot be certain what steps theft
victims may have taken to report their losses, or what other equities
may weigh in their favor,368 collectors who want to make certain that
their legal ownership rights are protected must investigate valuable
materials with special attention. Accordingly, the inherent flexibility
367. Erisoty, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *18.
368. As discussed at pages 670-73, supra, art theft victims may suffer many impediments
and confront numerous obstacles in seeking to locate and recover their stolen property. For these
reasons, courts view the equitable balance as weighted heavily in theft victims' favor.
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of the equitable balancing standard and the very capability of buyers
and collectors to make informed and extensive inquiries, reinforces the
need for them to do so.
Q Flexibility of Laches Doctrine to Protect Buyers and Collectors
The inherent flexibility of the equitable doctrine of laches and
the manner in which it protects the typical reliance interests of art
buyers and collectors also suggests a comprehensive standard of
inquiry. The doctrine of laches safeguards the reliance interests of
buyers and collectors who acquire and care for expensive works and
who create financial and estate plans with valuable art objects as inte-
grated assets.
Because courts consistently have recognized that laches determi-
nations are appropriate for summary judgment, the laches doctrine
offers an efficient way for collectors who appropriately investigate the
background of a valuable art object to protect their ownership rights.
The responsiveness of the laches doctrine to the needs of buyers and
collectors for an effective title clearing mechanism makes it all the
more reasonable for courts to expect that inquiries undertaken to
identify potential conflicting ownership claims to expensive artworks
will be appropriately comprehensive.
IV. LACHES
Laches is the equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations.
It is an affirmative defense which, if successful, establishes the facts
necessary to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. Unlike the
statute of limitations, however, laches does not apply to mere delay
alone, but only to delay that causes a defendant harm or prejudice.
Laches "permits a court of equity to cut off a right of action when the
plaintiff has delayed unreasonably and inexcusably in instituting liti-
gation and thereby has prejudiced the defendant significantly."369
Accordingly, a successful defense of laches requires not only a
showing by the that the plaintiff delayed unreasonably and without
excuse under the circumstances in asserting a claim, but also that as a
result of the delay, the defendant has suffered prejudice. As the Uni-
ted States Supreme Court has instructed, "[1]aches requires proof of
(1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted,
and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.""37 Prejudice and
369. David D. Higgins, The Application of the Doctrine of Laches in Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 56 B.U. L. REv. 181 (1976).
370. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity §
158, at 635-37 (1996), observing that
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delay, however, are integrally inversely related in the laches determi-
nation. As one court explained, "the greater the delay the less
prejudice required to show laches, and vice versa. ' 371  Most impor-
tantly, a causal relationship must exist between the delay of the plain-
tiff and the resulting injury or prejudice to the defendant. As the
court explained in Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger,7 a
showing of laches requires not only a "lack of diligence by the plain-
tiff," but also "injurious reliance thereon by the defendant." '373 The
defendant asserting the defense of laches, then, must be able to show
As a general rule, two elements are necessary to a finding of laches: (1) Delay by a
party in asserting a known right or claim, or, stated otherwise, lack of diligence, lapse
of time, or failure timely to assert such right or claim; and (2) prejudice, injury, harm,
hardship, damage, disadvantage, unfairness, injustice, inequity, or change of position,
circumstances, or condition, that is caused by or results from the delay.
371. White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Stone v. Williams, 873
F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir.), vacated, 891 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989) (instructing that "an evaluation of
prejudice... is integrally related to the inquiry regarding delay. Where there is no excuse for
delay.., defendants need show little prejudice; a weak excuse for delay may, on the other hand,
suffice to defeat a laches defense if no prejudice has been shown."). In Larios v. Victory Carri-
ers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1963), the court stated that delay and resulting prejudice "are
not to be viewed independently. A weak excuse may suffice if there has been no prejudice; an
exceedingly good one might still do even when there has been some." See also HENRY L.
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, § 28, at 71 (1941) (observing that
"[w]here no prejudice has resulted, a long delay has been held not to amount to laches. On the
other hand, a very short delay may prevent recovery where it has resulted in serious loss to
defendant.").
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated its initial decision in Stone based
upon new facts that had come to light after it had issued its decision and not because of any error
of law it had committed in applying the doctrine of laches in that decision. The vacation was
based upon a petition for a rehearing of appeal filed under pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 40
requesting in which the plaintiff requested that the court reconsider its earlier decision. Stone,
891 F.2d at 402. That earlier decision had affirmed an award of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on their defense that the doctrine of laches precluded plaintiffs claim seeking her
alleged share of copyright renewal rights to songs written by her natural father, Hank Williams.
Id.
The petition for rehearing was primarily based upon a subsequent decision by the Supreme
Court of Alabama that set aside judicial decrees of an Alabama circuit court in 1967 and 1968
that held that the plaintiff was not an heir to William's estate. Id. at 403. The Supreme Court of
Alabama had found that the defendants had "intentionally, willfully and fraudulently concealed
plaintiff's identity, existence, claim and rights as a natural child of Hank Williams, Sr.," and that
this fraud, in conjunction with other errors, was sufficient ground to set aside the earlier rulings.
Id. The Second Circuit declared that the Alabama Supreme Court's "finding of fraud requires a
reappraisal of our decision made before the court ruled." 891 F.2d at 404. The court further
concluded that "the prejudice to defendants we identified in our prior opinion.., would not
have existed but for the failure of the present defendants to reveal the facts of which they had
knowledge," and that the defendants "should not be allowed to claim that they are prejudiced by
plaintiff's present assertion of her rights when they were aware of them all along." Id. The court
accordingly vacated its earlier opinion and remanded plaintiff's claim for a trial upon its merits.
Id. Most importantly, the court found no error of law in its earlier decision.
372. 694 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
373. Id. at 843.
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that the failure of the plaintiff to exercise greater diligence reasonably
caused or induced injurious reliance. As another court instructed,
"laches arises upon the failure to assert a known right under circum-
stances indicating that the lached party has abandoned or surrendered
its right. ,374
The discrete elements of laches vary slightly in the several states,
although proof of unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice are
essential criteria in all formulations of the doctrine.37 Under the law
of New York, where many persons in unknowing possession of stolen
art objects may be subject to suit, the laches defense is comprised of
four elements:376
374. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Driver, 451 S.E.2d 924, 929 (S.C. Ct. App.
1994).
375. Courts throughout the United States have announced tests for establishing the laches
defense that differ slightly. However, all consider whether the delay of the plaintiff was reason-
able or excusable under the circumstances and whether the defendant sustained injury as a result
of the delay. For example, in Province v. Province, 473 S.E.2d 894, 904 (W. Va. 1996), the court
instructed that under the law of West Virginia "[tlhe elements of laches consist of (1) unreason-
able delay and (2) prejudice."
The Court of Appeals of Indiana, however, has declared that "[ljaches is comprised of three
elements: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from
knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice
to the adverse party." Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Other courts have recognized as many as four distinct components to the laches defense that
are not always the same. For example, the Appellate Court of Illinois instructed in Evers v.
Collinsville Township, 647 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (I11. App. Ct. 1995):
For a court to bar a suit on the grounds of laches, the following facts must be dis-
closed:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had notice or knowl-
edge of defendant's conduct and the opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit.., and (4) injury or prejudice to the defend-
ant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is held not to be
barred.
See also Henderson v. Smith, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (Idaho 1996), declaring that "[tihe necessary ele-
ments to maintain a defense of laches are:
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the
plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be
barred.
For another formulation of the laches test, which recognizes the absence of excuse of the plaintiff
in maintaining a claim as a distinct component, see State ex. rel Polo v. Cuyahoga County Board
of Elections, 656 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (Ohio 1995) (stating that the elements of laches are: "(1)
unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right; (2) absence of excuse for the delay; (3)
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and; (4) prejudice to the other party.").
376. 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Limitations and Laches, § 333 at 538 (1989). See also Rapfv. Suffolk
County of New York, 755 F.2d 282, 292 (2d Cir. 1985) (instructing that "[a]n equitable action is
barred by laches under New York law where the following exist: (1) proof of delay in asserting a
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(1) conduct by an offending party giving rise to the situation
complained of;
(2) delay by the complainant asserting his or her claim for
relief despite the opportunity to do so;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the offending
party that the complainant would assert his or her claim for
relief,377 and;
(4) injury or prejudice to the offending party in the event that
relief is accorded the complainant.
Courts deciding disputed claims of ownership to stolen art works
consistently have applied an equitable "balancing" principle to weigh
the factors of delay and resulting prejudice.37 Authorities have recog-
claim despite the opportunity to do so; (2) lack of knowledge on the defendant's part that a claim
would be asserted; and (3) prejudice to the defendant by the allowance of the claim."); Dwyer v.
Mazzola, 567 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (prescribing the four distinct elements
to the laches defense).
377. Courts in New York and other states have underscored the importance in establishing
laches of the reasonable lack of knowledge by the defendant that the plaintiff would bring a claim
and have defined the doctrine as essentially protecting the justifiable expectations of the defen-
dant in this regard. For example, in Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1139 (2d Cir.
1991), the concurring opinion of Judge Jon 0. Newman explained the significance of the Lubell
decision as balancing the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that it owned the controverted
painting against the steps the theft victim took to try to find it:
The result of this decision is to permit a court encountering a dispute between a theft
victim and a good-faith possessor to consider and balance all of the equities, including
the reasonableness of the efforts the theft victim made to locate the property and the
reasonableness of the possessor's basis for believing that it was entitled to keep the
property.
Other courts have described the laches defense similarly. See, e.g., Self v. Self, 893 S.W.2d 775,
778 (Ark. 1995), instructing that
[t]he doctrine of laches is based on a number of equitable principles that are premised
on some detrimental change in position made in reliance upon the action or inaction of
the other party... It is based on the assumption that the party to whom laches is
imputed has knowledge of his rights and the opportunity to assert them, that by reason
of his delay some adverse party has good reason to believe those rights are worthless or have
been abandoned, and that because of a change of conditions during the delay it would
be unjust to the latter to permit him to assert them. (Emphasis added).
See also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Driver, 451 S.E.2d 924, 929 (S.C. Ct. App.
1994) (commenting that "as with waiver, laches arises upon the failure to assert a known right
under circumstances indicating that the lached party has abandoned or surrendered the right");
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 371, at 73, (asserting that "defendant's ignorance of notice of plain-
tiff's claim may have a bearing on the question of what is a reasonable delay").
378. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 623 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990), reviewing the argument of the plaintiff that the defendants should have taken
greater precautions against acquiring a stolen painting and stating that "[w]e comment on this
argument only to point out that defendant's vigilance is as much in issue as plaintiff's diligence,
which is another reason we characterize the defense urged here as laches. The reasonableness of
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nized that under this equitable balance, the failure of theft victims to
exercise diligence in seeking to locate their stolen artworks can result
in their ownership rights being expunged.379 As the federal district
court observed in DeWeerth v. Baldinger"' (a controversy involving a
Monet painting stolen at the end of World War II):
[i]n reviewing a laches defense, a court must balance the two fac-
tors of delay and prejudice, and then apply the balancing test to
the facts of the case .... Because of the particular fact sensitive
nature of the laches inquiry and the lack of any objective stand-
ard pursuant to which a laches defense will be held to bar an
otherwise valid claim, an assessment of whether a plaintiff is
guilty of laches is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
A. Equitable Basis of the Laches Doctrine
The equitable foundation of the laches doctrine, and its concern
with protecting good faith property possessors from stale claims,
rewards buyers and collectors who take appropriate precautions
against acquiring stolen art.
First, the adaptability of the doctrine benefits persons who per-
form adequate due diligence investigations. As a principle of equity,
laches invokes the conscience of the court and its ability to consider
equitable factors in deciding a controversy.38' Laches is applied flexi-
bly, not mechanically.382 As one court noted, "[t]he distinguishing
both parties must be considered and weighed." In affirning the decision, the New York Court
of Appeals declared that defendant's "contention that the [plaintiff] museum did not exercise
reasonable diligence in locating the painting will be considered by the Trial Judge in the context
of her laches defense. The conduct of both the appellant and the museum will be relevant to any
consideration of this defense at the trial level and ... prejudice will need to be shown." 569
N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991). See also Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1137-38 (stating that "[tihe doctrine
of laches sufficiently safeguards the interests of a good faith purchaser of lost art by weighing in
the balance of competing interests the owner's diligence in pursuing her claim.").
379. See Carla J. Shapreau, California Court of Appeals Adopts Discovery Rule in Cases to
Recover Stolen Art, 17 IFAR REPORTS, No. 5, at 3 (May 1996), asserting that
[D]iligence is still an important factor in the battle for title to stolen art. A theft vic-
tim who fails to act reasonably to locate stolen art and to timely bring a claim to
recover it could be vulnerable to a laches defense which could cut off the victim's right
to recover stolen art.
See also 1991 Practice Commentary to N.Y.C.P.L.R. 206, at 84 (McKinney 1962) (discussing
the Lubell decision and instructing that "[t]he lesson for the owner is that the taking of diligent
steps to solve the theft may still be relevant in combating a laches defense.").
380. 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
381. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
382. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946), explaining that
Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility. Equity has acted on the
principle that laches is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a
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feature of equity jurisdiction is that it possesses full power to apply
settled rules to unusual conditions and to mold its decree so as to do
equity between the parties. ' 383 Because the court considers all aspects
of a case, including the many benefits to international art theft victims
and the U.S. art market of appropriate due diligence inquiries, it
champions the position of those who conduct such investigations.
Second, the diligence and good faith that an expansive investiga-
tion evidences greatly increases a defendant's chances of winning on a
defense of laches. This is because laches is premised upon the maxim
that "[e]quity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights, '384 Equitable relief can be awarded only when the party who
petitions for it has demonstrated diligence and good faith: "[a] court
of equity ... has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the
party has slept upon its rights, and acquiesced for a great length of
time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience,
good faith and reasonable diligence." 311
Third, laches protects the property rights of those who perform
appropriate due diligence investigations. The doctrine of laches is
specifically calculated to safeguard property rights and to reward rea-
sonable ownership expectations. Laches seeks to encourage owners to
care for their property and to make their ownership claims known. As
the court instructed in Livermore v. Beal:386
No doctrine is so wholesome, when wisely administered, as that
of laches. It prevents the resurrection of stale titles, and forbids
the spying out from the records of ancient and abandoned rights.
It requires of every owner that he take care of his property, and
of every claimant that he make known his claims. It gives to the
actual and longer possessor security, and induces and justifies
him in all efforts to improve and make valuable property he
holds.387
question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced - an inequity founded
upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties.
383. In re Marriage of Jones, 921 P.2d 839, 845 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
384. See, e.g., Gull Airborne Industries v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (asserting that "[tihe laches doctrine ... reflects the principle that 'equity aids the vigilant,
not those who slumber on their rights,' and is designed to promote diligence and prevent
enforcement of stale claims"); Comment, The Doctrine of Laches in Florida: A Statutory Hybrid?
13 STETSON L. REV. 446, 449 (1984) (observing that "[l]aches, an affirmative defense, is tradi-
tionally predicated on the maxim that 'equity aids the vigilant."').
385. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 371, § 419, at 171. See also Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396
(declaring that "to call into action the powers" of a court in equity, "'[tihere must be conscience,
good faith, and reasonable diligence').
386. Livermore v. Beal, 64 P.2d 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
387. Id. at 995.
[Vol. 23:631
2000] Due Diligence Investigation
Fourth, the doctrine of laches enhances the position of those who
perform appropriate due diligence investigations by weighing the
benefit to public interest and policy of such inquiries. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the welfare of the public in securing good
title to property can bear importantly upon the laches determina-
tion.388 Accordingly, the public interest in creating an appropriate
"title clearing" mechanism for the U.S. art market, and the imperative
of safeguarding the reasonable commercial expectations of buyers and
collectors, properly informs laches determinations and thus benefits
those who fulfil their investigative responsibilities.
Fifth, the doctrine of laches charges nondiligent theft victims
with knowledge of the reasonable efforts of current owners or pro-
spective buyers to discover whether a particular art object has been
stolen and to locate the true owner. The laches doctrine imputes con-
structive notice to plaintiffs of all information that they reasonably
should have ascertained.389 Had theft victims made their losses known
388. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Minnesota Ry. Transfer Co., 169 U.S. 237 (1898). In Wetzel, the
Court affirmed a decision precluding, on the ground of laches, a claim brought by the family of a
Mexican war veteran to recover a 160 acre tract of land issued to the widow of the veteran under
a government land warrant. Id. at 239-40. The warrant later was sold but not duly recorded in
the orphans' court where the children of the decedent resided. Id. at 239. The buyer located the
warrant within the corporate limits of the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, and the land appreciated in
value over the next thirty years from approximately $1,500 to more than $1,000,000. Id. at 240.
Some forty-four years after the warrant was issued, and thirty years after the eldest child of
the decedent had reached majority, the family sued to recover the land on grounds that the
recording defect voided the transfer. Id. at 240-41. The Court held that merely because plain-
tiffs had been unaware of the defect earlier, and lacked the capability to investigate the matter,
did not outweigh the ownership expectations of the public concerning the land which had
become settled over the years. The Court declared:
While the fact that the complainants were ignorant of the defect in the title and were
without means to prosecute an investigation into the facts may properly be considered
by the court, it does not mitigate the hardship to the defendants of unsettling these
titles. If the complainant may put forward these excuses for delay after thirty years,
there is no reason why they may not allege the same as an excuse after a lapse of sixty.
The truth is, there must be some limit of time within which these excuses shall be
available, or titles might forever be insecure. The interests of public order and tranquility
demand that parties shall acquaint themselves with their rights within a reasonable time,
and, although this time may be extended by their actual ignorance, or want of means,
it is by no means illimitable.
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice White,
and Justice Rehnquist in County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
State, 470 U.S. 226, 265 (1985) (citing the foregoing passage in Wetzel and arguing that laches
properly should preclude the claim of a native American tribe seeking to void a conveyance of
land that it had made some 175 years earlier).
389. See Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 448, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Mey-
ers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declaring that "[t]o establish the
defense of laches, a defendant must prove.., the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known of its claim against the defendant .... ). In Grant Airmass Corp. v. Gaymar Industries,
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to any of the multiple resources that collectors consulted, they would
have been able to locate their stolen works. Accordingly, the failure of
nondiligent theft victims to have done so properly should preclude
their claims.
Finally, laches bars many excuses that nondiligent theft victims
might raise in seeking to avoid an equitable bar to their claims. This
is because in deciding whether prejudice outweighs delay in a given
instance, courts necessarily consider the plaintiff's excuse for the
3112delay.39 Courts have ruled that poverty,"' ignorance of legal rights,392
and the inability to locate an attorney to prosecute an action393 are
inadequate excuses and will not justify a delay in asserting a claim for
laches purposes.3 94
B. Appropriate Due Diligence Investigation to Establish Prejudice
Collectors who acquire or maintain expensive works of art after
investigating the background of these items frequently are positioned
to establish the prejudice necessary to state a defense of laches. Per-
haps the most common forms of prejudice to the defendant are loss of
evidence necessary to meet the claim of the plaintiff and a change in
the situation of the parties or the position of the defendant that has
been induced by the delay.
Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court stated that in deciding the laches ques-
tion "[t]he court will inquire as to when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts affecting his rights .. "
390. See, e.g., In re Brin-mont Chemicals, Inc., 154 B.R. 903, 907 (M.D.N.C. 1993)
(explaining that "[tlhe role of the court in considering the equitable defense of laches is to bal-
ance the plaintiffs delay in bringing his claim and the resulting prejudice to a defendant, against
plaintiffs excuse for such delay"); see also White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990)
(discussing generally the balancing of delay, prejudice, and excuse in deciding the laches ques-
tion).
391. Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548,1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (asserting that
"[t]he Supreme Court made clear long ago that poverty, by itself, is never an excuse for laches
purposes"); see also Leggett v. Standard Oil Co., 149 U.S. 287 (1893).
392. See Ortega v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 258 F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D. Cal.
1966) (ruling that the ignorance of a worker injured while unloading cargo from a ship was "not
sufficiently exceptional to excuse the delay" in filing suit). The court observed in In re Marriage
of Flynn, 812 P.2d 1087, 1088 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), that "ignorance of the law or legal rights
will not excuse a delay in suing."
393. See Coleman v. Coming Glass Works, 619 F. Supp 950, 954 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
(repudiating the excuse of a patent holder that he failed to initiate a patent infringement claim
earlier because he could not locate or afford appropriate counsel: "[h]e alleges that much of the
delay was due to his inability to find an attorney to prosecute the action, or to raise the necessary
funds. Those excuses are inadequate as a matter of law.").
394. But see 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 168, 648-49 (1996) (stating that under certain lim-
ited circumstances courts have found these excuses sufficient to preclude a showing of laches).
2000] Due Diligence Investigation
1. Loss of Evidence
Authorities consistently have recognized that the prejudice nec-
essary for a laches defense can be established by showing that the
delay of plaintiff has resulted in the loss of evidence, such as the death
of an important witness or the destruction of essential documents.395
2. Change in the Situation of the Parties or the
Position of the Defendant
Changes in the position or situation of the parties can be brought
about by an intervening transfer in title to the property in controversy,
expenditures or investments that have been made for maintaining or
improving the property, lost opportunity costs and the frustration of
preexisting plans, and an increase in the value of the property at issue.
For example, a transfer in title that occurs when an innocent party
acquires disputed property with no reason to believe that it belongs to
another or has been impaired by claims of others may support a laches
defense.396 Courts have acknowledged that defendants can suffer
severe prejudice in such instances.397 Prejudice to the rights of third
395. See, e.g., Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d 537, 540 (Mont. 1991) (declaring that
"in determining whether laches shall bar a particular claim it is proper to consider (1) whether a
party or an important witness [has] died, and the party against whom the claim is asserted has
been deprived thereby of important testimony .... ). In Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 A.2d
1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978), the court commented that "[iun the past typical examples of prejudice
that have supported the defense of laches have been the loss of evidence.., or the death of a key
witness."
In Nunley v. Nunley, 925 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), the court ruled that
laches barred the claim of a former wife against her ex-husband and songwriter for an accounting
of her share of royalties earned from the sale of the defendant's song when consequences of her
protracted delay included the loss of necessary business records and the deteriorating physical
condition of the defendant, "which made it impossible for him to testify in court .... " In Illinois
v. Heirens, 648 N.E.2d 260, 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), the court ruled that laches precluded the
petition of a prisoner for post-conviction relief when petitioner had delayed for some 49 years in
asserting his claim and "all of the witnesses and attorneys in the original case appear to be long
dead."
396. See Fitzgerald, 386 A.2d at 1388 (commenting that "[i]n the past, typical examples of
prejudice that have supported the defense of laches have been ... a change of title..."); see also
75 N.Y. JUR. 2D Limitations and Laches § 337, at 544 (1989) ("[t]he disadvantage may come
from ... change of title").
397. See, e.g., Lake Caryonah Improvement Ass'n v. Pulte Home Corp., 903 F.2d 505 (7th
Cir. 1990), where the court affirmed a ruling that the doctrine of laches precluded a claim by a
property owners association seeking specific performance of a contract to convey a parcel of land
from a home developer (Pulte). The record showed that Pulte had purchased the land "reasona-
bly believing that there were no outstanding claims on the property" and had paid taxes and
insurance on it for eleven years. Id. at 510. The court declared that "[w]e find it hard to imagine
a circumstance in which the application of laches would be more justified." Id. at 509.
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parties who have modified their position during the period of delay
also can be the basis for establishing laches.398
Prejudice Resulting from a Change of Position: Prejudice sufficient
to raise a laches defense also can be shown "if, during the period of
delay, the circumstances or relationships between the parties have
changed so that it would be unfair to let the suit go forward., 399
Changes in the relative positions of the parties for laches purposes
sometimes are referred to collectively as "economic" or "financial"
prejudice and include the following."'
Prejudice Resulting from Change of Title: Primary prejudice for
laches purposes occurs when an innocent party acquires disputed
property with no reason to believe that it belongs to another or has
been impaired by claims of others.4"' Courts have acknowledged that
defendants can suffer severe prejudice in such instances.4 2
Prejudice Resulting from Incurring Expenses or Making Expendi-
tures for Improvements to Disputed Property: Courts have recognized
that if, during the period of delay, an innocent party incurs expenses,
enters into obligations, makes improvements to property, or pays
taxes, the necessary prejudice for laches purposes may be shown.403
Prejudice can occur in this context when a party, in reliance upon a
certain condition or state of affairs, incurs expenditures that it other-
wise would not have made40 4 or improves property.4 5 The fact that
398. Id.
399. Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1989); see also DRT Mechanical Corp.
v. Colin County, 845 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (asserting that "[l]aches consists of
an unreasonable delay by one having a legal or equitable right in asserting such right and a good
faith change of position by another to his detriment because of the delay.").
400. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity, § 177, 656, § 186, 664 (1996).
401. See Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978) (commenting that "[i]n
the past, typical examples of prejudice that have supported the defense of laches have been... a
change of title... "); see also 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D Limitations and Laches § 337, at 544 (1989) ("[tlhe
disadvantage may come from... change of title ... ").
402. See, e.g., Lake Caryonah Improvement Ass'n, 903 F.2d 505, where the court affirmed a
ruling that the doctrine of laches precluded a claim by a property owners association seeking spe-
cific performance of a contract to convey a parcel of land from a home developer (Pulte). The
record showed that Pulte had purchased the land "reasonably believing that there were no out-
standing claims on the property" and had paid taxes and insurance on it for eleven years. Id. at
510. The court declared that "[w]e find it hard to imagine a circumstance in which the applica-
tion of laches would be more justified." Id. at 509.
403. Id. at 510, instructing that "[p]rejudice is established when a party 'remains passive
while an adverse claimant incurs risk, enters into obligations, or makes expenditures for improve-
ments or taxes."'
404. See, e.g., Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City Engineer, 632 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (ruling that organization opposed to development of certain property was lached
from challenging site review process because four months elapsed after grading permit had been
issued and road construction was under way); Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 642 A.2d 1324, 1327 (D.C.
1994) (holding that eight year delay by ex-wife in seeking child support arrearages may result in
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the defendant expended money or other resources during the period of
delay alone does not establish laches; the defendant also must show
that an award of the relief plaintiff seeks would work an injustice.406
Prejudice Resulting from Disruption or Frustration of Preexisiting
Plans and Past Decisions: Prejudice for laches purposes also can be
shown when the petitioned relief would frustrate the existing plans or
laches when former husband, in reliance upon unilateral monthly reduction in amount of child
support payments, had "made medical and educational payments on behalf of his daughter and
paid approximately $18,000 for her wedding," which he otherwise would not have done); Stan-
field v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1499, 1507 (D. Kan. 1993), affd, 52 F.3d 867 (10th
Cir. 1995) (awarding summary judgment to the defendant in an action by an inventor brought
against a manufacturer for fraudulent procurement of trademark when the inventor had delayed
for fourteen years in enforcing his rights during which time the manufacturer "ha[d] spent con-
siderable time and expense registering and promoting (the] trademarks").
In Finnie v. Town of Tiburon, 244 Cal. Rptr. 581, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), the court ruled
that opponents of town ballot measure were lached from challenging special election when during
period of delay
the Town had taken all the necessary steps to hold the special election: the notice of
election had been published; the sample ballot including the analysis and arguments
for and against the measure had been prepared and printed; and the absentee ballots
had been mailed and the absentee voting had commenced" and "the Town had
incurred expenses of $5,845 in connection with election preparations.
405. See, e.g., County of Du Page v. K-Five Construction Corp., 642 N.E.2d 164, 171 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994), where the court affirmed a ruling that a county was lached from enforcing a zon-
ing ordinance against an asphalt company when "the County had known of the asphalt plant
operating on the subject property" for more than five years before taking action, during which
time the defendants had "experienced changed circumstances regarding the use of the property
in that they decided to spend approximately $600,000 on improvements to the plant."
In Oakes v. Hattabaugh, 631 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the court precluded
landowners from enforcing a restrictive covenant when adjoining property owners had "bought
their property in order to build a new home where they could raise their horses and other ani-
mals" and, in apparent violation of the covenant, had erected a barn, boarded their animals, con-
structed their home and bought an adjacent field "for at least two years without objection" from
the plaintiffs. The court found that the "silence" of the plaintiffs constituted an "implied acqui-
escence in the [defendants'] actions."
In Miller v. Bloomberg, 466 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), the court affirmed a
ruling that prospective buyers were lached from reinstating proceedings to obtain specific per-
formance of an agreement to sell real estate pursuant to a lease option clause when, during the
more than two and one-half years that had passed since the case had been remanded, the defen-
dants had expended some $6,700 on taxes and $41,900 in improvements.
In Scheer v. City of New York, 284 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), the court
ruled that doctrine of laches barred a taxicab operator from seeking to enjoin a City regulation
requiring a partition between front and rear seats of all taxicabs operating during certain hours
when during the delay of several months in which the provision had been effective, "many in the
industry, it may be assumed, have incurred expenses in reliance upon the regulation."
406. See 30 CAL. JUR.3D Equity § 45, at 555 (1987), asserting that
It is clearly the rule that the mere expenditure of either money or effort on the part of
a defendant is, in itself, insufficient to show the degree of prejudice necessary to sup-
port a plea of laches. A defendant, therefore, in order to invoke the plea successfully,
must show in addition to such expenditures that the enforcement of the plaintiff's
claim would be inequitable.
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past decisions of the defendant. For example, in Stone v. Williams, °7
the court affirmed a ruling that the doctrine of laches precluded the
natural daughter of the late country music singer Hank Williams from
seeking an award of a portion of the profits earned over the years on
transactions involving the decedent's songs. The daughter had
delayed unreasonably for at least five years after learning of her poten-
tial rights before bringing suit to enforce them. The court rejected the
plaintiffs contention that the transactions at issue "need not be unrav-
eled" and that she could "simply share in the profits" that defendants
already had made." 8 The court explained that the plaintiff misappre-
hended that defendants' business activities had been based upon a
belief that plaintiff had no claim to the song rights. The court repudi-
ated any notion that it could determine what alternative arrangements
defendants would have made had they contemplated the reduction in
their profits that plaintiff now sought. The court declared,
But that argument ignores the fact that the transactions were
premised upon the apparent certainty of the ownership of the
songs' renewal rights-attributable to appellant's delay. This
procrastination prejudiced defendants by lulling them into a
false sense of security that the renewal rights were as they
appeared....
We cannot be sure that defendants would have struck the bar-
gains they did had they anticipated the diminution in their prof-
its that Ms. Stone seeks. This result is logically not altered by
whether the defendants made actual expenditures or whether
they simply incurred the opportunity costs implicated in fore-
going other ventures. 0 9
Other courts have not hesitated to preclude claims on the
grounds of laches when the petitioned relief would undermine the set-
tled expectations of defendants arising from past decisions or transac-
tions or would wreck havoc upon preexisting plans.410
407. 873 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1989).
408. Id. at 625.
409. Id. at 625-26.
410. See, e.g., Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1994), where the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a ruling that a musician (Jackson) was lached from seeking to establish that he had co-
authored a song with country singer Hoyt Axton after 22 years had passed since the song had
been released. The court found that Axton's business activities had been premised upon his
assumed exclusive ownership of the song and had been structured in a way that would have been
different had Jackson asserted his claim earlier. The court declared
Here, Appellees have shown that circumstances have changed in a way that would not
have occurred had Jackson sued earlier. Axton has arranged his business affairs
around the Song, promoted the Song as his own, licensed the Song many times to
third parties, and sold the Song....
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Prejudice Resulting from Lost Opportunity Costs: Courts have rec-
ognized that lost opportunity costs suffered during the period of the
delay can result in adequate prejudice to sustain a laches defense.
Courts consistently have entertained claims that the delay of a plaintiff
in asserting its right caused the defendant to forego opportunities it
otherwise would have enjoyed to avoid or mitigate damages or to pro-
tect its interests. For example, courts have ruled that the expense of
litigating an untimely claim alone can be prejudicial and deprive a
defendant of the chances it once may have had to settle the dispute or
Similarly, in Robins Island Preservation Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 424
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 603 (1992), the court affirmed a ruling that laches barred a
nonprofit organization from challenging the ownership rights of a real estate developer (SDC) in
a parcel of land (Robin's Island on Long Island) based upon a claim that had arisen nearly two
hundred years earlier. The court concluded that the relief requested would undermine SDC's
plans for the property:
It is unlikely that SDC would have purchased the property had it known its title was
in dispute. SDC's plans for Robins Island's use, as well as those of SDC's predeces-
sors-in-interest, were premised on the assumption that chain of title was, for almost
two hundred years, quiet and complete as recorded. This assumption was not unrea-
sonable. There must arrive a point at which title.., is settled.
See also In re Cutillo, 181 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995), where the court ruled that
bankruptcy trustee was lached from seeking to dismiss or convert a Chapter 13 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding based upon a default by the debtors who reduced their prescribed monthly payments
from $600 to $400 under a reorganization plan, yet the trustee had accepted the reduced pay-
ments for more than five years. The court ruled that the delay of the trustee denied the debtors
the opportunity "to seek modification of their Plan. Instead, they continued to make payments
on a regular basis for over six years in reliance on a lack of objection by either the Trustee or any
creditors." The court declared that at this late juncture to frustrate debtors' expectations con-
cerning their plan would be "highly prejudicial." Id.
In In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 151 B.R. 674, 683-84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993), the court disallowed the late claim in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding of the manag-
ing general partner of the debtor because such claim would undermine the debtor's reorganiza-
tion plan: "[a]llowing Claimant to file a late proof of claim would substantially prejudice
Debtor's attempts to pay claims according to the plan of reorganization and would frustrate the
administrative goals of the bar date." In Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 768 F. Supp 493, 497 (M.D. Pa. 1991), the court precluded the late subrogation
claim of a subcontractor (York) to an escrow fund when the performance bond surety (USF&G)
had already settled other claims based upon the "expectation that the settlement proceeds would
be distributed among the three competing claimants who had asserted claims as of the date of the
settlement .. " The court declared that the other claimants to the fund had been prejudiced by
York's untimely claim: "[b]ecause movants changed their position by settling with USF&G and
reasonably relied on the assumption that no additional claims would be asserted, they were pre-
judiced by York's delay in filing its petition to intervene." Id.
Also see Bums v. Egan, 501 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), wherein the court
ruled that the doctrine of laches precluded plaintiff taxpayers from challenging the constitution-
ality of a financing scheme for the construction of a state prison. Plaintiffs had delayed more
than two years in filing suit during which time the State had begun construction on the prison"and sold bonds for approximately $294 million." The court declared that "[a]dverse judicial
action at this juncture would 'cause unacceptable disorder and confusion"' (citation omitted).
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to minimize damages.41' Courts regularly have acknowledged that
prejudice is incurred when a party is deprived of an opportunity it
otherwise would have enjoyed to limit its exposure. Such lost oppor-
tunity costs can arise in a variety of contexts."'
Prejudice Resulting from a Change in the Value of the Disputed
Property: A significant increase or decline in the value of the property
at issue during the period of delay also may result in prejudice.413 As
one court has explained, "a marked appreciation in the value of the
property which is the object of controversy, such that the granting of
relief would itself work an inequity, is evidence of injury or prejudice
justifying the invocation of laches."4 4 Courts have applied the doc-
trine of laches both to preclude claims to recover property when it has
411. See, e.g., Wafer Shave, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 857 F. Supp. 112, 129 (D. Mass. 1994),
where the court ruled that laches barred plaintiffs (Wafer) action for patent infringement against
the Gillette Company (Gillette) when, during the three and one-half year delay of Wafer in
bringing suit, Gillette had developed and marketed products that allegedly violated the patent
and had foregone opportunities it would have enjoyed to minimize its damages had Wafer
brought its claim earlier. The court declared that as a result of Wafer's delay,
Gillette lost the opportunity to limit its present exposure to substantial litigation costs
and damages because it believed there was no longer a threat to litigation concerning
the.., patent. More specifically, the opportunities to reach a settlement, file an early
declaratory judgment action, or purchase the.. . patent were no longer available when
Wafer Shave filed suit ......
Id. at 125.
412. See, e.g., Kotsias v. Continental Bank, N.A., 601 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992), where the court affirmed a ruling that denied, on the grounds of laches, the claim of a
beneficiary of a Totten trust against a bank (Continental) for allegedly honoring a forged letter to
remove the name of the beneficiary from the trust after the bank already had paid the trust cor-
pus to the estate of the grantor. The court found that the delay of the plaintiff in bringing suit
had denied the bank opportunities it otherwise would have had to protect its interests as
stakeholder. In Schaller v. Castle Dev. Corp., 698 A.2d 528, 530 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), the
court affirmed a decision that laches precluded a bank from amending an audit of sale of mort-
gaged property that increased the amount of its petitioned claim. Other creditors had neglected
to bid on the property in reliance upon an earlier, much lower bank claim that had induced them
reasonably to believe that they would be paid. In Arvizu v. Fernandez, 902 P.2d 830, 834 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995), the court barred on grounds of laches, in a contempt proceeding for failing to
pay child support, the counterclaim of a former husband challenging his paternity of the child.
The court ruled that the failure of the defendant to assert his claim earlier deprived the mother of
an opportunity to seek support payments from the biological father and because the child has
"been emancipated for more than seven years, mother cannot seek support from someone other
than [the defendant]."
413. See, e.g., 30 CAL. JUR. 3D Equity § 46, at 557 (1987), (stating that "[a] marked
increase or decrease in the value of property will ordinarily prove fatal to a plaintiffs cause of
action where he could have asserted his full rights prior to the change in value and where, as a
result of his failure to do so, the allowance of the relief sought would be inequitable to the defen-
dant.").
414. Schroeder v. Schlueter, 407 N.E.2d 204, 206 (I11. App. Ct. 1980). See also, e.g., Filler
v. Richland County, 806 P.2d 537, 540 (Mont. 1991) (declaring that "[iun determining whether
laches shall bar a particular claim it is proper to consider.., whether the property involved has
increased in value.").
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appreciated and to compel specific performance to convey property
when its value has declined."'
The doctrine of "speculative delay" also may apply when the
value of disputed property has materially changed.416 In Madrid v.
Norton,417 the Supreme Court of Wyoming explained that courts are
reluctant to allow one party to speculate at the expense of another on
the value of property or other rights before making a claim:
Courts look with disfavor upon the claims of those who lie idle
awaiting the results of development. The waiting may be years,
months, or days, depending upon the circumstances. There is
an inherent injustice in one purportedly holding a right to assert
an ownership in property to voluntarily await the propitious
event and then decide, when the danger which has been at the
risk of another is over, to come in and claim a share of the prof-
its.418
Courts have applied this principle when circumstances indicated
that one party has attempted to gamble on the potential appreciation
of property or business rights to the disadvantage of another. 9 The
415. See, e.g., Nahn v. Soffer, 824 S.W.2d 442,445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming a rul-
ing that in a quiet title action for the specific performance of a contract to convey a parcel of real
property, a counterclaim was barred under the doctrine of laches when the counterclaimant had
delayed for more than 21 months following the plaintiff's repudiation of the contract before filing
suit, during which time "the property's value increased from $200,000 to between $300,000 and
$350,000."); see also Renth v. Krausz, 579 N.E.2d 11, 14-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (barring an
action seeking specific performance of a contract to convey real property when during the six
year period plaintiffs had delayed in filing suit, the value of the property had declined by 42%).
416. See, e.g., 30 CAL. JUR. 3D Equity § 46, at 556 (1987), declaring that
[a]mong the important changes of condition that require consideration in determining
the existence of laches are those that result from a change in the value or character of
property. Equity does not favor those who first sleep on their rights and then attempt
to assert them after the thrift and enterprises of others have made those rights valu-
able and desirable.
417. 596 P.2d 1108 (Wyo. 1979).
418. Id. at 1120.
419. See, e.g., Tarrin v. Pellonari, 625 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), where the
court upheld a ruling that laches precluded the director and shareholder of a radiator repair chain
(Tarin) from challenging the right of several employees to establish a new, potentially competing
business (Cool Rite). The circumstances indicated that the plaintiff had delayed in bringing suit
while defendants were laboring to set up the new business to see how it would fare before decid-
ing whether to seek to participate. The appellate court observed that "there was a strong infer-
ence that Tarin did not intend to file suit immediately because he wanted to see how successful
Cool Rite would be before he invested money to hire a lawyer and assert his interest in a business
that might not become successful." Id. The court observed that "Tarin's conduct was not the
type of conduct which justified affirmative relief." Id.
Also see Tristram's Group, Inc. v. Morrow, 496 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986),
wherein the court affirmed a ruling that laches barred an action by a real estate developer seeking
to recover a parcel of real property. Eleven years earlier the developer's assignor had initiated
repurchase of the property exercising an option reserved to the grantors. The court found that
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fact that the disputed property has appreciated in value, however, does
not alone establish that the plaintiff has wrongfully attempted to profit
to the detriment of the defendant or otherwise engaged in inequitable
conduct that will preclude a claim for recovery.42 °
Prejudice Resulting from the Intervention of Third Party Rights:
Authorities have recognized that prejudice for laches purposes may
result if the petitioned relief will adversely affect the rights of third
parties.42' Laches can apply "when third parties have contracted with
the developer had delayed more than eleven years in asserting its claim during which time the
value of the property had increased from $6000 (the original contract price) to at least $50,000.
The court declared that "[tihe value of the property having risen to not less than $50,000, and all
risk for practical purposes having disappeared, the plaintiff now choose to sue. Its position is
inequitable." Id.
420. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 A.2d 1384 (R.I. 1978) (reversing a ruling
applying the doctrine of laches to preclude a claim seeking specific performance of a contract to
convey real estate). In Fitzgerald, the plaintiffs (the Fitzgeralds) had entered into a contract in
1963 for the conveyance of a parcel of real estate in Newport, Rhode Island with the owner
(O'Connell), who died shortly thereafter. The property then passed to her husband who also
soon died. Id. at 1385. Although the Fitzgeralds did not commence suit for specific perform-
ance until 1973, the court found they had pursued their interest in performing the contract with
the representatives of both estates, id. at 1385, and under the circumstances had not been guilty
of laches. The court declared,
Nothing in the record suggests that the Fitzgeralds awaited the rise in value of the
property before asserting their claim. To the contrary, the Fitzgeralds have, since
1963, stood ready, willing, and able to perform their part of the bargain.... In short,
the fact that the value of the property has appreciated does not in and of itself convert
delay into laches.
Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
421. See, e.g., British Columbia Inv. Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 1217,
1222 (S.D. Cal. 1976), where the court concluded that laches precluded a claim by corporate
shareholders of a failed bank seeking declaratory and ancillary relief against the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and others, and requesting, inter alia, cancellation of certain
indebtedness of the bank. Plaintiffs had delayed more than two years in seeking relief while pro-
ceedings "involving some of the very debts and assets which plaintiffs seek to place under the
jurisdiction of this court" had been ongoing. The court declared that because plaintiffs' claims
would impair the rights of other parties, relief must be denied: "[g]iven the scope of the relief for
which they pray and the intervening negotiations and settlements involving parties that would be
affected by the proposed relief, the court must conclude that plaintiffs did not file this complaint
with the diligence required under the circumstances." Id.
See also New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Levitt, 395 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977), affd, 404 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. 1978), wherein the court ruled that the doctrine
of laches precluded a complaint challenging under the New York State Constitution an agree-
ment among New York State, the City of Albany, and Albany County for the acquisition of land
for the construction of certain public improvements. The court found that the plaintiffs had
delayed twelve years in filing suit, during which time "$925,000,000 in bonds had been issued
and sold to investors. $768,000,000 in bonds are still outstanding," and "a huge complex of
office buildings, museum and auditorium has been built which would be valueless for the most
part to anyone but the State of New York." Id. at 610. The court declared that the petitioned
relief would impair the rights to too many third parties: "[tihe action has been too long delayed.
The rights of too many other parties have been created. This is the classic situation where equity
clearly demands that this action be barred by laches." Id.
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defendant and are harmed by the delay in filing suit" and "particularly
is justified where plaintiffs delay in proving a claim would have a
catastrophic effect on the rights of many third parties. "422 Many
of these types of prejudice inhere in the ordinary and necessary activi-
ties of collectors. For example, significant expenditures are evident in
acquiring an expensive work. Still, thereafter, expenditures can be
made to appraise, insure, preserve, restore, or improve a valuable art
object based upon the assumption that one owns it. Moreover, the
decision to purchase one expensive work instead of another may sig-
nify that corresponding opportunity costs have been forfeited.
Even when collectors already have acquired valuable works,
extensive prejudice may result when they make important estate or
financial planning decisions based upon a reasonable and good faith
belief that a particular item is not subject to a conflicting ownership
claim. For example, the estate plans of many collectors prescribe that
works of art be sold to pay estate taxes and to provide estate liquid-
ity. 423 If a work of art assigned this purpose is removed from an estate
by a legal claim of a former owner, the estate plan of the collector is
prejudiced. As one commentator explained,
If a stolen work is designated to be sold to provide estate liquid-
ity, the removal of the work from the estate through a successful
judicial challenge means that other assets must be disposed of to
[provide estate] liquidity. The original estate plan has been dis-
rupted, and a new estate plan must be devised. 424
Third party rights, including the settled expectations of both
individual and charitable beneficiaries, also may be frustrated when
expensive works of art are removed from an estate. In summary, the
many forms of prejudice that the doctrine of laches recognizes facili-
tate a showing of laches in almost any context.
C. Summary Judgment on the Laches Defense
The ability of courts to decide the question of laches on summary
judgment makes the laches doctrine a very effective title-clearing
mechanism for buyers and collectors. Although the decision to apply
the doctrine of laches is extremely fact-dependent42 and such fact-
422. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 176, at 657-58 (1996).
423. See, e.g., Basha, supra note 1, at 62 (stating that "works of art often are designated to
provide liquidity."); Madden, supra note 1, at 463.
424. Madden, supra note 1, at 463.
425. See, e.g., Baron Philippe de Rothschild v. Paramount Ditillers, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 433,
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that "[tihe determination whether laches bars an action... requires
a fact intensive inquiry.").
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intensive questions generally are resolved best by the trier of fact, both
federal and state courts consistently have granted summary judgment
to defendants on the laches question when the circumstances war-
ranted.426
Because the decision to preclude a claim on grounds of laches is
committed to the broad discretion of the trial court, as long as the trial
court does not decide disputed questions of fact on summary judg-
ment, appellate courts review laches determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard.427 Courts have entered summary judgment on the
laches question in a variety of cases when the unreasonable delay of
the plaintiff in asserting a claim and the resulting prejudice to the
defendant were apparent. Appellate courts regularly have affirmed
such rulings when no abuse of discretion was indicated.42
426. Summary judgment is a procedure that allows the court to decide a discrete question
of law or an entire case when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment saves
the resources of both the court and the parties. See 6 JAMES MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 56.15, at 56-20 (1996).
Summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is prescribed by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c), which provides that summary judgment shall be "rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is enti-
tled to a judgment as a matter of law."
427. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 40
F.3d 698, 707 (5th Cir. 1994).
428. Many federal and state courts have recognized that summary judgment may be
awarded on the defense of laches. See, e.g., Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 48 F.3d
1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming an award of summary judgment in favor or an employer in
Title VII action when the employee had delayed six years in bringing suit during which time
necessary evidence had become unavailable); Dickey v. Alcoa Steamship Co. 641 F.2d 81, 82 (2d
Cir. 1981) (affirming an award of summary judgment in favor of a shipping company on grounds
of laches in a product liability claim brought by a seaman for personal injuries); Boone v.
Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming an award of summary
judgment in favor or an employer in a Title VII claim when the employee (Boone) had delayed
more than seven years in bringing suit and evidence had become unavailable: "Boone offered no
evidence from which this court or the court below could even infer an excuse for his seven year
delay. In the absence of any factual issues, we conclude that the district court correctly found
that Boone's delay in bring suit was unreasonable.").
Federal district courts consistently have granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
when the relevant facts were not in dispute. See, e.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers Local 764 v. Greenawalt, 919 F. Supp. 774, 782 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (ruling that laches
barred a claim by a labor union challenging the legality under union bylaws of certain severance
payments made to a former union president when the union had delayed some two years and
nine months after the transfer before filing suit); ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics
Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (ruling that laches precluded a patent infringement
action brought by a patent holder and exclusive licensee against a robotics manufacturer); De
Silvo v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (awarding a shipowner sum-
mary judgment on the question of laches in a personal injury action brought by a longshoreman).
State courts also have confirmed that the laches question properly may be decided on sum-
mary judgment. See, e.g., San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc'y v. City of Moreno Valley, 51
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V. SPECIFIC INQUIRIES REQUIRED IN AN APPROPRIATE
DUE DILIGENCE INVESTIGATION
The considerations that favor a broad investigative responsibility
also help identify the specific inquiries that comprise an appropriate
investigation. Both equity and logic require that buyers and collectors
contact those discrete art world authorities, resources, and channels of
communication that have proven effective in locating stolen art objects
and that can be consulted in a reasonable, cost-efficient manner.
Moreover, as previously discussed, the Association of Art Museum
Directors has counseled its members to investigate the background of
any works potentially looted during World War II and has prescribed
inquiries to several of the resources identified below. The failure of a
buyer or collector of an expensive work to undertake such inquiries
should preclude it from defeating the competing ownership claim of
an art theft victim under the "balance of equities" judicial criterion.
An adequate due diligence investigation requires art buyers to
inquire into several categories or types of art world authorities or
resources. The first inquiry is to those institutions, persons, or art
world participants to whom theft victims might most likely report
their losses. As one commentator suggested many years ago, "[t]he
steps which they [private dealers and collectors] should take in check-
ing a title correspond to those which a rightful owner should take in
putting the public on notice that the work is stolen and no title can be
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 897, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming an award of summary judgment that
laches precluded an environmental group from challenging the validity of an agreement between
a state agency and certain counties, municipalities and others and asserting that "[wihen the facts
are undisputed, we are free to determine the [laches] issue as a matter of law"); Cannon v. City of
Durham, 463 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming a decision granting summary judg-
ment in favor of a city on the question of laches in an action by a citizen challenging its purchase
of certain land and the construction of a ballpark); Eastern Shopping Centers, Inc. v. Trenholm
Motels, Inc., 306 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (affirming an award of summary
judgment for the defendant in an action for damages or specific performance of a contract con-
taining an option clause to repurchase certain land and observing that "[w]hile the determination
of what is a reasonable time is usually a question of fact, under the circumstances here, where
there are no disputed facts, what is reasonable time becomes a question of law and the case is a
proper one for summary judgment."); Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources Int'l, 905 P.2d
312 (Utah 1995) (affirming the dismissal on the grounds of laches of an action brought by an
investor in a syndicate for an accounting and distribution of profits after the investor had delayed
35 years in bringing suit).
See also Troup v. Loden, 469 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. 1996), in which the court affirmed a summary
judgment on the laches question entered in favor of defendants in an action seeking division of
certain real estate when the plaintiffs had not filed suit until some twenty years after the claim
had arisen. The court counseled that, under Georgia civil procedure, "[b]ecause laches is a fac-
tual defense, the better practice is for 'the trial judge, sitting as a chancellor in equity, and with-
out the intervention of a jury' to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact rather than
act on summary judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 666.
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conveyed.'4 29 As noted below, these steps include reference to stolen
art databases and relevant experts concerning the particular artist or
type of art object.
A second category of inquiry is to locations where the type of art
object in question, if stolen, reasonably might be expected to be rein-
troduced into the legitimate market43 ° Courts have recognized that
theft victims discharge their due diligence responsibilities by alerting
"the likely points of sale" of stolen art43' and by attempting to "stifle
the trade at the point of destination. 43 2 These potential "points of
contact" with the international market include noted dealers of the
particular artist or type of art object, auction houses, and leading insti-
tutions and experts. Such regular art market participants may be
positioned to receive reports about stolen art not only from theft vic-
tims, but also from the law enforcement authorities of various coun-
tries and from governments themselves.
A final category of prescribed inquiry is to those resources that
reasonably might assist an informed attempt to determine whether a
particular work has been stolen. Examples include the applicable cata-
logue raisonne of a particular artist (if available), collectors' specialty
groups, and journalists who cover the art world.
Each of the following resources has proven effective in identify-
ing and locating stolen art. Collectively, they comprise sources that
should be consulted in the course of a conscientious and comprehen-
sive due diligence investigation for a valuable art object. A docu-
mented record of investigation to each of these resources should enable
a buyer or collector to defeat, under the balance of equities judicial
criterion, the claim of a putative theft victim seeking to recover the
item. A due diligence investigation into these resources provides an
effective title clearing vehicle for valuable art objects, given the
irregularities of the international art market and the many factors that
favor the position of theft victims in the initial equitable balance with
buyers and collectors of expensive works. 33
The failure of a buyer or collector to undertake each of these pre-
scribed inquiries should not mean that a former owner necessarily
should prevail in a judicial contest. Rather, in such instances courts
429. Wertheimer, supra note 319, at 47.
430. Hoover, supra note 6, at 55.
431. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fines
Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 290 (7th Cir. 1990).
432. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
433. The peculiar attributes of the international art market that enable stolen materials to
become widely disseminated are discussed supra at pages 659-63.
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should still weigh the relevant equities between the parties and judge
the efforts of both parties.
A. Commercial Stolen Art Databases
Collectors of valuable art objects must be required to consult any
publicly available stolen art databases, archives, or registries. Two
databases currently meet this description: The Art Loss Register
(ALR) and Thesaurus Group's "TRACER" Database. The ALR has
offices in both London and New York. "TRACER" is a computer-
ized "on-line" service operated by Thesaurus Group and located on
the Isle of Wight, Great Britain. Each service can be accessed for a
reasonable fee. These databases can help collectors determine whether
a particular work has been stolen, provided the theft victim has used a
principal means for notifying the international art market of the theft.
The ALR was created in 1991 as a joint venture that included as
partners the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) and
several insurance companies and other art world investors in Lon-
don.4" ALR maintains a computerized database of reportedly stolen
art objects using reports of losses compiled by IFAR since 1977 from a
variety of sources, including local and state police agencies, art dealers,
homeowners, church committee members, museum registrars, library
professionals and periodic reports from the FBI and INTERPOL.435
ALR also obtains reports of losses from insurance companies, which
are increasingly becoming a primary contributor.436
Like ALR, TRACER receives reports of stolen and missing art
objects from a variety of sources. All reports of stolen materials that
Trace Publications, Ltd. (Trace) of Plymouth, England has compiled
since its inception in 1988 have been submitted to TRACER, and all
such reports that Trace continues to receive as a matter of course also
are conveyed to TRACER. In addition, TRACER includes a number
of losses promulgated by INTERPOL.
Whether losses have been related to accessible databases and
whether collectors have contacted these resources clearly bear upon
the "balancing of the equities" determination. Courts consistently
have suggested that art theft victims report their losses to such data-
bases and also have urged collectors to contact them.43 7 Art theft vic-
434. Lowenthal, supra note 72, at 310.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 311.
437. For example, in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey suggested that the art world create a registry that collectors and buyers of
art objects could consult to determine whether they had acquired good title to art objects: "[lit
may be time for the art world to establish a means by which a good faith purchaser may reasona-
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tims in several noteworthy cases did report their losses to the stolen art
archives available at the time.43 Moreover, stolen materials recently
discovered on the international market already had been reported both
to ALR and TRACER.439
Several legal commentators have counseled theft victims to make
their losses known to stolen art databases and have recommended that
collectors consult these databases to determine whether items of inter-
est have been indicated as stolen.44 Publicly accessible stolen art
archives and databases also play a major role in proposed solutions to
the international stolen art epidemic.44'
bly obtain the provenance of a painting. An efficient registry of original works of art might...
serve the interests of artists, owners of art, and bona fide purchasers ......
In Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fines Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d at 294, the court recommended that the stolen art files maintained by the Interna-
tional Foundation for Art Research (on behalf of Art Loss Register) be consulted when an art
transaction presents suspicious circumstances.
In Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. 1991), the Court
of Appeals of New York, in surveying the diligence of each party, noted that the plaintiff
museum from whom a Chagall painting had been stolen had failed to report the loss to any avail-
able resources: "[iut is undisputed... that the Guggenheim did not inform other museums,
galleries or artistic organizations of the theft .. "
438. In O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 866, the artist Georgia O'Keeffe reported, in 1972, to the
American Art Dealers Association, Inc. (AADA) stolen art database (which later was merged
into the stolen art files maintained by Art Loss Register) the theft of several of her paintings that
had occurred more than 25 years earlier.
Similarly, in Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 93-6215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2096, *15 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 1995), affd, No. 95-1807 (3d Cir. 1996), a family from whom a Giaquinto painting had been
stolen in 1960 reported the loss in 1992 to the ALR/IFAR stolen art database upon learning of
its existence.
439. See Walter J. Robinson and Maureen Goggin, Stolen Art Claims Shake N.Y Museum,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1997, at Al (reporting that a European citizen had made a demand
upon New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art for the return of a Monet painting stolen at the
end of World War II); Society to Prevent Trade in Stolen Art, press release of June 24, 1997
(reporting that an Irish citizen had recovered a stolen antique gaming table from a U.S. dealer
who had offered the table for auction at Christie's in New York). The table had been reported as
stolen both to ALR and TRACER.
440. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 318, at 4 (asserting that an "appropriate attempt at due
diligence" entails, inter alia, checking with the available commercial data banks of stolen art); see
also Charles A. Palmer, Stolen Art and the Struggle for Good Title, 7 ENT. SPORTS L. 1, 13 (1990)
(declaring that "reporting the theft to archives that are set up to locate stolen art is essential.
Diligent efforts to locate stolen art after it has been sold deprive innocent purchasers of the nec-
essary means to protect themselves.").
See Hoover, supra note 6, at 51, admonishing that "[m]useums must be aware of the
resources available for filing notices of stolen art and utilize these services when necessary." See
also Drum, supra note 21, at 943 (proposing that a large institution should be required to report
the theft of an art object to the "FBI, INTERPOL or a private registry.").
441. See, e.g., Franklin Feldman & Bonnie Burnham, An Art Archive: Principles and
Realization, 10 CONN. L.REV. 702, 704 (1978] (observing that "[o]ne generally accepted premise
in all of the hypothesized solutions is that an international clearinghouse could materially
advance the recovery of stolen objects"); Hoover, supra note 6, at 458-59 (declaring that "[tihe
establishment of a central registry of art would give art buyers a complete and reliable source of
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B. Catalogue Raisonne
A catalogue raisonne is a comprehensive compilation of many of
the known works of an individual artist, and often includes informa-
tion concerning the history of ownership and display of each work pre-
sented.442  When available, the catalogue raisonne becomes the
standard reference for that artist.443
The catalogue raisonne may reveal that a particular work is
owned by a museum or other institution. Museums and institutions
are often the only owners listed in a catalogue raisonne that can be
identified specifically and contacted, because catalogues rarely disclose
the names of private individual owners by name. Museums and insti-
tutions listed as owners may be less likely than private collectors to sell
or dispose of a particular art object. Accordingly, when an art object is
listed in the catalogue raisonne as belonging to a museum or institu-
tion or someone other than the listed owner, this strongly suggests a
duty of further inquiry. Realistically, collectors should only be
expected to contact those museums or institutions that are listed as the
current owner of a particular work as of the date the catalogue was
published. Consistent with the equitable principles that inform the
"balance of the equities" determination, the identification of subse-
quent owners of a particular work in a catalogue entry places any for-
mer owners on constructive notice of an adverse claim of ownership
and reasonably occasions a duty of further investigation on their part.
Parties in art ownership disputes have lauded themselves for
resorting to the catalogue raisonne and castigated their opponents for
information .... [A] comprehensive registry would cut down on the market for stolen art by
making it more difficult for thieves to sell stolen objects to innocent purchasers"); Pecoraro,
supra note 116, at 41 (proposing a central registry for stolen art that both would measure the
obligation of theft victims to pursue losses diligently as well as constitute a benchmark for pur-
chasers to establish the requisite "good faith"); Bibas, supra note 8, at 2460-68 (recommending a
central art theft database to which art theft victims must report their losses in order to preserve
their ownership rights; under this proposal, the failure of art theft victims to report their losses to
this database would result in their ownership rights being expunged if good faith purchasers
relied upon the absence of such reports in buying the disputed items).
442. As one commentator explained:
The catalogue raisonne of a given artist's work generally contains information about
every known piece by that artist. This information usually includes a physical
description (and an illustration) of an object, say, a painting, as well as whatever data
the author has gleaned regarding the painting's provenance, exhibition, history, and
bibliographic references. In many cases, scholars and art trade professionals univer-
sally refer to a celebrated artist's works using the numbers assigned each work in a
particular catalogue raisonne. The catalogue becomes the standard reference as to
that artist.
Mary McKenna, Problematic Provenance: Toward a Coherent United States Policy on the Inter-
national Trade in Cultural Property, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L 83, 104 n. 89 (1991).
443. Id.
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their failure to employ it. In Lubell,444 a museum from which a Cha-
gall painting had been stolen was listed as the most recent owner of the
work in the relevant catalogue raisonne. The museum challenged the
failure of a couple who had purchased the painting from a Manhattan
gallery to examine the catalogue entry before buying it.445 The muse-
um argued that had the couple reviewed the catalogue entry they
would have realized that the museum was the most recently listed
owner. 446  The buyers, on the other hand, championed their own
efforts to contact the compiler of the catalogue personally.447
C. International Museums
Collectors should attempt to contact several major international
museums with prominent collections of an individual artist or type of
work in question. Museums often have unique resources and exper-
tise concerning the types of art objects they collect. The professional
responsibilities of museum curators and directors require them to keep
apprised of the latest developments in their areas of specialization.
These developments may include whether particular art objects are
available for acquisition and, periodically, whether certain works have
been reported.
Courts and commentators have encouraged theft victims search-
ing for their stolen art objects to contact museums that specialize in
the prescribed area. The distinctive capabilities and resources of
museums often enable them to identify particular art objects as having
been stolen.448 In several notable judicial decisions concerning dis-
puted claims of ownership to stolen art objects, theft victims contacted
relevant museums in an effort to find their missing works and
museums officials were instrumental in helping theft victims to locate
their property." 9
444. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
445. Id. at 623.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 619.
448. Collin, supra note 14, at 29-30.
449. For example, in one much acclaimed instance the director of an East German museum
from which several Albrecht Durer paintings had been looted during World War II informed,
among other persons, appropriate museums both in Europe and the United States in an effort to
locate the paintings. See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 850
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), in which the court observed that the museum director notified, inter alia, the
Kaiser Frederich Museum in Berlin and the Bavarian National Museum in Munich, as well as
the Germanic Museum at Harvard University. The ultimate location of the paintings at the
residence of a Brooklyn collector was reported in a front page article of the New York Times in
May 30, 1966, and, in the words of the court, "was described by one official of the Metropolitan
Museum as the 'discovery of the century."' 678 F.2d at 1156.
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D. Authorities in the Art World
Collectors also should attempt to discover whether an art object
in question has been reported as stolen to noted art world professionals
in the relevant field or subject area. By making inquiries to such
experts, collectors avail themselves of another recognized resource for
ascertaining whether a particular item has been reported, or is known
to be, stolen.
Courts have urged art theft victims to contact recognized profes-
sionals in the relevant field to help locate their missing property and
also have counseled buyers to do the same when they have been
offered suspicious works. Recognized specialists in prescribed areas
are often privy to information about stolen art objects that others are
unable to attain. For example, in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church v. Goldberg, the court rebuked the failure of an art dealer
(Goldberg) to contact an independent expert before buying valuable
Byzantine mosaics.45 By making inquiries to such experts, collectors
avail themselves of another recognized resource for ascertaining whe-
ther a particular item has been reported, or is known to be, stolen.
E. U.S. and International Auction Houses
U.S. and international auction houses are another resource that
collectors reasonably might be expected to consult. By contacting auc-
tion houses, collectors extend their investigation to significant partici-
pants within the commercial art world who are positioned to receive
both reports that certain art objects have been stolen, as well as look
for stolen materials consigned for sale. In Autocephalous Greek-Ortho-
dox Church of Cyprus, the court found that the government of Cyprus
(Cyprus) had discharged its obligations to search diligently for stolen
Byzantine mosaics by reporting the theft to the "likely points of sale of
Similarly, the Government of Cyprus, in an attempt to locate priceless Byzantine mosaics
that had been looted from a church, reported the theft to the British Museum, the Louvre, and
Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Institute for Byzantine Studies. See Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fines Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
1374, 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1996).
In Autocephalous, the mosaics were located when an official at the Getty Museum in Los
Angeles whom the Government of Cyprus had notified about the theft was able to identify them
when they were introduced into the market. Id. at 283. Similarly, in Keim v. Louisiana Histori-
cal Ass'n Confederate War Museum, 48 F.3d 362 (1995), a curator at the Milwaukee Public
Museum apprised the Louisiana Historical Association Confederate War Museum (War Muse-
urn) that a Confederate battle flag belonging to the War Museum (and which apparently had
been stolen) had been sold to a private collector, but the War Museum neglected to pursue its
claim to recover the flag in a timely manner.
450. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1404.
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the mosaics."451 Cyprus had reported the looting of the works to"individuals from international auction houses, such as Sotheby's and
Christie's."4 2  The court, quoting Cyprus' expert witness, found
Cyprus' strategy in reporting its loss in this manner to be "consistent
with what is happening in the art world today, the goal being to stifle
the trade at the point of destination.""4 More recently, the Dresden
Museum recovered nine drawings missing since the end of World
War II after identifying them in a Sotheby's pre-auction catalogue.454
Auction houses have become increasingly important in the art market
and are situated to learn whether particular works have been stolen.455
F. Collector Groups and Specialty Publications
Art buyers and collectors also might contact relevant collector
groups and specialty publications to determine whether a work in
question has been stolen. These organizations are defined by their
concentrated interest in, and attention to, the specific category of art
object to which the work in question belongs. As such, they may
acquire information that particular art objects belonging to this cate-
gory have been stolen. Because stolen art objects often are offered for
sale to individual collectors, organizations of collectors may be chan-
nels of information not only about particular art objects that have been
stolen, but also about stolen works that have resurfaced in the mar-
ket.456 Contacting relevant trade publications that specialize in the
451. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290.
452. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1380.
453. Id. at 1389.
454. Press release issued by the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 8, 1998).
455. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 6, at 1002-03 (discussing how auction houses have
become a "dominant force" in the international market and commenting that "[m]ost suspect art
is funneled through auction houses, and it is therefore most strategic to target this narrowest
point in the distribution chain.;" see also Joette M. Blaustein, Why Is This Sale Different from All
Other Sales? Abrams v. Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc., 4 CARDOzO ART & ENT. L.J. 139, 167
(1985) (asserting that "[liegislation should be enacted to compel auction houses who are 'in a
position to dominate the whole art ... field' to thoroughly investigate title, thus protecting the
purchaser.") (citation omitted).
456. For example, in Society of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996), a member of the board of directors of a collector's society from which an antique cane
handle had been stolen was able to find it in the possession of a collector. The court commented
that the director "apparently worked with others to locate and identify stolen items though col-
lecting activities and had recovered items in the past using these measures." Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 873.
In Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1380, the Republic of Cyprus disseminated reports about
the looting of certain Byzantine mosaics from a church in Northern Cyprus to many persons in
the international art community, including, generally, organizations interested in Greek and
Cypriot affairs.
And in Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991), the court
observed that a museum from whom a Chagall painting had been stolen failed to notify the art
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type of art object that has been stolen also has proven to be an effec-
tive way to notify the international art market of the loss. 457
G. Fine Arts Dealers
Collectors might be expected to contact one or more fine arts
dealers who specialize in the particular artist or type of work. Many
fine arts dealers, of course, have their fingers on the pulse of the inter-
national art trade and often may be the first persons to learn of an
attempt to reintroduce a stolen work into the market. Dealers have
distinctive expertise in their areas of specialty and have qualified as
expert witnesses in high profile cases concerning the recovery of stolen
art objects.4"8 Directors of prominent museums have recognized the
unique role that dealers play in the art market and the opportunities
that they often enjoy to acquire information to which others are not
privy.459
H. Fine Art Restorers and Conservators
Fine art restorers and conservators also may be situated to learn
that a particular work may be stolen. Art thieves and illicit traffickers
frequently commission art restorers to improve or modify stolen art
objects that they wish to resell. Police are sometimes able to trace
stolen materials by consulting restorers.460 Consulting appropriate
restorers and conservators expands the contacts of persons who are
likely to receive reports of stolen art objects and improves the chances
of learning whether any such reports have been made. Recently,
world about the loss, and neglected to "inform other museums, galleries or artistic organizations
of the theft ......
457. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 6, at 51 (declaring that "[s]pecial trade publications
should also be considered as resource for spreading the word."). See also Pinkerton, supra note
144, at 28 (recommending that theft victims notify, inter alia, "art and archaeological periodicals
in the major capitals of the world, including the major cities of the art market such as New York,
London, Basel, Geneva, Paris and Rome.").
458. For example, at the trial stage in Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1404, New York art
dealer Andre Emmerich testified as an expert witness on behalf of the defendant.
459. See Art Dealers Association of America Directory 1995-1996, "The Role of the Art
Dealer," comment by Sherman E. Lee, retired director, Cleveland Art Museum:
I have always had a great deal of respect for dealers. They're knowledgeable people.
They put their money on the line and they also are very keenly interested in what goes
on in the art world. They hear and see many things that I certainly never did.
Also see comment by Edmund P. Pillsbury, Director, Kimbell Art Museum:
The dealers control the market to the extent that even with the enormous increase in
the role of the auction houses, still it's the dealers who often locate the material and
bring it to the market and decide where it should be offered, how it should be made
available.
460. Prott, supra note 168, at 347.
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appraisers and conservators with special knowledge about distinctive
markings on Dutch old master paintings helped the government of
Romania recover four paintings stolen some thirty years earlier.461
I. Insurance Agents
Insurance agents for fine arts insurers may have information con-
cerning whether a particular art object has been stolen. Collectors
whose works are insured against theft often report their losses to their
insurance companies to obtain reimbursement. Accordingly, insur-
ance agents who work in the fine arts field may receive reports of art
thefts and may learn about thefts that are not insured or that their own
companies do not cover. Authorities have acknowledged the role of
insurance agents in this context.462
J. Journalists
Journalists who report on the fine arts trade may learn that a
particular work has been looted or plundered. In Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus, for example, Cyprus reported the looting
of Byzantine mosaics to many persons who might be positioned to
help locate them, including international journalists.463 In another
case, a museum established a record of success in recovering stolen art
objects by placing classified advertisements.464 Commentators have
recommended that art theft victims contact journalists as part of their
"due diligence" efforts to recover their stolen property.46
461. William H. Honan, Stolen Old Masters Resurface in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1998, at A14.
462. See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 319, at 46 (recommending that art theft victims
report their losses to the police because "[m]any major insurance carriers will not accept loss
claims which have not been reported to the police because they seek to prevent fraudulent
claims."). See also Lowenthal, supra note 72, at 311 (observing that "[i]nsurance companies are
increasingly sending in loss reports and are becoming a major source of reports" for the Art Loss
Register).
463. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fines
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
464. Society of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
465. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 6, at 51 (asserting that "[tihe museum victimized by
theft should consider issuing a press release on the loss, as media coverage will reach a wide seg-
ment of the population"); Pinkerton, supra note 144, at 28 (prescribing that art theft victims pro-
vide notice of their losses "to the major newspapers and art and archaeological periodicals in the
major capitals of the world, including the major cities in the art market such as New York, Lon-
don, Basel, Geneva, Paris and Rome.").
[Vol. 23:631
Due Diligence Investigation
K. Government of Nation Especially Identified with
Particular Work or Artist
Collectors should contact any foreign government that may be
closely identified with a particular artist or type of art object. Inquiry
to that government may be indicated or suggested in a comprehensive
due diligence investigation because the very identity of the work or
artist might put a reasonably informed person on constructive notice
that a particular country may have a special interest in the work and
thus may know whether it has been reported stolen.
Authorities have appreciated that governments of nations closely
identified with a specific type of art object may have information con-
cerning whether a particular work of that type has been stolen.
Indeed, plaintiff-theft victims in several prominent judicial decisions
concerning the recovery of stolen art objects have been governments or
government-sponsored institutions.466 Authorities also have recog-
nized that because individual countries enjoy special contacts,
resources, and wealth, they should be held to the highest standards of
diligence in pursuing losses of stolen art objects, especially when
works of national significance have been lost. As one commentator
asked, "[i]f, in examining all the circumstances of the case ... the
court considers the wealth and sophistication of the victim, can any
individual be considered more wealthy or sophisticated than an entire
nation which claims to be losing its patrimony?" '467 Courts ruling that
individual countries suffering stolen art investigated their losses with
sufficient diligence under the "balance of the equities" criterion also
found that the countries pursued their losses in an informed, methodi-
cal, and systematic manner.468
466. See, e.g., Kunstsammulungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)
(affirming a ruling returning stolen paintings by the Renaissance artist Albrecht Durer to a
national art museum of the German Democratic Republic from which they had been stolen at
the end of World War II); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming a ruling returning looted Byz-
antine mosaics to the Republic of Cyprus and the Church of Cyprus); Republic of Turkey v.
OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64 (D. Mass. 1992) (denying a motion to dismiss an action brought
by the Republic of Turkey seeking to reclaim an ancient coin collection allegedly smuggled out
of Turkey).
467. Pinkerton, supra note 144, at 15.
468. The court in Autocephalous found that the Republic of Cyprus "took substantial and
meaningful steps, from the time it first learned of the disappearance of the mosaics, to locate and
recover them. The efforts of the Republic's officials, targeted at the likely points of sale of the
mosaics, were sweeping and consistent with trade practices." 917 F.2d at 290. The District
court in Elicofon concluded that the investigation of the plaintiff museum "followed many chan-
nels" and "reflect[ed] a continuous and diligent search." 536 F. Supp. 829, 852 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
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L. Other Possibilities
Several organizations recently have responded to the need of the
international market for greater information about stolen art. A rea-
sonable due diligence investigative responsibility necessarily must
consider any significant information gathering initiative, provided, of
course, that it can be accessed in a cost-effective way. Three such ini-
tiatives are the Historic Art Theft Database of the Washington, D.C. -
based Trans-Art International, L.C.TM, the Commission on Art
Recovery (CARR), and the Holocaust Art Recovery Project (HARP).
1. The Historic Art Theft Database
According to a nationally prominent asset protection specialist,
the Historic Art Theft Database "comprise[s] the largest and most
complete compilation of information available about losses of art
objects sustained as a result of World War II."469 The database con-
tains, among other materials, all items reported in a catalog of German
losses from World War II and known as "Verlorene Werk der
Malerei." The Verlorene was published in 1945-46, and items
reported in it as stolen continue to appear for sale on the market. 47" As
of January 1999, the database reported losses of approximately 35,000
art objects from more than one dozen countries, and the database is
being updated continually.47' According to Trans-Art representatives,
the database contains reports of stolen materials at issue in at least five
recent and well-publicized claims.472
469. Spero, supra note 1, at 62.
470. The Verlorene first attracted notoriety in the late 1960s. Two portraits by the Renais-
sance artist Albrecht Durer that had been looted from an East German museum during World
War II and were listed in the Verlorene were discovered in the residence of a private collector in
Brooklyn. The museum successfully sued the museum to recover them. See Elicofon, 536 F.
Supp. at 851.
More recently, a work by the artist Joachim Wtewael, entitled "The Holy Family with Saints
John and Elizabeth and Angel" (and valued at more than $1.2 million), listed in the Verlorene as
belonging to the Schlossmuseum of the City of Gotha, Germany, was offered for sale at auction
by Sotheby's in London. The City of Gotha has sued Sotheby's for the return of the painting.
Schlossmuseum of the City of Gotha v. Sotheby's, 1993 C. No. 3428 (Q.B. 1993).
471. Telephone conversation with Lloyd P. Goldenberg, Trans-Art managing member.
472. According to Trans-Art managing member Lloyd P. Goldenberg, the Database iden-
tifies as stolen from the War the materials in dispute in the following claims: (1) a 16th century
parade shield that an Italian museum recovered from Ronald Lauder, president of the Este
Lauder cosmetics firm and vice chairman of New York's Museum of Modem Art (see ART-
NEWSPAPER, December 1996, at 35); (2) a Tishbein painting that a German Museum recovered
from heirs of an estate offering the work for sale through Sotheby's in New York (see Paula Span,
"A Bird in the Hand: Stolen German Work Returned After 50 Years," WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
1997, at Cl); (3) a Botticelli painting looted during World War II from a Holocaust victim. The
heirs obtained from European sellers of the painting a substantial cash payment tied to a January
1997 price offer to buy the work at Sotheby's auction (see Walter V. Robinson, An Ignominious
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2. The Holocaust Claims Processing Office of the
New York State Banking Commission
The Holocaust Claims Processing Office was established with
the support of New York Governor George Pataki. The Processing
Office is designed to serve as a repository of claims for personalty,
including artworks, registered by claimants from around the world.
The Processing Office works with two other recently established
organizations that help Holocaust victims or their descendants: the
Commission for Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress and the
Holocaust Art Restitution Project. The Processing Office is seeking
new claims made directly by Holocaust victims or their descendants.
It has made no attempt, however, to record historically available
rec??ords of losses.
VI. NEED FOR DOCUMENTING DUE DILIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
Authorities have counseled that to be effective, due diligence
inquiries must be documented and the record of communications pre-
served. As one commentary explained, "[a]ll such contacts should
be... documented and all documents retained. Failure to present
sufficient evidence of attempts to substantiate title may a cause a court
to decide the buyer was not a good-faith purchaser." '473 Some com-
mentators have recommended that a file be maintained of all contacts
made and that records of any telephone inquiries be comprehensively
recorded:
When undertaking an inquiry into title, keep a file on the
sources contacted. Records of telephone calls with the dates, the
name of the person contacted and the substance of the discus-
sion should be included. Keep copies of any letters written or
received. This file should be retained indefinitely in case...
ownership is ever called into question. 474
Indeed, the failure to document properly contacts made to iden-
tify potential conflicting ownership claims to valuable art objects may
cause a court to doubt that such efforts were ever undertaken. In
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, for example, the
Legacy: Evidence Grows of Plundered Art in U.S., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1997 at Al); (4) a
15th century painting upon which the Government of Belgium made a demand from New
York's Metropolitan Museum of Art (see Walter J. Robinson and Maureen Goggin, Stolen Art
Claims Shake N.Y. Museum, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1997, at Al); (5) $10 million dollars of
looted art that the Bremen museum recovered from a Japanese citizen in New York. Benjamin
Weiser, $10 Million in Looted Art Is Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at A23.)
473. Acquiring Title, supra note 123, at 239.
474. Hoover, supra note 6, at 52.
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court questioned the inability of the defendant, in a lawsuit brought to
reclaim looted Byzantine mosaics, to produce documented records of
several telephone calls that she testified she had made to determine
whether the mosaics had been stolen.47 The failure of the defendant
to produce documented records of these calls helped inform the
court's conclusion that she had not investigated the mosaics ade-
quately.476
VII. POLICY BENEFITS OF INVESTIGATIONS OF ARTWORKS
The legal rule requiring extensive due diligence investigations for
valuable art objects advances many valuable policy goals for the art
market. The "due diligence" responsibility reconciles, in the most
equitable and practical manner, the many hardships confronting vic-
tims of international art theft with the need of the U.S. art market for
an appropriate title clearing mechanism. Because the due diligence
rule validates only the reasonable commercial expectations of buyers
and collectors who demonstrate genuine good faith, it protects the
ownership rights of international theft victims and encourages the U.S.
art market to reform its lackadaisical practices.
The most significant policy rewards of the "due diligence" rule
include the following:
First, comprehensive and informed due diligence investigations
are best calculated to determine whether a particular art object has
been stolen in fact. The due diligence rule adheres to the bedrock
U.S. commercial law principle that a thief can never convey good title
to stolen property and that stolen property remains stolen, regardless
of how often it is bought and sold. It respects the ownership rights of
international art theft victims in their missing property and discour-
ages trafficking in stolen goods.
Second, the due diligence rule deals responsively with a major
and potentially troubling category of stolen art objects: items illegally
excavated from a particular country in violation of the ownership
rights that country has asserted as a sovereign. Inquiries beyond sto-
475. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1403. The court observed that the defendant art dealer
(Goldberg) lacked documents recording telephone calls that she maintained that she had made to
the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) and the United Nations UNESCO:
Goldberg testified that she telephoned authorities at UNESCO's office in Geneva.
She cannot recall the name of any individual that she spoke with at UNESCO, Swit-
zerland ....
Goldberg also testified that she telephoned the International Foundation for Art
Research (IFAR) in New York .... No document sent to or received by IFAR con-
firms Goldberg's telephone call.
717 F. Supp. at 1304.
476. Id.
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len art databases, and especially to relevant experts in the relevant
subject area, are essential to identify stolen and looted materials in this
context, because such items necessarily cannot be reported prospec-
tively.
Third, by preserving the focus in stolen art cases upon whether a
particular item has actually been stolen, the due diligence rule antici-
pates, and indeed requires, that buyers and collectors use all reasona-
bly available resources and channels of investigation to make this
determination. The flexibility of the due diligence criterion requires
buyers and collectors to invoke cost-effective information gathering
initiatives such as the Historic Art Theft Database. The due diligence
rule thus is calculated to make optimal use of all investigative
resources that are available at any given time to determine whether a
particular item has in fact been stolen.
Fourth, because the substantive content of the due diligence
requirement is necessarily informed by currently available investiga-
tive tools, the due diligence rule encourages the development of
additional resources for ascertaining whether a particular art object has
been stolen. The due diligence rule invites improvement in capabili-
ties for identifying stolen materials.
Fifth, the due diligence investigative responsibility provides an
essential backstop to help victims of international art theft to locate
and recover their stolen property. As previously noted, international
art theft victims encounter many obstacles in attempting to locate
missing art objects. They may not even be positioned to know that a
particular item has been stolen.477 By invoking as many resources as
reasonably available to determine whether a particular item has been
stolen, due diligence investigations can identify stolen materials that
theft victims themselves were not able to relate. This capability is
especially important for casualties of the Holocaust and other geno-
cides who cannot report and pursue their losses.
Sixth, while safeguarding the rights of theft victims, the due dili-
gence rule at the same time provides an essential title-clearing mecha-
nism for the U.S. art market that validates the reasonable commercial
expectations of buyers and collectors. The due diligence rule is the
appropriate vehicle for title clearing decisions in the U.S. art market
for two reasons. First, by entailing proof of genuine good faith (given
the distinctive attributes of the international art market), the due dili-
gence rule decides the question of title in a manner consonant with
477. See discussion supra pages 670-73.
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jurisprudence in stolen chattel cases.47 Second, the due diligence
investigative responsibility for valuable art objects parallels due dili-
gence requirements that have become standard procedure for protect-
ing assets of comparable value and for limiting risks with similar
potential exposure.
Seventh, the due diligence rule helps protect the moral and ethi-
cal position of U.S. buyers and collectors. It encourages museums in
the United States to comply with the formal ethical responsibilities
they invoke to justify their tax exempt status and public trust. It also
ensures that private collectors have a moral, as well as legal, entitle-
ment to any stolen materials that they mistakenly may have
obtained.479
Finally, the due diligence rule coheres with a developing interna-
tional legal consensus favoring comprehensive investigative responsi-
bilities upon art buyers and collectors. This trend is represented by
the recently enacted UNIDROIT Convention4 0 as well as a 1996
Swiss commercial law decision.481
478. See supra pages 652-58 (discussing the historical focus of courts in stolen chattel cases
decided under the doctrine of adverse possession upon the good faith of the possessor of stolen
goods).
479. In a letter to Honorable Joseph Bruno, Majority Leader, New York State Senate, Sid-
ney Clearfield, Executive Vice President of B'nai B'rith, referred to proposed legislation in New
York that would permit purchasers of artwork to consult only one cultural property registry to
determine if the artwork was stolen. As Clearfield stated, such legislation would "help legitimize
the original theft."
480. "UNIDROIT" is the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. It
was created in 1926 at the instigation of the League of Nations as an independent body to work
on the harmonization of the international laws. It deals mostly with commercial law issues. THE
ART NEWSPAPER, Vol. 51, Sept. 1995, at 57.
UNIDROIT has been described as "an innovative and workable mechanism for controlling
the illicit international trade in art" and approaches the problem of international art theft from
the perspective of private international law. See Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade
in Cultural Property: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Short-
comings of the UNESCO Convention? 15 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 469, 491 (1994). UNIDROIT is
designed to remedy the "motley assortment of laws currently governing ownership rights in cul-
tural property." Id.
UNIDROIT aspires to prevent stolen art traffickers from manipulating choice of law and
substantive commercial law differences in various countries in order to launder title to stolen cul-
tural property. See A.G. Somers Cocks, U.S. and U.K. Art Lobbies Muster to Scupper the
UNIDROIT Convention, THE ART NEWSPAPER, Vol. 51, Sept. 1995, at 26.
To accomplish these goals, UNIDROIT requires collectors to return stolen art objects and
other collectibles found in their possession, but permits them to be compensated in an amount
reflecting the current fair value of the item if they can show that they could not reasonably have
known that the object was stolen and they took all reasonably available precautions against
acquiring stolen property. UNIDROIT CONVENTION, Chapter II, Article 4(1).
481. A 1996 decision by the highest civil law court in Switzerland, Insurer XV.A.M., 2nd
Civil Dept., March 5, 1996, imposes an affirmative due diligence investigative requirement upon
merchants in the art trade to determine that the materials that they sell have not been stolen.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Until recently, purchasers of valuable artworks conducted mini-
mal, if any, investigations into title to such works. Now however, the
recent and growing number of lawsuits brought by theft victims who
are seeking return of their stolen art has demonstrated that massive
quantities of stolen materials have filtered unnoticed through the
international art market and has accentuated the "time bomb" that is
lurking with respect to almost all art collections in the United States.
Because law in the United States prevents a purchaser from
acquiring good title to property that once was stolen, regardless of the
purchaser's good faith and ignorance of the theft,482 innocent purchas-
ers of stolen artworks are exposed indefinitely to claims of true owners.
Thus, with stolen artwork flooding the U.S. and international art mar-
kets, prospective buyers of valuable artworks must conduct due dili-
gence investigations into title in order to limit their investment risk.
Not only do such investigations protect the commercial expectations
of buyers and collectors, they also can curtail the illicit commerce in
stolen art. As the court noted in Porter v. Wertz,483 "commercial
indifference to ownership ... facilitates traffic in stolen works of
art. ,484
Several circumstances, as well as developments in the art market,
underscore the need for potential purchasers and possessors of art-
works to conduct due diligence investigations of title. These can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Due diligence investigations are the only effective way collectors
and buyers can avoid acquiring stolen artworks.85
(2) The increased likelihood of being sued for the recovery of a stolen
art object both intensifies the need for, and amplifies the scope of,
appropriate due diligence investigation.4 6
(3) The comparative equities in lawsuits brought by art theft victims
initially weigh heavily in favor of the theft victims. 47
(4) The laches doctrine with its equitable foundation protecting good
faith possessors from stale claims will reward buyers and collec-
tors who take appropriate precautions against acquiring stolen
art.48 8
482. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1977); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
483. 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
484. Id.
485. See discussion supra page 694.
486. See discussion supra page 685.
487. See discussion supra page 670-73.
488. See discussion supra page 701 -05.
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(5) To avoid the extensive injury that the recovery of a stolen art
object can cause individual collectors, as well as their estates,
trusts, and financial plans, collectors have a broad investigative
responsibility.4 9
(6) The fiduciary obligations of both tax-exempt institutional col-
lectors and trust institutions mandate discrete duties to protect
the value and title of assets under their control.49 The Code of
Ethics for Museums prepared by the American Association of
Museums prescribes that U.S. museums owe fiduciary responsi-
bilities to the public and requires that secure legal title attach to
all objects in their collections.49' The fiduciary responsibilities of
estate-planning attorneys and trust institutions that manage
assets on behalf of wealthy collectors require a broad investigative
standard.
As noted in this Article, courts and commentators have articu-
lated discrete due diligence investigative steps that prospective buyers
and current owners of valuable art objects can take to safeguard their
legal ownership rights in stolen artwork.492 These steps entail inquir-
ies to institutions, persons, or art world participants to whom theft
victims most likely would report their losses. They include inquiries
to publicly available stolen art databases, archives or registries, such as
the Art Loss Register and Thesaurus Group's "TRACER" Data-
base.493 Potential purchasers should inquire at locations where the
type of art object in question, if stolen, reasonably might be expected
to be reintroduced into the legitimate market. Purchasers should
inquire of those resources that reasonably might assist them in deter-
mining whether a particular work has been stolen, such as the applic-
able catalogue raissone of a particular artist, collectors' specialty
groups, international museums, authorities in the art world, auction
houses, and any nation that is especially identified with a particular
work or artist.494 Inquiries to each of these sources consistently has
helped to identify stolen art objects. Accordingly, the steps that com-
prise an appropriate due diligence investigation are essentially self-
defining and are prescribed because they are demonstrably effective as
well as reasonable. Moreover, an appropriate "due diligence" investi-
gation necessarily will expand from time to time to include any addi-
489. See supra notes 727-28 and accompanying text.
490. See discussion supra pages 673-85.
491. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
492. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
493. See discussion supra pages 717-19.
494. See discussion supra pages 719-26.
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tional resources that may become available to help locate and recover
stolen art and that can be consulted practically.
Although these wide-ranging inquiries initially may depict a due
diligence investigation as unduly broad and cumbersome, investigative
resources are available that can narrow the scope of inquiry for art
buyers and collectors and facilitate this task.49 For example, Wash-
ington, D.C.-based Trans-Art International, with its Historic Art
Theft Database, has the largest and most complete compilation of
information about losses of art objects sustained as a result of World
War II, and it specializes in title searches of fine arts and antiquities.
Enlisting the service of an organization such as Trans-Art Interna-
tional to conduct a comprehensive due diligence investigation on
behalf of a potential purchaser or an estate or trust substantially limits
the process.
Purchasers of artworks can no longer claim "good faith" status if
they have not conducted an investigation of title. On the other hand,
an appropriate and adequate due diligence investigation can secure a
purchaser's title. To protect the reasonable commercial expectations
of buyers and to provide a way for title to be made secure in the mar-
ketplace, courts have expunged the ownership rights of theft victims,
even when they lacked constructive notice of rival claims. 496 Still,
because the theft victim is favored in any balancing of the equities
between a theft victim and an innocent purchaser, persons who have
acquired stolen artworks without first investigating their background
are, at a minimum, reckless.4 97 The lax commercial conventions of the
international art trade that enable massive quantities of stolen art to
seep into the legitimate market necessarily undercut any reasonable
reliance that secure title has attached to many objects. On the other
hand, with an appropriate due diligence investigation, collectors posi-
tion themselves prospectively to establish the equitable defense of
laches to possible future legal challenges to their ownership rights.49
Thus, the due diligence responsibility placed upon prospective pur-
chasers reconciles, in the most equitable and practical manner, the
many hardships confronting victims of international art theft with the
need of the U.S. art market for an appropriate title-clearing mecha-
nism.
495. See discussion supra pages 717-27.
496. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
498. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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